When the countries of Central and Eastern Europe enter the Union next year, the vision of the founding fathers of a united European continent will finally become a reality. The process embarked upon at Copenhagen represents for Europe's geography what the Brussels Summit (May 1998) represented for its currency. After monetary and territorial union, the current phase of European integration is now inescapably political; its results will dictate whether Europe shapes history, or is shaped by it. The debate on the future of Europe is already underway.
Many discussions have centred on the question of a suitable Presidency for Europe. The argument goes that if Europe is to shape history, it must become a political Union. It must be capable of providing security at its boundaries and of contributing to a world order of peace and justice, through a single representation at the United Nations (UN) and a credible threat of force where necessary. To achieve these objectives, there needs to be a Great President of Europe. The Great President would chair the European Council, in which the Heads of State and Government regularly meet, and would also ensure that their decisions are duly implemented. The Great President would represent Europe on the international stage, finally answering the question once posed by Henry Kissinger: "If I want to call Europe, what is the phone number?"
It is clear that Europe would benefit from having an internationally recognised representative who could pick up the phone and talk to the likes of George Bush or Vladimir Putin. However, the argument that to be united politically Europe requires such a President needs some clarification. Firstly, in terms of currency, trade and competition policy, Europe is already strong without a Great President, a point clearly illustrated when Brussels blocks high level mergers (e.g. General Electric and Honeywell), or retaliates over American protectionism (e.g. steel tariffs). Secondly, with the President of the Commission, Europe already has a President, with a level of democratic legitimacy equal to Italy's President of the Council of Ministers or France's Prime Minister. Like them, he is appointed by a higher body (European Council), and is accountable to an elected parliament. He has fewer powers only because the Union has fewer competences, not because of a deficiency of investiture. Finally, it would be futile to give this Great President responsibility for foreign and security policy if the Union itself does not have sufficient power in these areas. Such a Great President would soon become a "Paper President".
In sum, the discussion about Europe's Great President ignores - perhaps intentionally - that in order to be stronger in more areas, the Union needs to be given both the ability to decide and the means to act. The ability to decide essentially means more majority voting; it is clear that the Union only goes forward when the paralysing condition of unanimity for decision-making is removed. Even with all the goodwill in the world, as long as it exists, the veto will be used. Moreover, the veto not only blocks particular decisions, it also affects the Union itself because its mere possibility changes the nature of the discussions and the negotiating positions of Member States. Second, to implement decisions, the Union must be given the means to act. Whereas now the Member States provide the Union with resources "on loan", the Union must be granted its own independent resources in terms of budget, military apparatus, foreign embassies and a seat at international organisations such as the UN. A decision lacking execution amounts to warm words, but no action.
Without the ability to decide or to act, creating a Great President will not make the Union stronger. Worse, if such a President were created outside the present framework, it could threaten the institutional balance, since it would be very difficult for the new President to avoid conflict with the existing power structures. Far from adding strength to the Union, such a President could hence weaken it.
Should we therefore forget the idea of a President of the Union? No, but several aspects need to be clarified. In the last few months, two different proposals over the new President's institutional status have been put forward. In both proposals he would chair meetings of the Heads of State or Government, in which decisions over peace and war should be taken. However, one proposal suggests that he should be the President of the Commission and another the President of the European Council. Whereas the first proposal amounts to one single President ("One-headed Union"), the second would involve two, as in this scenario the Commission President would retain his role ("Twin-headed Union") for policy areas presently under Community competence. The consequences, which go to the heart of the very nature of the Union, are difficult to evaluate.
However, assuming that both proposals aim to create a Europe capable of influencing world affairs, let us try to make clear what kind of President the Union requires. Firstly, the President's role should not be limited to the intermittent task of chairing the meetings of the European Council; it should be a full-time job.
The President should supervise the preparation of the European Council and provide political leadership after decisions are taken. Secondly, the President would need an administrative structure of his own: specialist policy advisors, information services and access to EU Ambassadors around the world.
When a military operation is under way he must have the power, albeit under the direction of the Council, to act as Chief of the Armed Forces, and that may include having a finger on the nuclear trigger.
Thirdly, such presidential power needs continuity, in contrast to the current system of rotating presidencies; it cannot change face, name, address and style of management every six months. Europe's constant musical chairs in front of world leaders such as George Bush and Jiang Zemin, or at multilateral fora such as the G8 and the UN Assembly only serves to reduce our political weight and weaken our position. Fourthly, the President must have full democratic legitimacy.
This cannot be ensured if the President were to be chosen by the Heads of State or Government, figures who are elected for serving a national interest rather than the interests of the Union as a whole.
In theory legitimacy could be gained from a direct general election; but would it be possible to run a televised electoral campaign with simultaneous translation into twenty different languages? It seems more reasonable that this legitimacy comes from a vote of confidence by the European Parliament, the only body that is both elected by the people and vested with the European interest. Finally, the President must only be given appropriate powers; decisions about peace and war should of course not be taken by him, but by the European Council, with the agreement of the Parliament.
The President should prepare, inspire and execute decisions, and should embody the policy of the Union, but he should not wield the power of peace and war.
This is in line with established political regimes, where power is articulated differently for peacetime government and conflict situations.
If agreement could be reached on the above role of the President, differences of opinion over the institutional context would loose importance. It would then seem natural to choose the most linear proposal, which in my opinion would be to enhance the President of the Commission. Efforts to create a stronger Union with a twin-headed leadership seem much more difficult than increasing the present profile of the Commission President, which must include foreign and security policy.
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