The US-Iraqi war after the one in Afghanistan is a new chapter of an announced series of wars against terrorism of uncertain success and duration. It is not sufficient to recognize that the American government was entitled to aggress Afghanistan because it offered hospitality and support to Al Qaeda. It is also important to understand the target of that attack.
The American government failed to explain it. And it is far less convincing when it tries to explain the relation between the attack on Iraq, described as a pressing threat to US security, and the struggle against terrorism.

It is difficult to imagine that Iraq can employ mass destruction weapons while it is under the UN pressure to disarm. On the contrary, it could resort to them if its survival is threatened by an invasion.

Is war the most efficacious way to combat terrorism? The results of the attack on Afghanistan seem to contradict this thesis. A stable government has not been established.
Those who are supposed to have inspired the terrorist attack on the US have not been captured or eliminated. Moreover, a new war against an Islamic country is likely to foster new acts of terrorism and to sharpen tensions in the Middle Eastern region.

Terrorism is an enemy hidden within our societies. It threatens us in the streets of our cities and in our houses. It can inflict enormous damages, even without mobilizing armies or mass destruction weapons, and can endanger peace and democracy. Its strength lies in the consent it enjoys in a considerable part of world public opinion. A plan to defeat terrorism, beside the necessary repressive aspects, should address with absolute priority the dramatic gap between North and South. The main goal to pursue is therefore global justice.

The Security Council resolution 1441 aims at Iraqi disarmament. But the US government pursues an additional goal, overthrowing Saddam Hussein and establishing a democratic regime conceived as a step towards the democratisation of the Middle East. This is not an objective that can be achieved through violence and puppet governments imposed by the Americans.

The choice of war is not the expression of the capability of the US to assure world order.
Quite the contrary. It is the expression of the decline of the hegemonic power of the US. However important the control on the Middle-East oil resources or the need to find a diversion to its economic weakening and to the alarming amount of its foreign debt, the US action is brought about above all by the need to enhance its own security after 9/11.
War reflects the attempt to perpetuate the US supremacy through another form of terror: that of the overwhelming destructive potential of its armed forces.

What the US has not been able to achieve is the large international coalition of forces that supported it at the time of the Gulf War in 1990-91, that was waged under the aegis of the UN. With the only abstention of China, it included all the permanent members of the Security Council. The doctrine of preventive war reflects the position of a superpower that believes it has the monopoly of force and justice and places itself above the international community and international law.

* * *

The concomitance of the military mobilization in the Middle-East with the European Convention that is drawing up the European Constitution stresses the need for a EU foreign and security policy. Europe could have an impact on the events on which world peace depends.
But it is weakened by the division in two groups of its nation-states, one supporting the US position, the other opposing it. This is not because America divides Europe, but because national governments are reluctant to question their faded sovereignty. With a single foreign and security policy, Europe could speak with one voice.
With a European Constitution and a European government, the unanimous vote could be abolished and decisions could be taken according to the majority principle.
The consequence of this decision-making process could be immediately perceived, since, within the EU, a majority of states and an overwhelming majority of citizens are against the American unilateralism.

In the world there is only one place where a new actor can arise which has the international influence necessary to steer the destiny of humankind in a new direction.
This place is Europe. Only Europe can condition the unilateral initiatives of the US government, channel the negotiations to solve international disputes within the framework of the UN and start a process leading to a new world order.
Only Europe can open an increasing space to the establishment of other regional groupings of states, that can lead to the transformation of the Security Council into the Council of the great regions of the world.
Moreover, it is only through regional unifications that the most backward countries of the South can achieve the economic dimension necessary to promote development and greater political influence on world affairs. Lastly, as regards terrorism, it can be defeated only if the industrialized countries can offer the peoples of the South a trust in the future through a plan of peace, development and democratization.

* * *

The Campaign for a European federal Constitution is involving an increasing number of civil society organizations which find in the European Convention a historic opportunity for the promotion at international level of values such as peace, solidarity, democracy and justice.
The abolition of war in Europe through a federal Constitution can point the way leading to peace in the world. The introduction of a single European actor in the world state system can have a real impact on the US position and strengthen the authority of the UN and international law.

Twenty years ago the peace movement won the battle for the removal of the "euro-missiles" when the prospect of a European Federation was still distant.
Now the welding of the peace movement and the federalist movement can produce a grand project that, through the European unification, aims at transforming the UN into the tool and the engine for the construction of world peace.

Fernand Braudel Center, Binghamton University
http://fbc.binghamton.edu/commentr.htm
Commentary No. 105 - Jan. 15, 2003

The simple answer is no, because the U.S. hawks won't take anything the Iraqis say or do as an acceptable reason to call off the war dogs. I feel we are in the midst of the novel by Gabriel Garcia Márquez, Chronicle of a Death Foretold (Crónica de una muerte anunciada), a story of death as a social ritual. The United States is going to war with Iraq primarily in order to go to war with Iraq. It is for this reason that nothing that the inspectors say, nothing that the other members of the Security Council (including Great Britain) say, certainly nothing that Saddam Hussein may say will make any difference.

The war with Iraq was publicly requested during the last years of the Clinton administration in a statement of some 20 hawks, including Cheney and Rumsfeld. We now know that within days of the Sept. 11 attack, President Bush gave his imprimatur to such a war. All the rest has been pretense and maneuvering. The open defiance of the United States by North Korea in the last three months, and the evasive response to this defiance by the U.S. government, provide further evidence that the real issue is not Iraq's non-compliance with various UN resolutions.

So, why do Bush and the hawks feel that a war is essential? They reason in the following way. The United States is not doing so well these days. In the words of some analysts, the U.S. is in hegemonic decline. Its economy is in an uncertain state. Most of all, it cannot be sure that it will outcompete western Europe and Japan/East Asia in the decades to come. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, it has lost the major political argument it had to persuade western Europe and Japan to follow all its political initiatives. All it has left is an extremely strong military.

Madeleine Albright, when she was Secretary of State, became at one point furious at the reticence of some of the high-ranking military to endorse her view of what should be done in the Balkans, and is reported to have said, "What is the point of having the strongest military in the world, if we can never use it?" The hawks make that viewpoint the centerpiece of their analysis. They believe that the U.S. has the strongest military in the world, that the U.S. can win any military encounter it undertakes, and that U.S. prestige and power in the world-system can only be restored by a show of force. The point of the force is not to achieve regime change in Iraq (probably a minor benefit, considering what might replace the current regime). The point of using the force is to intimidate the allies of the United States, so that they stop their carping, their criticisms, and fall back into line, meekly as the schoolchildren they are considered to be by the hawks.

The Bush administration has not been divided between unilateralists and multilateralists. They are all unilateralists. Those we call "multilateralists" are simply those who have argued that the U.S. can get its position formally adopted by others (the U.N., NATO), and that, if such resolutions are adopted, the policy is that much easier to implement. The "multilateralists" have always said that, if they fail to get the votes in the U.N. or elsewhere that they need, the U.S. can always go it alone. And the so-called "unilateralists" have bought this line because of the reserve clause. The only difference between the two groups is their estimate of how likely it is to get others to support the U.S. line. What we have therefore is a multilateralism that takes the form: the U.S. is multilateral to the degree that others adopt the U.S. unilateral position; if not, not.

The basic problem is that the hawks really believe their own analysis. They believe that once the war in Iraq is won (and they tend to think this will be done relatively easily), everyone else will fall into line, that the whole Middle East will be reconfigured to the desires of the U.S. hawks, that Europe will shut up, and that North Korea and Iran will tremble and therefore renounce all aspirations to weaponry. The whole world is yelling at the U.S. that the situation is far more complicated than that, that a U.S. military invasion of Iraq will probably make the world situation worse, and that they are reaping the whirlwind. They do not listen, because they do not believe that this is so. They are impressed with the power of the bully. It is called hybris.

The folly of this war that has been so abundantly foretold is that, in addition to causing untold and essentially unnecessary suffering for all sorts of people (and not only in Iraq), it will actually weaken the geopolitical position of the United States and diminish the legitimacy of any of its future positions on the world political scene. We are living in a truly chaotic world, and U.S. pretensions to an impossible "imperium" amount to increasing the speed of an automobile going downhill with brakes that are no longer functioning properly. It is suicidal, and not least for the United States itself.

In the ten years since the 1992 United Nations "Earth Summit" in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, the environmental health of our planet has not only not improved, but, in fact, has worsened. Climate instability, drastically depleted fisheries, catastrophic droughts, devastated forests, disappearing freshwater resources, polluted waterways, and poisonous mega-cities threaten delicate ecosystems and, indeed, the inhabitants of the earth.

A proliferation of weak international environmental treaties and national laws has failed to address the problem of global environmental decline.

The lack of adequate international environmental governance (IEG) is a result of a fundamental injustice in the current state of global governance: tremendous power and resources have been concentrated in international finance and trade without a corresponding legal and institutional authority for the environment, social concerns and human rights. The increasing power and influence of major international finance and trade institutions such as the World Bank and World Trade Organization (WTO) that took place over the course of the 1990s contrasts sharply with a weakening of the, already-lesser, UN environment and development programs (UNEP, UNDP).

The existence of powerful international trade and financial regimes without comparable legal and institutional structures for social and environmental standards allows the World Trade Organization (WTO) to act as the de facto arbiter on environmental issues. However, the WTO is an institution that not only lacks a core competency on environmental issues and policy, but views the environment as a commodity to be exploited rather than a resource requiring management and conservation. The result is that environmental, social and human rights issues, treaties and commitments are trumped by finance and trade interests. Rather, it should be the case that these considerations get prioritized ahead of finance and trade.

Many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) argue for the elimination of the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Even some governments criticize these institutions. However, as world federalists, our perspective is that the solution is not the elimination of such organizations, but instead to strengthen international environment, sustainable development and human rights bodies while simultaneously making all international organizations more democratic and accountable. In order for the environment and social issues to be adequately addressed in the international legal order, they will have to be given equitable legal and institutional authority. We believe one response for international environmental governance is to create a World Environment Organization (WEO)(1) and to strengthen and upgrade the UN's social and development organizations so that these institutions can act as a counterbalance to the powerful finance and trade institutions. A WEO would be a designated and empowered advocate for the environment that could serve to ensure effective policy and decision-making and provide an adequate response to environmental management. WFM does not favor simply adding bureaucratic and wasteful layers to a constitutionally weak "program" structure.

World federalists believe international democracy requires not one centralized world government, but the legal and institutional structures to underpin a responsive, accountable system of democratic global governance. The WEO we advocate is, therefore, not a world government or an institution advocating a single policy approach, but a governance organization that would increase the effectiveness of environmental management at multiple levels - national, regional, global.

It is not that a system of IEG does not exist, indeed, there is a strong basis of international environmental law. However, this foundation is diffused through various existing institutions and a myriad of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). The fundamental weakness of these legal and institutional arrangements is a lack of a central coordinating authority to exert influence on other arenas of international political power. The various bodies that address environmental issues in some cases have conflicting mandates and lack sufficient authority and funding to prioritize the environment. Additionally, in contrast to the WTO structure, the system of IEG has weak enforcement and compliance mechanisms.

Developing countries are resistant to the creation of a new organization that would deal only with environmental issues. Among their valid concerns are that IEG or a WEO might set conditionalities that could impinge on their right to develop economically or undermine their sovereign rights over natural resources. Developing countries concerns are reinforced by industrialized countries' lack of action on the Rio Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities that was identified at the UN's Earth Summit in 1992. Instead of IEG, developing countries highlight the need for international sustainable development governance. Our world federalist perspective fully acknowledges the South's concerns; however, the need for sustainable development governance does not negate the need to strengthen environmental governance through the creation of a WEO. Indeed, a WEO could potentially benefit developing countries as it would provide them with a forum for uniting and addressing their concerns as well as create a headquarters, thus reducing the number of meetings necessary for the current system of IEG.
<pIn the lead up to the 2002 Johannesburg Summit, a few governments offered progressive proposals for IEG through a WEO. A German government commission produced a report outlining an institutional system that included proposals for an Earth Organization, an Earth Commission and an Earth Funding Organization(2) France also emphasized the need for a WEO, announcing at the start of its European Union presidency in 2001 their support for a World Environment Organization. France's president Chirac reiterated this position in his statements to both the Financing for Development Conference in Monterrey, Mexico in March 2002 and again at the Johannesburg Summit.

In spite of the profile given to the issue of a WEO, the Johannesburg Summit failed to even consider launching a multi-year, high-level intergovernmental process to address main priorities and necessary commitments for adequate institutional arrangements for sustainable development and the environment. The negotiations for "institutional frameworks for sustainable development" on the agenda of the 2002 Johannesburg Summit witnessed another round in the global governance battle of finance and trade versus the environment, social and human rights issues. The disappointing outcomes of the WSSD not only exhibited the imbalance in global governance; it also demonstrated an alarming lack of political will to address these broad and critical institutional issues.

Although governments lack the political will to begin serious discussions of a WEO, much can be done to address the practical needs for global governance for the environment. One of NGOs' roles is to continue to keep discussions of such politically unpopular topics alive. The World Federalist Movement International Secretariat (WFM) believes that fundamental issues relating to the development of international democracy and global governance are inextricably linked to the issues of international governance for sustainable development and the environment and the establishment of a WEO. NGOs need to continue to draw attention to the fact that a system of global governance is evolving without due consideration of social, environmental and human rights issues. Some cynically say that the current system of international environmental governance - with its myriad of MEAs and lack of a central authority - has been designed with the intent that it be weak and ineffective. However, there is increasing awareness amongst NGOs and many governments that global governance must be addressed. In the spirit of the "new diplomacy", NGOs should work together with like-minded governments, such as Germany and France, to correct the democratic deficit in global governance and move towards the creation of a WEO. A politically viable first step could be upgrading UNEP to a UN specialized agency.

Although some may say that proposing a WEO denies political realities, WFM would point out that historic progress is occurring in other sectors. The recently established International Criminal Court (ICC) could have wide ranging implications for international sustainable development and environmental law. While the ICC will not be a court for environmental disputes, the establishment of the ICC, and its coming into force only four years after the adoption of the Rome Statute, demonstrates that international justice may soon be employed to address social, environmental and economic rights as it is now being done for human rights. It demonstrates the world is ready to move rapidly towards an effective system of international law once a goal has been articulated.

Of course, a World Environment Organization alone will not solve the problems of international environmental governance and global governance. There also needs to be fundamental reform of the WTO, consistent implementation of the Rio Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities, advancement of the legal and institutional system for international sustainable development governance and more. Correcting the imbalance in global governance and the broader issue of the democratic deficit will require a multi-pronged approach. Although establishment of a WEO may be a long-term project, WFM believes that fundamental issues relating to the development of international democracy and global governance are inextricably bound up in these issues of international governance for sustainable development and the environment and the establishment of a World Environment Organization. Establishing a WEO would be one step towards a more balanced, effective and accountable system of global governance.

1. Or a "Global Environment Organization" (GEO) or "Sustainable Development Organization"

2. German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU), "World in Transition: New Structures for Global Environmental Policy," September 2000. Full text available at: http://www.wbgu.de/wbgu_jg2000_engl.html

When the countries of Central and Eastern Europe enter the Union next year, the vision of the founding fathers of a united European continent will finally become a reality. The process embarked upon at Copenhagen represents for Europe's geography what the Brussels Summit (May 1998) represented for its currency. After monetary and territorial union, the current phase of European integration is now inescapably political; its results will dictate whether Europe shapes history, or is shaped by it. The debate on the future of Europe is already underway.

Many discussions have centred on the question of a suitable Presidency for Europe. The argument goes that if Europe is to shape history, it must become a political Union. It must be capable of providing security at its boundaries and of contributing to a world order of peace and justice, through a single representation at the United Nations (UN) and a credible threat of force where necessary. To achieve these objectives, there needs to be a Great President of Europe. The Great President would chair the European Council, in which the Heads of State and Government regularly meet, and would also ensure that their decisions are duly implemented. The Great President would represent Europe on the international stage, finally answering the question once posed by Henry Kissinger: "If I want to call Europe, what is the phone number?"

It is clear that Europe would benefit from having an internationally recognised representative who could pick up the phone and talk to the likes of George Bush or Vladimir Putin. However, the argument that to be united politically Europe requires such a President needs some clarification. Firstly, in terms of currency, trade and competition policy, Europe is already strong without a Great President, a point clearly illustrated when Brussels blocks high level mergers (e.g. General Electric and Honeywell), or retaliates over American protectionism (e.g. steel tariffs). Secondly, with the President of the Commission, Europe already has a President, with a level of democratic legitimacy equal to Italy's President of the Council of Ministers or France's Prime Minister. Like them, he is appointed by a higher body (European Council), and is accountable to an elected parliament. He has fewer powers only because the Union has fewer competences, not because of a deficiency of investiture. Finally, it would be futile to give this Great President responsibility for foreign and security policy if the Union itself does not have sufficient power in these areas. Such a Great President would soon become a "Paper President".

In sum, the discussion about Europe's Great President ignores - perhaps intentionally - that in order to be stronger in more areas, the Union needs to be given both the ability to decide and the means to act. The ability to decide essentially means more majority voting; it is clear that the Union only goes forward when the paralysing condition of unanimity for decision-making is removed. Even with all the goodwill in the world, as long as it exists, the veto will be used. Moreover, the veto not only blocks particular decisions, it also affects the Union itself because its mere possibility changes the nature of the discussions and the negotiating positions of Member States. Second, to implement decisions, the Union must be given the means to act. Whereas now the Member States provide the Union with resources "on loan", the Union must be granted its own independent resources in terms of budget, military apparatus, foreign embassies and a seat at international organisations such as the UN. A decision lacking execution amounts to warm words, but no action.

Without the ability to decide or to act, creating a Great President will not make the Union stronger. Worse, if such a President were created outside the present framework, it could threaten the institutional balance, since it would be very difficult for the new President to avoid conflict with the existing power structures. Far from adding strength to the Union, such a President could hence weaken it.

Should we therefore forget the idea of a President of the Union? No, but several aspects need to be clarified. In the last few months, two different proposals over the new President's institutional status have been put forward. In both proposals he would chair meetings of the Heads of State or Government, in which decisions over peace and war should be taken. However, one proposal suggests that he should be the President of the Commission and another the President of the European Council. Whereas the first proposal amounts to one single President ("One-headed Union"), the second would involve two, as in this scenario the Commission President would retain his role ("Twin-headed Union") for policy areas presently under Community competence. The consequences, which go to the heart of the very nature of the Union, are difficult to evaluate.

However, assuming that both proposals aim to create a Europe capable of influencing world affairs, let us try to make clear what kind of President the Union requires. Firstly, the President's role should not be limited to the intermittent task of chairing the meetings of the European Council; it should be a full-time job.
The President should supervise the preparation of the European Council and provide political leadership after decisions are taken. Secondly, the President would need an administrative structure of his own: specialist policy advisors, information services and access to EU Ambassadors around the world.
When a military operation is under way he must have the power, albeit under the direction of the Council, to act as Chief of the Armed Forces, and that may include having a finger on the nuclear trigger.
Thirdly, such presidential power needs continuity, in contrast to the current system of rotating presidencies; it cannot change face, name, address and style of management every six months. Europe's constant musical chairs in front of world leaders such as George Bush and Jiang Zemin, or at multilateral fora such as the G8 and the UN Assembly only serves to reduce our political weight and weaken our position. Fourthly, the President must have full democratic legitimacy.
This cannot be ensured if the President were to be chosen by the Heads of State or Government, figures who are elected for serving a national interest rather than the interests of the Union as a whole.
In theory legitimacy could be gained from a direct general election; but would it be possible to run a televised electoral campaign with simultaneous translation into twenty different languages? It seems more reasonable that this legitimacy comes from a vote of confidence by the European Parliament, the only body that is both elected by the people and vested with the European interest. Finally, the President must only be given appropriate powers; decisions about peace and war should of course not be taken by him, but by the European Council, with the agreement of the Parliament.
The President should prepare, inspire and execute decisions, and should embody the policy of the Union, but he should not wield the power of peace and war.
This is in line with established political regimes, where power is articulated differently for peacetime government and conflict situations.

If agreement could be reached on the above role of the President, differences of opinion over the institutional context would loose importance. It would then seem natural to choose the most linear proposal, which in my opinion would be to enhance the President of the Commission. Efforts to create a stronger Union with a twin-headed leadership seem much more difficult than increasing the present profile of the Commission President, which must include foreign and security policy.

The immediate unavoidable question of European politics, is: What does the European Union constitutionally require to assert Europe's international identity? The answers to this question crystallise what federalism offers Europe. These answers set the agenda for responding to the question: Who should represent a genuine European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy?

It is a basic question that Euro-federalism has yet to fully resolve. Born in the same circumstances as Atlanticism and adopting Atlanticist concepts of international relations cold-war conduct, Euro-federalism has yet to develop its own potential in the post-cold-war era divorced from this Atlanticist frame of reference. Its failure to make this adjustment stems from failing to realise the underlying dichotomy between European and American global interests.
A Chicago Global Centre survey of American public opinion pinpoints this. Although Americans rated Europe as possessing greater importance to the United States than Asia (42% versus 28%) in 1994, a year later there was a fourteen point shift in favour of Asia.
These statistics cannot be dismissed as exceptional. Hence, despite imminent economic depression, the Republican mid-term success stemmed from the American electorate's empathy with the Bush Administration's conduct of foreign policy.
Contrasting substantially from the anti-war European consensus on Iraq, this foreign policy bi-partisanship that Bush has achieved highlights the gulf between American and European global perspectives which get mirrored in more fundamental spheres of international affairs.
This reflects the diminution of Euro-centric content in Washington's foreign-policy-making elite. This is inevitable.
The pressures of American domestic politics upon Washington's foreign-policy elite are the ultimate determining factor in Nato's, and consequently European security's, decision-making. Posed in such a context, the question that federalists need to ask should be: Is the implementation of Europe's security by Nato compatible not just with Europe's security needs in terms of democratic federal accountability, but also compatible in terms of achieving a democratic global balance-of-power along federalist lines?

It isn't. Nato's democratic inadequacy as Europe's primary security system stems from it being unrepresentative of Europe's geo-strategic security needs. Ostensibly representing of Europe and its citizenry together with those of the United States and Canada, in reality Nato is governed by the United States and the ultimate democratic will of its citizenry, not Europe's. If Nato had to choose between saving Manchester, Bonn or Chicago, Nato would opt for Chicago, a legitimate decision given Washington's sense of democratic priorities. Far from being cynical, this ultimate reality affirms Washington's legitimate right to make that choice. Even if all member states had genuinely equal decision-making influence, Nato's decision-making, the mere fact that Nato's decision-making structures are strictly inter-governmental, based on consensus rather than on procedural voting moreover, makes it unsatisfactory from a federalist perspective.

This doesn't just militate against federalist logic; it also militates against medium to long term European security. Russia's apparent acquiescence in Nato's expansion is a hostage to Europe's security fortune, not pragmatism's triumph.
Thus Vladimir Putin's secrecy over the components of the nerve gas to resolve the October 2002 Moscow siege, brutal in its detachment from humanitarian considerations though it was, had an undeniable logic in response to Washington's global hegemony consolidating itself by Nato's expansion. This response legitimatised itself almost immediately after the event by the Guardian's revelation of Washington's massive development programmes in bio-warfare and chemical weaponry.

Such developments, stemming from European insecurity generated by an outside power, bring the relevance of federalist democratic principles to post-cold-war European security into harsh geo-political focus. According to these principles, each level of government has its own direct relationship with the citizens. Its laws apply directly to the citizens and not solely to the constituent states. Thus, quite apart from its decision-making structures and processes being inter-governmental rather than supra-national, Nato's lack of geo-political coherence invalidates it as a unit of democratic accountability.

It is in this context that federalists need to propose democratic decision-making structures and processes to replace Nato's consensus driven decision-making infrastructures devoid of democratic accountability. These proposals need to be formulated strictly according to federalist principles rather than in terms of accommodating Atlanticist preconceptions.

Placed in such a context, the Draft UEF contribution to the European Convention is perhaps wanting in not posing the required conceptual challenges. These challenges demand a clear-cut choice between cold-war and post-cold-war international relations logic.
For instance, in Part 2 it states: "Whenever possible, the EU should act in close partnership with the US and its other friends and allies world-wide. The EU needs access to NATO assets to avoid duplication of equipment and structures, but should also, when necessary, be capable of acting independently of NATO in the interest of peace and human rights."
This statement, reflecting current euro-federalist convention, accommodates Atlanticism at the expense of both federalist principles and geo-political logic.

In terms of asserting the medium to long term federalist logic of establishing Europe as the initial counter-balance to the United States as the basis for achieving world government, the statement should read: "Whenever within Europe's best international interests, the EU should act in close partnership with the US and its other friends and allies world-wide. In the short to medium term, EU needs access to NATO assets to avoid duplication of equipment and structures.
In the medium to long term, the EU, together with Russia, must activate and transform the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe as the post-cold-war European Security framework replacement for Nato. Transformed and institutionalised thus, the OSCE should be offered to the United Nations as the basis for developing a global security system."
Excessively idealistic though this revised statement might appear, it is one that takes into account ultimate federalist goals. Such a revised statement, detaching the European Union's CFSP from its ingrained Atlanticist frame of reference, would give the UEF's contribution to the European Constitutional Convention added coherence.

Far from being politically unrealistic, such a revised statement of euro-federalist goals would re-enforce euro-federalist influences within the European political establishment. A European Voice interview with Greece's Alternate Minister of Foreign Affairs Tassos Giannitsis substantiates this. Rejecting such questions as "WHERE is Europe heading?" and Where are Europe's borders?, Giannitsis opts to pose the question "What kind of Europe do we want?" Concluding the interview, he replies: "The values we wish Europe to express set the foundation of 'the kind of Europe we want' and also signpost 'where Europe ends'.
Europe ends at the point where policy choices start jeopardizing its consistency and its appeal as a model of economic, social, and political organisation."
It is a conclusion that European Federalists need to increasingly reflect upon in the context of Atlanticism's influence on European political integration.

Wang Liping
Federalism and the World Order (in chinese)
Beijing, Beijing University Press, 2000

A federal system of government is adopted by almost all the large countries in the world, with one notable exception: China, the largest of all. Why is it so? May this change in the future? Thanks to the country's recent accession to the WTO and increasing international visibility, these questions are achieving a new, global significance.

"Federalism and World Order" is among the first extended studies of federalism to be published in Chinese by an author from the People's Republic. Wang Liping is a young post-doc from the Department of Political Studies of Beijing University, a respected centre of learning which is also traditionally seen as a think-tank of the ruling Party. It is an ambitious 300-page work that builds on a one-year research visit by Dr Wang to the Department of Political Science of the University of California at Berkeley, and touches on issues as diverse as the origin of federalism in the Greek city states and the possibility of African unification.

The Chinese Communist Party has chosen a set of new leaders at the 16th National Congress in November, and the new formal government line-up will be announced at the national parliamentary plenum in March. It is an open secret that some of the new leaders have their own agendas for change, up to and possibly including political reform. China's current political culture does not encourage open statements of intent or unambiguous political campaigning, so it is difficult to know the real thoughts hiding behind the new faces. Hu Jintao, the new Secretary General, is acknowledged to be in favour of increased accountability and the rule of law. Some Pekinologists have even suggested that Zeng Qinghong, former Secretary General Jiang Zemin's right-hand man and a prominent power broker in the new hierarchy, may be in fact a closet admirer of the US federal constitution. In these times of change, as usual with a society as old and as complex as China, unconfirmed and sometimes even contradictory rumours abound.

Whatever the balances of power may be behind the red walls of Zhongnanhai (China's Kremlin), federalism is a subject of increasing interest in the much wider community of intellectuals that have always been receptive to trends in the wider world. For China, reforms of some kind might by now have become a necessity. The challenges that China's government will have to master in the next two years are exceptional and unique, and the country's leaders at this time may find themselves to be particularly in need of new ideas.

The book gives a detailed historical overview of federalism, and hints to its relevance to current affairs. "As the countries of the world gradually draw closer, both politically and economically, the political situation of one country inevitably influences the political situation of [...] the world as a whole. In this sense, no matter whether the principles of federalism are applied domestically or serve as guiding principles for regional, supranational integration or unification, the theory of federalism is fundamentally relevant to the political order of the world."

A common misconception, both in China and elsewhere, that "federalism is an euphemism for decentralization", is dispelled, and the author states on the contrary that "federalism historically arises as an answer to a need for unifying a polity; as such, it focuses more on how much power has to be placed in the centre, rather than on how much power has to be devolved away from it." For example, "the founding of the United States of America was a move from a situation where power was diffused to one in which it was relatively more centralized." In other words, federalism is not a blueprint for the degeneration of an existing central authority, but rather a sophisticated method for bringing together the members of a diverse community.

Wang argues that "federalism, as it also aims at unifying a country, is a historical descendant of 19th century nationalism, that had the objective of producing a unified nation state." She writes: "Nationalism is itself a product of history and, in fact, it served the purpose of gradually increasing the size of the community of shared interests; however, save for Utopian societies, this increase in size is not without limits, and the nation state is to this day the ultimate fortress of these shared interests." (Chapter 2: "Federalism as a special manifestation of nationalism").

Of the world's countries, only a small percentage adopts a federal system of government: the book surveys 28 of these, and notes that as many as 21 of them have experienced colonialism in the recent past. "Federalism, as a rational endeavour to build up a unified community from many different local centres, has gone far beyond the traditional theory of the nation state", and has developed an unusual ability to deal with complex societies and internal diversity. The social, economic and political differences that arose from years of colonial rule in many countries of the developing world, Wang argues, was just what made federalism almost an obligatory choice for these countries in the post-colonial era.

The author identifies seven elements that historically have made the choice of a federal structure of government more likely. These essentially boil down to the common perception of an external threat, a favourable economic environment, the existence of social and political similarities and the action of political leaders and the media.

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This sustained effort to extract the essence of the federal experience in many countries and regions of the world at different times in history naturally leads the author to look at its potential uses for today's world. In particular, she is ready to admit that the processes of regional integration present unique and new challenges to the classical theory of federalism.

The chapter on European integration is a very detailed, self-contained history of European political thought and of European institutions. The most important cases made in the 20th century for the political unification of the continent, from Kalergi's pan-European movement and Rossi and Spinelli's Ventotene Manifesto all the way to Joschka Fischer's talk given at Berlin's Humboldt University on May 12, 2000, are outlined.

Wang sees the different approaches and interests of European political élites as a formidable obstacle towards the establishment of a true federation. "... in Europe, on one hand, within each state, the collective sense of belonging to a common entity is extremely well developed, so that European countries have been the first in the world to give birth to democracy; however, this sense of communion is almost entirely lacking between different nationalities, so that Europe has known conflicts and confrontations for most of its recorded history." In particular, she believes that Europe lacks a consensual élite, with a sufficient degree of internal cohesion and persuasion power to bring about a constitutional process similar to the one that established the United States of America.

This vision of Europe is in a sense typical of those who are outside of Europe, and see it most importantly as the cradle of the nation state. Whether Europe will be able to overcome the burden of its own history, is a question that the author of "Federalism and World Order" raises several times but on which she remains mostly uncommitted. By giving a detailed and up-to-date account of the history of the idea of Europe, and by hinting at the relevance of federalism to this question, Wang does however a good service to China's understanding of Europe at a crucial time.

For a foreign readership, the most interesting chapter must be the one on federalism in China. Since the decline and fall of the Qing dynasty at the beginning of the 20th century, China has gone through many turbulent stages of reform, and the option of choosing a federal system of government has come up several times.

Sun Yat-Sen, the father of modern republican China, revered on both sides of the Taiwan Straits, was a strong advocate of a federal system of government right up to the revolution of 1911. At the founding of the "Revive China Society" in 1894 he called for a "US-style union government" to replace the imperial system. However, at the time the focus was more on revolutionary action than on theoretical debate, and this particular issue was dealt with only in general terms.

After the revolution, the discussion became tangled up in factional struggle. In the words of famed US sinologist John K. Fairbanks, "the 1911 Revolution was to a good extent a struggle for power between Beijing and the provinces." According to the opponents of federalism at the time, Wang recalls, "all the countries in the world with a federal system of government, like Germany and the US, had first been divided, and then only later united - in other words, they first formed as individual states, then, only when they had a need to unify did they form a federal union. China, on the contrary, has long been a unitary state (...) They also believed that the country was too backward, and too easily prone to instability if a federal system were set up too quickly." Similar arguments were readily used at the time also to argue in favour of restoring the empire (the country not being "ready" for republican government and democracy), and echoes of this gradualistic logic still recur today whenever the subject of political reform is brought up.

In the three decades before the Communist revolution, there were some isolated attempts at creating loose political federations from the semi-independent provincial governments that were sprouting up all over the country. After the founding of the republics of Hunan and Zhejiang in 1921, and the beginning of constitutional processes in the provinces of Sichuan and Guangdong, local independence movements started up in Yunnan, Guangxi, Guizhou, Jiangsu, Jiangxi and Hubei. At this time, the famous revolutionary and intellectual Zhang Taiyan "took a step further and proposed to form a Confederation of Provincial Governments of China to be made up of representatives of each provincial government." Eventually, the regional power plays of the warlords and an increasing consensus on the need for a unitary government to mantain stability and national unity made Zhang abandon the project.

"In fact, the leaders of these [early] federal movements went too far in their rejection of central authority, to the extent that to them a federation was not really suitable for China, and that only a confederation which gave the centre almost no power whatsoever would do." Wang argues that this precedent lies at the foundation of many modern misconceptions about federalism in China.

Any discussion of China and federalism after 1949 arguably requires a stretch of the imagination. In a country where the ruling Communist party runs a nomenklatura system and adheres to Lenin's principles of "democratic centralism" and party supremacy, a federal system of power balances is a formal exercise. The author's analysis of the constitutional provisions that allow for minimal minority representation at local level, while interesting, inevitably leave some fundamental questions unanswered. The formula "One country, two systems", that was originally proposed as a blueprint for reunification with Taiwan and later adopted in 1997 for Hong Kong and in 1999 for Macau, also tends to be a statement of intent rather than an effective constitutional arrangement in the European sense.

More significantly, Wang argues against a federal system of government for China in the near future, and concludes that "a transition from a unitary to a federalist system is a fundamental change in the relationship between local and central government, that leads to an increase of the actual cost of safeguarding national unity. This is something that the Chinese government cannot tolerate." This argument resembles that made by opponents of federalism in the first half of the century: that since China had been under a strong unitary government before, changing to a federal system may only encourage centrifugal tendencies and be detrimental to stability.

As open discussions of political reform have been essentially non-existent throughout the '90s, it is hard to assess whether this belief enjoys unanimous or broad support within the ruling élite, or whether there are any alternative views. In any case, the theory and practice of federalism will reach a wider audience thanks to Dr Wang's work, and, as the country as a whole gradually opens up and deals with the possibilities of reform, these issues will hopefully give rise to a more informed intellectual debate both within the Chinese-speaking world and in the larger global community.