In a world marked by international violence and social injustice states have always been obliged to seek political stability and public consent through the threat of the use of violence. This is the reason why they have sought to strengthen their legitimacy beyond the political sphere, and most often through the support of religion. Over the course of history the concept of the divine right of kings was one of the most commonly utilized principles legitimising political power. Only in the modern age, through the processes of industrialization, secularisation and rationalization of society, has politics progressively developed a tendency to emancipate itself from religion.
The guiding principle was the separation of religion from politics. The Gospel provides a basis for the separation of the two spheres when Jesus says: “Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar’s and to God the things that are God’s”. This separation leads to the affirmation of the primacy of civil law within state borders and this implies that the state should not be conceived simply as an arbiter between different conflicting organized groups and values. Its primary task is to knock down the fences which divide societies, to refuse to favour one faith over another and to promote peaceful co-existence and social solidarity among different outlooks.
Pluralism is an essential characteristic of a free society. It can be fully achieved provided that common values such as freedom and equality are widely shared. In political life, the citizenship link should prevail over every other form of loyalty. On the other hand, the state is expected to protect the free exercise of religion and to abstain from interfering with religious activities provided that they do not breach public order.
Prior to the end of the Cold War, a general tendency seemed to prevail throughout the world: the declining influence of religion on politics. This secularisation of society was conceived, according to Max Weber’s widelysupported viewpoint, as a constituent part of modernization. But now the political landscape has fundamentally changed. Religion is everywhere. President Bush asserted that the Iraqi war was inspired by God. “God is with us” he frequently says. The Islamic terrorists undertake their suicidal attacks driven by the faith that they will be rewarded in Paradise. A cartoon published in a Danish newspaper representing the Prophet with a bomb on his head in place of his turban was considered blasphemous in the Islamic world where it triggered a great number of demonstrations
with many casualties.
What then is the reason for this growing influence of religion on world politics? I believe its origins are in politics itself rather than in religion. It is the result of a political use of religion rather than a consequence of spontaneous religious fervour.
The Cold War was not simply a clash between two superpowers and two blocs. It was also a clash between two universal ideologies: democracy and communism. Since the end of Cold War, brought about by the collapse of the communist bloc, nationalism has been widely utilized both in the East and the West to replace the more universal ideologies, primarily in the East, where people no longer believe in communism, but also in the West where democracy, now deprived of its external enemy, shows its own shortcomings. Confined within national borders and unable to manage global issues, democracy has been reduced to a mere decision-making procedure.
In the Post-Cold War era two types of nationalism are emerging: ethnic nationalism and the nationalism promoted by the great powers. The former, which brought about the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, is also active in the West, as shown by the Basque, Corsican and Irish terrorism, though constrained by the EU. Another example is Québequois separatism which is contained by Canadian federal institutions. The other form of nationalism is active in the US, Russia, China and India where it functions as a necessary ingredient for strengthening domestic cohesion of those states and their affirmation at world level.
It is in this context, characterized by the revival of nationalism, that religion has entered the scene as a force subservient to nationalism. This is the contemporary expression of an old tradition: the concept of religion as an instrument of government. Germany and the Vatican supported the secession of the Catholic states, Slovenia and Croatia, from Yugoslavia. Thus, the Catholic Church, behaving as a national force, abandoned its original inspiration – for “Catholic” means universal. Bosnia was dismembered into three communities: Serbian-Orthodox, Croatian-Catholic and Islamic. The wave of so-called ethnic cleansing revived Nazi methods in the former Yugoslavia. On the other hand, in order to fight more effectively against the secessionist claim of Chechnya, an Islamic province, Russia strengthened its own Orthodox identity.
Islamic fundamentalism is a movement that preaches the return to the founding principles of a religion threatened by contamination by modern culture and modern life-styles. Since the West is the vehicle of modernization, it is represented as a menace to the principles of Islamic religion. It is in the nature of the clash of civilizations to transform the Other into a stranger and an enemy. This was the ideological root of the attack to the Twin Towers. Such Islamic fundamentalism promoted corresponding versions of religious extremism in Judaism (Israel), Christianity (US), Hinduism (India), Confucianism (China). What is troublesome is the reaction of the US: namely, the acceptance of this “clash of civilizations” game. Hence the promotion of a Christian fundamentalism, the re-emergence of obscurantist tendencies such as for example rejecting the results of scientific research like the theory of evolution. This same reaction led the neocons to identify the West specifically with Christianity – a position echoed in Europe during the debate on the European Constitution when the Pope, supported by conservative circles, claimed that the Christian roots of European civilization should be mentioned in its preamble.
But this is no way to promote dialogue, mutual understanding and peaceful coexistence among religions and cultures. Separation of religion and politics is a glory of European history. A European Federation would represent a substantial progress along the way traced by the founders of this political tradition. It would unify a group of countries once divided by national hatred, yet without
erasing their individual character. The secular aspect of the European way of life emphasizes the equality of the citizens whatever their religion may be. Only this political model is fit to receive a great Islamic country such as Turkey into the EU.
The EU shares with India the role of a laboratory where the construction of multinational communities with many languages and many religions is planned. They show how federal institutions represent a bulwark against the dominance of a single nationality or a single religion. Unity in diversity is the principle the world needs to be able to promote a culture of dialogue and peace.

The first of a series of seminars on Contemporary International Criminal Law and the ICC scheduled for 2006 was held in Guiyang, China on March 18-19. Organized by the International Criminal Court Project Office of Beijing Normal University (ICCPO), Gui Zhou University and the Coalition for the International Criminal Court (CICC), the twoday conference brought together ICC Judge Sang-Hyun Song from the Republic of Korea; legal scholar Roger S. Clark, a specialist on the debate around the crime of aggression; John Currie from the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Eileen Skinnider from the International Centre for Criminal Law Reform & Criminal Justice Policy (ICCLR); and Evelyn Balais Serrano from the Coalition for the International Criminal Court. An array of renowned Chinese criminal lawyers and academics, including Dr. Gao Ming-Xuan and Dr. Wang Xiu Mei also took part in the seminar.
During the conference the participants discussed Chinese concerns about accession to the ICC Treaty, especially the issue about how the principle of complementarity works. Complementarity is a lingering concern for the Chinese government which has repeatedly expressed its reservations about how the terms “unwillingness” and “inability” as defined by Article 17 of the Rome Statute are measured. Other topics of discussion included: the definition of the crime of aggression; the implementation of the Rome Statute into national law; the capacity of the UN Security Council to refer a situation to the ICC Prosecutor; and the United States’ position on the ICC. A segment of the conference was also devoted to analyzing other international criminal tribunals as well as recent anti-terrorism legislation.
The Project Office of Beijing Normal University has been working strategically with key constituencies to promote awareness around the ICC. This work has included the hosting of seminars and workshops directed at legal scholars as well as judges and prosecutors. Through concerted efforts, the Project Office has also produced information resources that will assist the Chinese Government in their accession process and set up a website. As one example, they recently prepared a Chinese translation of key comparative ICC implementing legislation that has been adopted by States Parties to the Court around the world. Their next workshop, scheduled for November 2006 in Beijing, will target Chinese Government officials in an effort to dispel misconceptions around the ICC’s mandate and continue national efforts toward accession.
China’s position on the ICC to date has been cautious, with the Government moving from an initial fear about the Court infringing on national sovereignty to a position made public in June 2005 in which China stated that it “supports the establishment of an ICC characterized by its independence, impartiality, effectiveness, and universality, […] [but that] in view of some deficiencies in the Rome Statute of the ICC which may hinder the just and effective functioning of the Court, China has not yet acceded to the Statute”¹. Despite this tentative approach towards an acceptance of international jurisprudence and legal reform, these statements do hint at an increasing willingness to consider Chinese accession to the ICC treaty.
¹UN Reform position paper presented by China on June 7, 2005. The government follows this quote noting that China “still hopes that the Court will win the confidence of non-Contracting Parties and wide acceptance of the international community through its work. The Security Council should act with prudence as to whether to refer a certain situation to the International Criminal Court”. To access the full statement see:
www.reformtheun.org.

It is not an easy task to compare the values established by the so-called European Constitution, and the values expressed in Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. For a comparison we need to have at least a particular viewpoint and a proper measure to, which I do not have at this time. In addition to this, making a comparison useful also requires a shared purpose, which I have not found so far. This situation keeps me from making any comment on Mr. Claudio Mandrino’s remark: “While Japan decided to modify the ‘No-War Clauses’ as set in its Constitution, at the same time in another region of the world, a supranational text which imposes itself over the laws of 25 member States envisages Peace as one of the fundamental values linking them together¹”.
But as far as I understand, the word peace is not mentioned in Article I-2 (The Union’s Values), but it is included in Article I-3 (The Union’s Objectives): “The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples”. In this text we see that peace is defined as one of “objectives,” and that it is
differentiated from “its values and the wellbeing of its peoples²”. And this leads me to focus on the real context of revision for Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan.
Article 9 comprises two paragraphs. The first establishes that Japan “forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes”, while the second prohibits the maintenance of “land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential”, and states that “the right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized”. Also, the second paragraph of the Preamble includes the sentence: “We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want”.
Japan’s ruling party (Liberal Democratic Party) released a draft of the proposed amended constitution in November 2005, and the proposed changes include:
- New wording for the Preamble, deleting the right to live in peace clause,
- While the first paragraph of Article 9 is retained, the second paragraph is replaced by an Article
9-2 which permits a “defense force”, under control of the Prime Minister, which defends the nation and may participate in international activities. This new section uses the Japanese term gun (“army” or “military”), which has been avoided in the current constitution. “In addition to activities needed for self-defense… the defense forces can take part in efforts to maintain international peace and security under international cooperation, as well as to keep fundamental public order in our country”, the draft says.
This constitutional draft explicitly authorises Japanese participation in foreign peacekeeping efforts, and broadens the government’s ability to send forces overseas.
This revision also opens the door to a broader interpretation of the constitution, permitting what some call “the use of the right of collective self-defense”, or coming to the military aid of other countries. The most likely beneficiary is Japan’s closest ally, the United States, which has urged Japan to adopt such measures. And it is worth recognising that the official New China News Agency described Japan’s revision as a document “designed to provide legal support for its ambition of playing a greater political role on the global stage and of boosting the defense force’s status³”.
So, we should understand the serious implications of the following text in the context of Japan’s constitutional revision. The Security Consultative Committee Document, issued May 1, 2006, starts by saying: “The U.S.-Japan Alliance, with the U.S.-Japan security arrangements at its core, is the indispensable foundation of Japan’s security and of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. A close, cooperative relationship based on the alliance also plays an important role in effectively
dealing with global challenges, and must evolve to reflect the changing security environment⁴”. In particular it wants the Japanese Government to legalize “the use of the right of collective selfdefense” both regionally and globally.
As Rust Deming says, the Japanese government’s third National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) of late 2004 and its recommendations will affect the ongoing constitutional debate. The focus is on the need to legitimize the existing Self-Defense Forces fully and the right of self-defense; on the issue of collective self-defense; and on the future direction of defense policy⁵. Assuming that it is so, we the Japanese people are in the midst of dismantling Article 9. Still, there remain significant obstacles making it hard to confidently predict change⁶.
However, Rust Deming’s state policy-oriented opinion on Article 9 and on Japan’s defense policy is a subject of controversy. I would argue against his opinion that both the new NDPO and the later emergence of a revised constitution would provide the framework for strengthening the Japan-US alliance, and that bilateral cooperation is likely to increase with respect to the ballistic missile defense, support for contingencies on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait, and to sea lane protection⁷. One passage will be cited here to orient my approach for exploring Deming’s opinion. Richard Tanter’s remark on the subject seems to be based on the essence of the matter, saying that “the acceleration of the process of Heisei militarization by the Bush Doctrine has diminished rather than increased Japanese security. Japan has become technologically implicated in any American conflict with China through missile defense – the Taiwan Straits and Korea leap to mind⁸” .
As Tanter says, the missile defense decision poses serious long-term strategic consequences. It includes the almost open-ended budget demands implicit in the decisions, the legality of exporting missile defense technology beyond the US, and the question of control over launching. However the most important consequences derive from the political implications of the technologies involved⁹.
To me it is more important to consider a political and moral viewpoint than one which is statepolicy-
oriented. Such a constitutional revision as the Americans, including Richard Armitage, and Japan’s Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi have been talking about would create “a political and moral disaster¹⁰”. The LDP’s draft seems to neglect an important role played by paragraph 2 of Article 9, especially because the article bans military operations abroad, which contributes to Japan’s pacifist image in the international community. It appears questionable whether the LDP government has tried to exhaust every means conducive to the Constitution’s pacifist principle in its past attempts to address international problems. The principle should be maintained as a universal ideal toward which the nation must strive.
According to Masaru Tamamoto, “The Japanese, inspired by the European Union’s example, have an opportunity to build on that restraint and extend its principles to other Asian nations. Europe – like Japan, under an American strategic umbrella – has begun moving toward a defense force shared by nations that, not so long ago, fought terrible wars against each other. Japan might lead Asia in doing the same¹¹”. He also says that it would be important to see that Japanese Constitutional pacifism was part of a broader 20th-century project to create “a universal approach to peace¹²”, in the sense that it stands in the tradition of the League of Nations, the pacifist Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, and the United Nations. I would say here that, while it is safe to say so as to paragraph 1 of Article 9, some important controversies on this
topic remain concerning the original thoughts on the outlawing of war, and that paragraph 2 of Article 9 recognized them.
Paragraph 2 of Article 9 is also a thoughtful product of attempts to outlaw the war system in the age of nuclear weapons. And the world of the nuclear space age would be a better place if Japan were to make a firm commitment to spreading its constitutional pacifism. It is exactly in this context that we have the great significance of both keeping paragraph 2 of Article 9 and the right to live in peace, as well as resisting the dismantling of Article 9 and the Preamble.
The new draft constitution is sparking debate, including opposition from non-governmental organizations of other countries. Grassroots Japanese organizations, the Article 9 Association, Save Article 9, and others were formed in 2004 and 2005 to oppose changes to Article 9.
Finally allow me this quote: “If one takes a long view of where we are already heading, and merely projects that a decade or so (or even less time) into the future, one can envision a gradually accreting global constitution, piece by piece, brick by brick, international agreement by international agreement¹³”.
This reminds me of a global constitution draft which has only a clause establishing the Global Police to fight against the growing threat to the security of all peoples, and to fight against global crimes, while it has no clause permitting the Global Government to hold an army¹⁴. In addition to these two articles, there is a comment on forming global symbiotical relationships: “The WTO is about a trade partnership between nations. Of course it is a bad idea to be a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). There are no advantages! It just does not work for anyone except when you have an army to knock down any member who does not do your five wishes and plus. A membership in the WTO is not needed and nations should instead seek relationships with fewer other nations only if needed¹⁵”. Even though presupposing that each country will keep its own army for defensive security, the point is that this draft constitution denies the function of existing armies in the context of trade partnerships between nations.
I wonder if the majority of world federalists in Japan would support the present formulation of paragraph 2 of Article 9, which would be one of the core articles of a global constitution.
¹ Cf. Claudio Mandrino, “Italy and Germany between Peace and Adhesion to the European Union. A comparison with Japan”, in this issue of The Federalist Debate.
² Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, in Official Journal of the European Union, C 310, Volume 47, 16.12.2004, www.unizar.es.
³ See, Anthony Faiola, “Japan’s Draft Charter Redefines Military”, Washington Post Foreign Service, Wednesday, November 23, 2005, A16.
⁴ U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future, May 1, 2006, by Secretary of State Rice, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Minister of Foreign Affairs Aso, and Minister of State for Defense Nukaga, www.mofa.go.jp.
⁵ Rust Deming, “Japan’s Constitution and Defense Policy: Entering a New Era?” in Strategic Forum, No. 213, November 2004, Institute for National Strategic Studies. National Defense University, www.ndu.edu.
⁶ Richard J. Samuels, “Constitutional Revision in Japan: The Future of Article 9,” Wednesday, December 15, 2004, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, www.brookings.edu.
⁷ See note 5.
⁸ Richard Tanter, “Japanese Militarization and the Bush Doctrine,” February 13, 2005. www.nautilus.org. This essay was adapted from a piece that will be published in Peter Van Ness and Mel Gurtov (eds.), Confronting the Bush Doctrine: Critical Views from the Asia-Pacific, London, Routledge.
⁹ Ibid.
¹⁰ Masaru Tamamoto, “Tokyo’s Peace and the American Agenda” in New York Times, July 1, 2001, reported in taiwansecurity.org.
¹¹ Ibid.
¹² Ibid.
¹³ Cf. James T. Ranney, “How World Federalism will likely come into Existence”, in this issue of The Federalist Debate.
¹⁴ The Global Constitution, www.telusplanet.net.
¹⁵ Chapter 14.2 B.5 Agency of Global Police, Article 1: The Global Police; Chapter 7, and Article 5: Any symbiotical relationship is for the good of all, and all life on Earth,. www.telusplanet.net.

The MFE, the Italian branch of the UEF, has recently launched a new political campaign under the slogan “A pan-European referendum for the European Constitution”. Its aim is that the European Constitution, eventually amended, should be put to a popular ballot involving all the citizens of the EU and held on the same day in all member states, possibly in conjunction with the 2009 European Parliament elections. Possible amendments to the present text might involve, for instance, the exclusion
of Part Three, to which the largest number of objections were expressed in France, and/or the attachment of a “social protocol”, as proposed by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel in response to the citizens’ fears. If approved by a majority of citizens in a majority of member states, the Constitution would then enter into force in those states where the Yes vote prevailed. The other states could always ratify it in a second round, and thus join the new constitutional Union later.
By a happy coincidence, two great intellectuals, Jürgen Habermas and Ulrich Beck, proposed this same idea in the columns of the international press a few days after this campaign was launched. Furthermore, the proposal is also supported by several EU politicians including the Austrian President Heinz Fischer and the Italian PM Romano Prodi.
Of course, as happens with any innovative political proposal, such as the campaigns for European Parliamentary elections, the European single currency, and for the European Constitution (not yet concluded, but ideally continued with this new campaign), many objections will be raised both inside and outside federalist circles. This is why, in order to refine our analysis, I shall try with this article to summarise those objections, and to explain why I don’t find them convincing.
First objection: a pan-European referendum on the Constitution is risky because the citizens have turned their back against the EU, as was shown by the negative votes in France and The Netherlands.
This argument, repeatedly invoked by the anti-Europeans after last spring’s negative ballots, is de facto without any rational foundation. We need only add together the sum total of votes cast in the four referenda on the Constitution (in Spain, France, The Netherlands, and Luxemburg), to see that 26,662,958 electors voted Yes as against 22,667,763 who voted No – a clear majority in favour! And what about the 13 countries where the Constitution has been ratified by their respective Parliaments ¹? Or the fact that in other countries, such as Finland, the ratification process is still going on? I believe that the French and Dutch citizens’ negative vote was largely influenced by national rather than purely European issues, and that it was founded on the illusory hope that a No vote would pave the way for a better text to be negotiated without having to pay any political price.
Finally, we are convinced that we will never be able to achieve the political unity of Europe against the will of the citizens, because no government would ever renounce its power unless forced to do so by strong popular demand. From the time of the Congress of the European People, this has always been the federalists’ real task: namely, to show governments that their citizens are ready to make the European choice Some Arguments in Support of a Pan-European Referendum provided someone manages to convince them of the benefits they would gain.
Second objection: Since we cannot exclude any State from the EU, the Constitution must be approved by the unanimity of the member States.
First of all I must clarify that those who propose a pan-European referendum on the Constitution – as I do – have no wish to exclude any state from the Union. Those states whose citizens reject the Constitution should always have the possibility of negotiating a special status of association with the EU. This should include all the rights deriving from the present Treaties. Furthermore, they should always be able to rejoin the new Constitutional Union by holding a new vote after their citizens have had time to re-evaluate the situation.
The principle of unanimity, sometimes described as the main symbol of democracy, is in fact its extreme negation. Today 20 million French and Dutch No votes are deciding the destiny of 450 million EU citizens, a large majority of whom have already expressed themselves in support of the Constitution.
Already in the EU15 the unanimity principle showed its limitations, pushing the governments to convene the European Convention. Now, with the EU’s enlargement to 25 member states, it has become totally unacceptable, and might in the end paralyse the Union’s entire functioning. This danger was recently in evidence during the difficult negotiations over the 2007-2013 financial perspectives.
Not by chance in fact did article 82 of the Draft Treaty Establishing a European Union (better known as the “Spinelli Project”, approved by the European Parliament on February 14, 1984, with 238 votes in favour, 31 against and 43 abstained) already state, that «This Treaty shall be open for ratification by all the Member States of the European Communities. Once this Treaty has been ratified by a majority of the Member States of the Communities whose population represents two-thirds of the total population of the Communities, the Governments of the Member States which have ratified shall meet at once to decide by common accord on the procedures by and the date on which this Treaty shall enter into force and on relations with the Member States which have not yet ratified». Moreover, even in the field of international law, where the degree of integration is much weaker than in the EU, international treaties can normally enter into force after a minimum number of ratifications. Everybody knows, in fact, that probably no treaty would ever enter into force if a unanimous ratification were necessary.
Third objection: European integration cannot proceed without France.
This argument originates from a nostalgic conception of Europe, one tied to the myth of the Founding Countries. We must realise that too much has changed since then. The enlargement to 25 member states brought a profound shift in the political equilibrium of the EU, and modified the rules of the game forever. Furthermore, France is today facing a big crisis, deprived of any real influence over world politics, and unable to reform its own economic and social system. First the riots in the banlieues, and then the students’ revolt against the CPE (First Employment Contract), revealed to the world the alarming fragility of this country. To leave the final word on our common destiny in the hands of France, or of any other state, would be to commit political suicide. On the other hand, France’s hopes of overcoming this crisis of identity depend entirely on the re-launch of the European integration project, and France’s main interest lies in following that re-launch. We should never forget, by the way, that many believed it was impossible to create the euro without the UK. Everybody knows how that story ended.
There are also a certain number of “juridical objections”. A pan-European referendum would be illegal, either because in some countries referenda are forbidden by the Constitution, or because, according to the present Treaties, the Constitution must be unanimously approved before entering into force.
First we should clarify that our proposal is for a consultative, non-binding referendum. Each country would still be free to ratify or not by means of the procedure dictated by its Constitution. Furthermore, it should be clear that we are talking of a brand-new procedure which, by definition, cannot entirely comply with the existing laws. The history of European integration is full of episodes where the existing laws were “bent” in the face of a precise political will to move forward. At the December 1975 European Council meeting in Rome, for example, President Aldo Moro obtained a decision in favour of the direct election of the European Parliament, despite the fierce opposition of Great Britain and Denmark. To avoid being politically sidelined these two countries had to accept the deal. Should this example not be enough, the EP elections still take place in a manner that conflicts with the Treaties, which prescribe a uniform electoral procedure for the entire EU. The same happened in 1990 when the IGC on European Monetary Union was convened despite Mrs Thatcher’s opposition. In presence of a strong political will, it would therefore be perfectly possible for at least a first group of countries to hold a pan-European referendum. Some countries might not be able to take part in it, but that would not diminish the significance of the initiative.
Finally, both among European and Italian federalists there are some who think we should defer such an important instrument until we have a better draft Constitution, one that could give life to an authentic European Federation.
On the contrary, we think that unless the present Constitution is finally adopted there will be no chance for a very long time of elaborating a better text. If it were not adopted, those Governments who oppose the federal project most fiercely would immediately claim that the citizens do not want a European Constitution at all, and would try to close the debate for many years to come. The sole challenge before us now is, therefore, to obtain the ratification of this Constitution, eventually with the amendments we described.
We must reassert that, despite this text’s limitations, it could still pave the way for important developments. Furthermore, the very fact that its ratification has encountered so many difficulties should allow us to re-open the discussion on amendments immediately afterwards. In fact, if the Constitution were to be ratified by means of a referendum – which by definition excludes unanimity – any proposed amendments would also need to be ratified by majority. And one further point: the most hostile states will probably have rejected the basic text and therefore will have excluded themselves from these future negotiations.
In conclusion, if there were to be a pan-European referendum on the basis of the present text, in a few years we might be able to obtain a much better one. If not, we might never again get a chance to vote for a better Constitution. It would be a real pity to waste an historical opportunity in the name of an ideological pretext.
¹ Fifteen member states have ratified the treaty so far, including eight of the newcomers. They are old members Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and Spain, and new adherents Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia. The treaty has instead been rejected by the citizens of France and The Netherlands in two referenda last year.

One of the aims of Peace Journalism is the early warning of conflicts where current peace-making structures and institutions are inadequate and thus require increased attention and action by peace-makers.
Although Somalia is in a crucial geo-strategic position on the Horn of Africa facing the Arabian peninsula, the country has largely slipped from world attention except for specialists. The government had disappeared in 1991, proving that people can live without a State. What order existed was the result of very local “warlords” and clanic chiefs. For many in the United States, Somalia was recalled as
the location for the film “Black Hawk Down” and the images of a dead US soldier dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. These were scenes best forgotten, and for many US decision-makers an object lesson as to why one should not get involved in African disputes.
Now, renewed fighting – the sharpest in 15 years – between some of the warlords and a revitalized Islamic movement “the Union of Sharia Courts” projects the picture of a Taliban-type victory which could open a door to Islamic terrorists. The Union is led by Sheik Sharif Ahmed and seems to be gaining the military advantage.
In 1960, the Somali Republic was created by the Union of the British colony and the Italian trusteeship area. Italy had had part of Somalia as a colony until the end of the Second World War. From 1945 to 1950, Somalia was governed by UN administrators. In 1950, it was returned to Italy under a Trusteeship Council mandate. The Somalis speak the same language and practice the same forms of Islam. The divisions among the Somalis are not “tribal” but clanic, with clans, followed by subclans, lineages and extended families. Lineage is the most important identity, thus one has frequent intra-clan tensions as well as inter-clan disputes. It has been said that Somalis lived in societies with rules but without rulers. (See I.M. Lewis’ classic study: A Pastoral Democracy (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1969). There are Somalis also living in Ethiopia and Kenya – a fact which led to Pan-Somali aspirations and a 1977-1978 war with Ethiopia in an effort to annex the Ogaden area where most of Ethiopia’s Somalis live. These Pan-Somali efforts have always failed.
In such a clanic, largely pastoral society, one does not need state institutions to function. Clans are not all equal; some are severely disadvantaged due to their social status and thus their access to water and grazing land. There were, however, people who lived outside the clanic system. There was a small minority on the frontier with Kenya who were agriculturalists and non-Somali. There were also urbanized Somalis, especially those living in the coastal cities who no longer followed clanic authority as well as a small but growing educated bourgeoisie.
The army was the only institution of the state which was not originally structured along clanic lines. After some eight years during which government posts, seats in Parliament and government favours were distributed along clanic lines, in 1969, General Mohamed Siad Barre took control of the government. His ideology was an anti-clanic “scientific socialism”, and he received support from the USSR thus bringing Somalia into the Cold War. The Cold War helped to partition Africa into ideological spheres of influence. In order to counter Soviet influence in Somalia, the USA increased its support for conservative Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia.
Siad Barre with the help of Soviet advisors increased the size of the Army and the paramilitary forces. By 1982 there were some 120,000 men in the army with political commissars to develop ideological purity. Unlike the colonial period and the first years of independence during which the rural areas were left alone, Siad Barre extended government control to the rural areas, weakening clanic chiefs. Siad Barre also largely destroyed the independent bourgeoisie; some were jailed, more left the country to work
elsewhere.
Then, at the time of the 1977-1978 Ogaden war with Ethiopia, there was a classic Cold War switch of alliances. A Marxist, Mengistu Haile Mariam overthrew the Emperor of Ethiopia and looked to the Soviet Union for help. In 1978, Siad Barre abrogated the USSR/Somali Treaty of Friendship and turned to the USA for help with weapons and training of the military. As Barre was uninterested in US liberal-democratic ideology, he returned to governing on a clanic basis with members of the liniages of himself, his mother and his principal son-in-law. His style of government under US influence from 1978 until the end of 1991 ranged from the autocratic to the tyrannical.
With the end of the Cold War, neither the US nor the USSR had much interest in supporting difficult and unpredictable allies. Thus by 1991 both Siad Barre and Mengistu had been forced from power by rebel movements. While Ethiopia was able to re-establish a State structure having a long history of a weak but centralized government, Somalia returned to a pre-colonial structure but with few of the conflict-resolution techniques of pre-colonial times. Thus, in addition to traditional clanic conflicts over water and livestock, there was a clash between traditional clanic leaders and army officers who had gotten a taste of power under Siad Barre and who now wanted to set up little militarized kingdoms over which to rule.
As the 1960 merger of the Italian and British colonies had been more based on a desire of the Europeans to withdraw than any Somali urge to merge, the former British area reorganized itself after 1992 and took back the name Somaliland. The Somaliland area is relatively stable, and in 1993 Somaliland reintroduced the structures of government – tax, customs and banking. Somaliland has trade to Arabia and beyond through the busy port of Berbera and is helped by the remittances from in
Somaliland diaspora in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, in East Africa and some in Europe. However, there is a deep fear among many African governments that if one African state breaks up, many could follow the same pattern. Thus no African government wants to recognize the independent existence of Somaliland and Europeans and others will not go against the African consensus to recognize Somaliland.
Thus, it is in the former Italian area and its capital Mogadishu where there is no established government. The area is divided into many small, separate fiefs under the control of a warlord with fighting over the control of areas between two fiefs. The result is economic and political chaos with most people living a day-to-day existence. Many of the youth have been taken into the forces of the warlords but receive no education and even little military training. There are also independent bandit bands interested in looting.
Since governments do not like anarchy, there have been numerous efforts on the part of neighboring countries to help the Somalis create a government. After many failed efforts, there now exists a “Transitional Federal Government” in the provincial town of Baidoa made up of clan leaders, some warlords and some chosen from urban “civil society”. However, while people do not have much enthusiasm for a continuation of the armed conflicts, there is not much enthusiasm for the return of government either. Attitudes of animosity, suspicion and hostility are dominant, and it is unlikely that the Transitional Government will become a reality.
Into this void, Islamic groups which have always been around are now trying to take the high ground. The al-Ittihad al Islaami (Islamic Unity, often called just al-Ittihad) is a loosely structured group which has taken in floating Islamic fighters, many of whom had been in Afghanistan or Pakistan. They see the similarities between the time after the departure of the Soviets from Afghanistan when the resistance forces were fighting for control among themselves and the chaos in Somalia. They hope that with a Taliban-like ideology of “order” and “Islam will solve all your problems”, the people will help them come to power in order to put an end to the divisions among warlords.
Others, in particular the USA, which has troops in neighboring Djibouti, also see the similarities and fear the rise of a Taliban-type government which might also open the door to Islamists from other countries, the creation of training camps for terrorism, and increased dangers to oil-producing countries.
There is the old saying that “Nature does not like a void”, and we may see countries trying to influence events, much as Pakistan’s military intelligence services largely contributed to the original victory of the Taliban in Afghanistan. The situation merits close attention, and peacemakers must see what can be done so that Somali voices with a wider vision are heard.

Guy Verhofstadt
Les Etats-Unis d’Europe
Bruxelles, Luc Pire, 2006
In fifty years of integration the European Union succeeded in reaching its initial goals of peace, stability and prosperity. The initial enthusiasm now gives way to concern. The Europeans are worried about opening up European enterprises to new Member States, about competition from South-East Asian economies, and particularly from Chinese textiles. Above all they are worried about the degree of organised crime which could increase in an enlarged Europe (p. 12).
It is in this context that Guy Verhofstadt publishes his manifesto whose main aim is to contribute to the debate on the future of the European Union by presenting his vision of a United States of Europe.
Reviewing the historical context and past attempts to achieve a political European Union, Verhofstadt argues that a future “dynamic European politics is impossible without efficient, transparent and democratic institutions” (p. 63).
Today, the European Union functions at times according to the intergovernmental model and, at others, to the community method. Verhofstadt stresses that “The future of Europe lies in building a political Europe founded on a community or federal ground” (p. 32). He proposes that in future the EU should focus only on few missions. First, it should develop a socio-economic strategy to face both the challenges of globalisation and of Europe’s ageing population. Second, in order to meet the challenge of organised crime the EU should develop the area of justice and security. Third, the European Union must speak with one voice on common foreign and security policy, and be equipped with a common army.
Research and development (R&D) he considers to be a major priority for the future of Europe, as well as the implementation of a trans-European network. “Shortly, the expenses that go to the R&D must be periodically increased in order to take the second place in the budget after the agriculture spending” (p. 53).
The simplification of EU jargon, so-called Eurospeak, is also a matter of priority if we are to diminish the gap between the European dream and European reality as the citizens experience it.
So far, economic integration seems to have been successful. A European Constitution would have brought a major and necessary step forward towards political integration but was rejected “not because it was too ambitious, but because of its lack of ambition” (p. 65). Starting from the observation that the EU Member States are not a homogenous group and that some states favour an intergovernmental model for Europe and others prefer the federalist model, or perhaps a mix of the two, Verhofstadt envisages a federal-core Europe. “To wait until everybody is willing, would be absurd. It would be like waiting for a train that will never arrive” (p. 66). Thus he foresees a European Union made up of two concentric circles: a federal circle which would become the United States of Europe;
and a second confederal circle, possibly called the Organisation of European States.
This manifesto presents arguments in favour of a vision. A politician and Prime Minister of a federal Member State of the European Union, he sets out his arguments in favour of a federal European Union in all their complexity but written in a very accessible style. To be or not to be a federal European Union? The future holds the answer.