Foreword - On last September 15, all Parliaments around the world celebrated the International Day of Democracy, declared by the UN General Assembly in 1997. I would like to take that occasion to make some reflections on the relations between democracy and federalism in the past, and its topical significance in the present time.

The contribution of the Federalist Papers to the theory of democracy has to do with the definition of a typology of forms of democratic government and the means for compounding democratic government with liberty. As to the typology of forms of democratic government, the Federalist Papers differentiates between democracy, republic and federation.

Madison distinguishes between democracy and republic. “In a democracy, the people meet and exercise the government in person”. It is what we call assembly democracy. Instead, in a republic the people “assemble and administer [the government] by their representatives” (No.14). It is the form of government that in contemporary language is defined representative democracy. Therefore, “A democracy […] will be confined to a small spot. A republic may be extended over a large region. As the natural limit of a democracy is that distance from the central point which will just permit the most remote citizens to assemble as often as their public functions demand, […] so the natural limit of a republic is that distance from the centre which will barely allow the representatives to meet as often as may be necessary for the administration of public affairs” (No.14).

Also the federal democracy is a form of representative democracy, but constitutes an institutional innovation, as it doubles the democratic representation and is a different form of democratic government. Hamilton places the federal principle in the evolutionary process of republican institutions: “The science of politics […] has received great improvement. […] The regular distribution of power into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative balances and checks; the institution of courts composed of judges holding their offices during good behavior; the representation of the people in the legislature by deputies of their own election: these are wholly new discoveries, or have made their principal progress towards perfection in modern times. They are means, and powerful means, by which the excellences of republican government may be retained and its imperfections lessened or avoided. To this catalogue of circumstances that tend to the amelioration of popular systems of civil government, I shall venture, however novel it may appear to some, to add one more: […] I mean the ENLARGEMENT of the ORBIT within which such systems are to revolve, either in respect to the dimensions of a single State or to the consolidation of several smaller States into one great Confederacy” (No.9).

Hamilton tries to identify which institutions made humankind progress towards good government. It is a very short list, which comprises: division of powers, bicameralism, independence of the judiciary and people’s representation in the legislative bodies. It shows that the invention of new institutions is a rare event in history. To this list he adds the federal principle.

The history of federalism begins with the Constitution of the United States. Its preamble starts with these words: “We the People of the United States […] do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America”. The meaning of such words is clear. They mark the beginning of a new democratic era in the history of international organizations. A Union of States was born which had no precedent in history: its constitutional bodies have a democratic, not a diplomatic structure.

While the government bodies of the Unions of States were formed until then by the representatives of the States and their decisions were applied to States, with the American Constitution they are directly elected by the people and their decisions are directly applied to citizens. The Federation is then a State, but does not possess all the features that States were having until then: the unification of all powers in one centre. The federal institutions allow representative democracy to express itself on two (but potentially more) government levels. The federal system allows the self-government principle to be applied to a plurality of power centres, which coexist within a constitutional democratic framework that includes all of them.

This typology of forms of democratic government (assembly, representative and federal) takes into account the relation between these three institutional innovations and the enlargement of the democratic State. With assembly-democracy the democratic State could not be larger than a city, i.e. the number of people that could gather in a square. Representative democracy made it possible to extend democratic government to a national scale. Federal democracy has made it possible to form a democratic government of dimensions enclosing an entire world region, that potentially may be enlarged to the whole world (through the extension of the number of levels of democratic government).

We can appreciate the extraordinary historical vision of the evolution of the forms of democratic government that are found in the Federalist Papers if we compare it with the point of view expressed by Robert Dahl, who is considered the most authoritative contemporary scholar of democracy. Dahl divides the history of democracy into three stages, but regarding the third stage, which he correctly defines as an attempt “to create transnational ‘democratic’ systems”, he expresses this opinion: “If the weakness of citizens in exercising final control of the agenda of collective decision-making is already a problem of the utmost seriousness in all democratic countries, then surely internationalization virtually nullifies the possibility.” (R. Dahl, Toward Democracy: A Journey. Reflections 1940-1997, 1997, I, 437).

Dahl recognizes the need to extend democracy to international level and denounces, not without reason, the limits of the results achieved thus far. But the blinders represented by the national point of view, which considers representative democracy to be the highest form of government, prevent him from appreciating the revolutionary innovations that are underway in the institutional construction of the European Union. The European Parliament is the first supranational Parliament in history and the first attempt to extend democracy to an international level in a region of the world that had experienced the tragedy of nationalism and world wars. Of course, it is an unfinished attempt, but Dahl is unable to grasp its great potential.

We can presume that anyone who had considered the functioning of the Westminster Parliament in the years immediately after the “glorious revolution” of 1688-89 would have probably expressed similar reservations (the right to vote limited to a very narrow class of citizens, excessive power of the established interests of the king and nobles, etc.). In fact, that Parliament is a pale anticipation of the House of Commons as it developed in the 19th and 20th centuries. But today we can readily say that the modern form of representative democracy has been progressively taking shape starting from that experiment, which made it possible to democratize the great territorial states governed by absolute monarchies.

Thus, today the European Union is the laboratory for a new kind of statehood inspired by a very widespread need in the world, namely that of constitutionalizing international relations. Its historical significance can be interpreted as the first stage in realizing the Kantian design of the “universal republic”. And in addition to this meaning of European unification, it is also a further step in the history of the evolution of forms of government. It is the start of the era of federalism, or rather of new forms of statehood based on solidarity among nations and international democracy.

India is another important laboratory for experiencing democracy within a political community with very many languages, cultures and religions, so that it can be conceived of as another model for world democracy. In fact, if Indian democracy truly is a successful test, since democracy has lasted more than 50 years in a country of more than one billion inhabitants, there is no reason to believe that similar democratic institutions are not fit for a community of six billion citizens, i.e. the world. The difference is only of quantity not quality, as Dahl believes.

Some boast that the liquidity crisis has been brilliantly archived. The Fed and the other central banks (whose independence of their respective Governments, but not always of the Fed, is sacred) have now learned how to create new ones, many fantastillion dollars worth. Don't worry is the catchword, it is not like in 1929 when gold was there, that “barbarian” relic!

Some are proud to have tucked away, so far, the solvency crisis. Governments and Governors are financing the self-proclaimed “system” by piling up lots of junk as collateral, while banks are authorized or sometimes encouraged to not let the true losses emerge, and reward managers for the brilliant results thus obtained. Don't worry, it is not like in 1929, when such practices were leading to imprisonment or suicide!

Some pretend to have curbed the confidence crisis and its harshest repercussions on the real economy. Even Governments, in fact, have become pretty clever and one night is enough for them to cavalierly pass from Friedman to Keynes, the former being used until yesterday to legitimize privatization of public goods and lucrative monopolies, the latter being a natural reference, against his will, whenever there is to burden the community, through the increase of public debt and a surely coming inflation, with the incommensurable losses of financial capitalism. Don't worry, it is not like in 1929, we are no longer in the stone age (sorry, the gold age)!

Such boasts, prides and pretenses allow governments and bankers to divert public opinion and their own reflection from the painful reality of the crises that follow the financial one, namely, in increasing-gravity order: marketism crisis, dollar crisis, legitimation crisis and governance crisis. Exposition reasons and the difficulty of synthesizing suggest to look at these crises one by one, without forgetting, however, that they are actually intertwined. Moreover, they constitute, together with the financial and economic crisis (liquidity, solvency, confidence/demand), several aspects of a single global crisis, to understand which a multidisciplinary approach is required. The so-called “imperialism of the economic science” has never been so much inappropriate to the need. For example, one should not talk of the currency without having in mind some categories of power (history and political science) and without considering some emotions capable of arousing mass phenomena like euphoria and panic (behavioral psychology, psychology of the masses and experimental neuro-psychiatry).

I borrow from the Italian Minister of the Economy the expression marketism crisis for its being so concise and telling. Others speak of the end of market fundamentalism, of the neo-con economy, of an unbridled and unruled market. But we all speak of the same thing: the economic ideology that has been dominating unopposed for three decades, instrumentum regni of the American hegemony.

Deregulation, the magic word waved by Reagan-Thatcher and their brave emulators, has allowed the “system” (bank-finance-markets) to create new financial instruments backed by credits of dubious exigibility, and “vehicle-societies” necessary for decomposing, recomposing and dressing them up in various guises in order to finally stuff them in the portfolios of the equities destined to invest our savings in; to take risks with leverages (debt to equity ratios) as high as 30-50:1 (or more), in (substantial) disregard of the Basel norms and national rules, that may be applied to banks only; to pursue short-term profits disregarding “external” diseconomies (the affected externals are us, our living environment, our dignity as workers and individuals) and the costs projected into the future (our grandchildren do not vote); to ignore in their speculative fury indexes that are under everybody's eyes, like Fischer's on the trend of real estate prices, and to distribute the fake wealth thus created among its producers (the “sorcerer's apprentices” and their shareholders), thus fueling ostentatious consumption models, symbolic of the new global elite, the distorted use of resources, the richness of yachts and jets and the poverty of hospitals and schools, the underproduction of essential goods, most of them public, and the overproduction of superfluous goods, always private.

In order to make all this happen, it was necessary beforehand to strip the regulation and surveillance authorities in the banking and financial system of most of their powers, and encourage them to not apply with due diligence the remaining ones. Done. Care to do that, at the pressing request (immoral suasion) of the United States, has been taken by politicians of several countries we elected with the task to protect our interests, a democratic counterbalance to the huge power of financial capitalism (alas, an unequal national counterbalance to global capital; but I will talk about that later: one crisis at a time!). A crime, for sure, but what for?

The first motive for the crime: to allow to finance the US deficit of current expenditure balance, hence of the American wars, without the corresponding taxation of the American people. Probably the consensus on the Iraqi war would have collapsed in the face of a previous democratic discussion about its costs and financing methods, both in the US and in the allied countries.

The second motive for the crime: to allow the weakest population layers to gain access to the property of their house and to other goods. It would then be these Americans, dispossessed today of their homes and forced to live in tents or in rigged up shelters, the ultimate “beneficiaries” of the crime, the ones who did not see one cent of the trillions of public dollars poured over Wall Street! This motive would be a justification for discharging the political and financial managers who erred, OK, but for too much love for the people. I stop here because we are on the verge of crime support.

Anyway, this argument is pointless, because no trial is in sight. The majority of those managers have just self-discharged, self-promoted and self-gratified, ready to go on as before and, if possible, worse than before “with other people's money”, as Luciano Gallino says (University of Turin, 2009). It is better, then, to limit ourselves to check what has been done so far of the solemn intentions proclaimed in London last April by the Twenty (who still look to be getting their act together).

As to the United States, Barry Eichengreen (Eurointelligence, 2009) thinks that “the Administration’s much vaunted proposals for regulatory reform have been reduced to rearranging the deck-chairs on the Titanic”. In fact: 1) about bank re-capitalization, “rather than the $275 billion of new bank capital deemed necessary by the IMF, the Treasury’s infamous stress tests concluded that all that was needed was the $75 billion that could be raised from private sources: More would have been better. We would not be looking forward to a credit-less recovery. But injecting public money was impossible for political reasons”; 2) “the banks have pushed back against significantly tighter regulation. There clearly will be no new Glass-Steagall Act over their opposition. There will be no attempt to break up institutions that are both too big to fail and too big to save. There will be no meaningful reform of executive compensation”. (The new AIG President, rescued with public money, for example, will earn in total thirty times more than President Obama); 3) “the housing industry similarly pushed back against giving bankruptcy judges new power to modify mortgages. This key provision of the Obama Administration’s housing package has not made its way through the Senate. The regulators themselves have pushed back against the creation of a unified supervisor”.

Similar obstacles, made worse by the possibility of national States' vetoes, were met by the new regulations in the European Union. 1) the IMF (Global Financial Stability Report, April 2009) estimates that in the euro-zone about 900 billion dollars of bank writedowns will be necessary, only 150 of which done in the biennium 2007-2008 and the others postponed to 2009-2010 (in the US the amount is over 1000 billions, but in the biennium 2007-2008 almost a half of those has already been ascertained). Proposals of a European initiative for the creation of an Agency tasked with carrying out the necessary re-capitalizations do not seem to meet the necessary consensus. Against them people argue that the resources destined to reorganizations come from national contributions and that surveillance too is mostly national. So, the Brussels Commission limited itself to working out a procedure for authorizing the reorganization plans of European banks in difficulties: harmonized parameters for the stress tests, diagnosis of the problematic assets and a restructuring plan for recovering profitability in the long term envisaging a change in the business model, requiring in many cases liquidation and a scaling down of activities. The attempt is to metabolize the enormous flow of public aids to the sector and to restore conditions of general profitability in the long term, minimizing distortions to competition and to the single market. No supra-national body is there to assure that the actual application of the harmonized parameters in each member State will not produce distortions or will undermine the restoration of confidence. No supranational approach is there to help to limit the risk of cross-border bank insolvency, as the cases of Fortis and Hypo Real Estate showed. 2) As to surveillance, a compromise has been reached on the basis of the proposals by the De Larosière Commission, consisting in the distinction between micro- and macro-supervision. Micro-supervision is concerned with the surveillance over individual mediators and is entrusted to the European System of financial supervisors, a body composed of representatives of the three types of national supervising authorities over banks, insurances and stock exchanges in the 27 member States. Macro-supervision's objective, instead, is financial stability and macro-prudential surveillance over big financial institutions with trans-national activities, and is entrusted to the European Council of systemic risks, presided over by a man chosen by the ECB Council (he should be the ECB President himself, appointed indirectly). It is not clear yet who and how shall control the rating Agencies, how the Credit Default Swaps shall be dealt with, etc. The magnitude of the European reform could be judged in the autumn, when the Brussels Commission will present to the Council and to the Parliament the proposed directives, that should enter into force in 2010.

Some want people to believe that also the dollar crisis, i.e. its role as international currency, has been exorcised. To demonstrate the contrary, I will not cite theoretical economists, but the very practical billionaire Warren Buffet (NYT, 2009). In this way I should convince even the by-now disenchanted Queen Elizabeth. In 2009 the US-balance deficit will rise to about 13% of GDP (1800 billion dollars), making its public debt explode to 56% of GDP by the end of the year, to the tune of 1% per month. “An increase of public debt -Buffet reminds us- can be financed in three ways: by asking for money to be lent by foreigners, by asking for money to be lent by our citizens, or, in roundabout ways, by stamping money”. As to the first financing method, “the payments-balance deficit -dollars that we forcefully dish out to the rest of the world and which have to be invested- will amount this year to about 400 billions”. One must assume that they are totally reinvested, beginning with China, in buying American State-bonds, but “some countries may decide that buying shares, real estate properties or entire American companies makes more sense than stuffing oneself with bonds denominated in dollars. Signs of that are multiplying recently”. As to the second method, “let us assume that Americans save 500 billion dollars, which is much more than what they saved in the last years, but is perhaps in line with the new mood of the nation... and that they choose to invest all of their savings in American State-bonds. Even with all these heroic assumptions, the Treasury will be forced to find another 900 billion dollars to finance the remaining part of the 1800 billions debt that it is issuing. The mint's rotaries will have to work overtime”. Buffet calls for stopping the increase of public debt, but acknowledges that rising taxes or cutting expenditures may jeopardize the reelection of congressmen, while “a higher inflation rate never requires to be voted on and cannot be charged to specific actions promoted by a representative of the people”.

On the other hand, Larry Summers himself, in a speech at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, reported on by Fred Bergsten and Arvind Subramanian (FT, 2009), admitted that there is a contradiction between the status of superpower and the growing dependence on finances from abroad, and announced a policy aimed to reduce the deficit with foreign countries (increasing exports and reducing imports). This implies a devaluation of the dollar, in particular relative to the currencies enjoying the most significant surpluses with the United States, which could spark off a spiral of competitive devaluations and a trade war.

It is not a surprise that China, at the head of the BRIC countries, put forward once more the proposal of a currency to be issued independently of individual States, a world currency to be created taking the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) as the starting point (a world currency unit, as Alfonso Iozzo and myself were proposing on this review in 2006). It does not come as a surprise the decision by those countries to replace the dollar with their own currencies for paying the transactions among themselves, and often with the respective areas of most intensive exchanges. This is also reinforcing the tendency, already going on for some time, towards a progressive de-dollarization of the world economy and towards its transformation into a multicurrency foreign exchange system which, answering in a disordered fashion to the need of diversifying, may result costly, complex and risky.

The Chinese project is opposed not only by the United States (for understandable political reasons, not coinciding with the real economic interests of the American citizens), but also by the European Union, and that is not understandable under any aspect. As Lucio Levi observed (L’Unità Europea, 2009, n. 425-26), “Here lies Europe's malady. Here is the deepest reason for the citizens' disaffection with the European institutions. Commissioner Almunia, by saying no to the Chinese plan, chose to continue the policy of subordination to the USA in a moment when the world is evolving towards a multipolar order and the US needs to be helped to share with others the political and economic responsibilities it cannot any longer fulfill alone. It is an eschewing policy that has no justification. The EU, thanks to the euro, would indeed have the power to win the US resistance and start realizing the project of a world currency”.

The amount of public resources earmarked for rescuing private banking companies should lead, if public opinion were well informed and judicious enough, to a legitimation crisis regarding the control of some of the biggest banking and financial institutions in the world on the part of their shareholders and managers. Assuming (but not agreeing) that privately managing the groups which the destiny of the world economy depends on is better, that privilege should be legitimized by their sense of responsibility and sanctioned by their failure. Nothing of that. Privilege and nothing else.

The question has been raised, in commenting on the Geithner plan, by Paul Krugman (NYT, 2009) in these terms: “by using taxpayer funds to subsidize the prices of toxic waste, the administration would shower benefits on everyone who made the mistake of buying the stuff… And this means that the government would have to lay out trillions of dollars to bring the financial system back to health, which would, in turn, both ensure a fierce public outcry and add to already serious concerns about the deficit… Officials still aren’t willing to face the facts. They don’t want to face up to the dire state of major financial institutions because it’s very hard to rescue an essentially insolvent bank without, at least temporarily, taking it over. And temporary nationalization is still, apparently, considered unthinkable”.

Joseph Stiglitz (Der Spiegel, 2009) adds: “What the Obama administration is doing is worse than a nationalization: it is pseudo-capitalism, which privatizes the profits and socializes the losses. It is a partnership in which one partner robs the other. Such a partnership, whose control is in private hands, produces perverse stimuli, even worse than those that brought us to the present chaos... [The Geithner plan] has allowed the Obama administration to not go back to Congress and ask for the money necessary to rescue our banks, and has thus offered a way to avoid nationalization”.

The reflection on property (that is, on the power to make use of resources) has just started and could widen and consider other solutions, going beyond the peremptory alternative between private property or nationalization. One could take inspiration from several models, depending on the situations, the goals and the size of the interventions. I am thinking, for example, of the success of the multinational Agencies and Consortia through which a modest amount of public resources is sufficient to mobilize, thanks to the credibility of the European Union and to its process of selecting projects, significant private resources; of the fortunate spreading, in particular in Italy and France, of forms of cooperative-enterprise property, not only in the production and consumption fields, but also in retail banking and insurances; of the Italian experience of Bank Foundations, which offered to some of the biggest banking institutions stable prime share-holders, able to balance the short-term objectives of the markets with the long-term objectives of the territories; of the interaction projects between Foundations, Sovereign Funds and financial institutions like the Italian Cassa Depositi e Prestiti under study in France and Germany. And I also think that those new kinds of property could allow a first implementation of James Meade's Agathotopia, contemplating the issuing of a “citizenship dividend” that would represent the return on the investment made in rescuing the banks (an investment charged primarily to the weaker population layers, either if the bill will be paid through taxes or if it will be paid through inflation).

The mother of all these crises is the governance crisis or rather the crisis of “the many governance centers that do not make one government of the global economy” (Stiglitz, 2006). The decision to put the problems aroused by the crisis on the G20 agenda constitutes a significant progress in passing from the American supremacy to international cooperation. We shall not forget that the Bretton Woods Conference was in actual fact a G2 between Keynes, for the exiting superpower, and White, for the entering one. The rebalancing of weights between the different areas of the world, occurred from 1944 to the present day, makes us believe that a similar passing of the baton from the dollar to the yuan is to be ruled out, and that, instead, there is to devise more balanced, agreed to, thoughtful solutions, even with regard to the needs of the developing world, and applicable, at least potentially, to the entire world.

There is therefore to give an emblematic prominence to an event that has been instead neglected by the media. Last June 23 the UN Conference on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and Its Impact on Development took place in New York. An agreement was reached on the causes of the crisis and on why it is having such a terribly negative impact on the developing countries. Some measures have also been outlined that should be taken into consideration and a working group has been formed to find out new possibilities of intervention. Stiglitz himself, President of the Commission of experts appointed by the President of the UN General Assembly to prepare the Conference, has summed up the main innovations in the UN approach compared to the G20's (Project Syndicate, 2009):

“… The UN showed that decision-making needn’t be restricted to a self-selected club, lacking political legitimacy, and largely dominated by those who had considerable responsibility for the crisis in the first place… The most sensitive issue touched upon by the UN conference – too sensitive to be discussed at the G-20 – was the reform of the global reserve system. The build-up of reserves contributes to global imbalances and insufficient global aggregate demand, as countries put aside hundreds of billions of dollars as a precaution against global volatility. Not surprisingly, America, which benefits by getting trillions of dollars of loans from developing countries – now at almost no interest – was not enthusiastic about the discussion. But, whether the US likes it or not, the dollar reserve system is fraying; the question is only whether we move from the current system to an alternative in a haphazard way, or in a more careful and structured way. Those with large amounts of reserves know that holding dollars is a bad deal: no or low return and a high risk of inflation or currency depreciation, either of which would diminish their holdings’ real value. On the last day of the conference, as America was expressing its reservations about even discussing at the UN this issue which affects all countries’ well being, China was once again reiterating that the time had come to begin working on a global reserve currency. Since a country’s currency can be a reserve currency only if others are willing to accept it as such, time may be running out for the dollar ... The US and other advanced industrial countries pushed globalization. But this crisis has shown that they have not managed globalization as well as they should have. If globalization is to work for everyone, decisions about how to manage it must be made in a democratic and inclusive manner – with the participation of both the perpetrators and the victims of the mistakes. The UN, notwithstanding all of its flaws, is the one inclusive international institution…”.

On September 2009, also the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development issued a report calling for a Global Reserve Bank with the power to issue its own currency, to monitor its members' national exchange rates, and to prop up or push down their currencies.

I am sure, however, that Stiglitz himself, should he take off his UN garments, would not have any difficulty to admit that the General Assembly's Conference was in a position to tackle issues excluded at the G20 for the simple reason that, unfortunately, it is deprived of effective powers. The only UN body with decision-making powers, the Security Council, is not indeed an example of democracy. That is why we must acknowledge the progress represented by the choice to address the crisis in a wider and more representative venue like the G20, whereas I believe that a great project to strengthen and democratize the UN is to be put on the agenda if we want to be capable of facing the new distressing global problems. The initiative could be taken up by the Sleeping Beauty, the European Union, which represents the laboratory experimenting how to regulate and govern the international economy, and a point of reference for whoever poses himself the problem of how to govern globalization. But which Prince, or federator, will come and kiss her?

Ever since the advent of nuclear weapons, the debate over the issues of global security within the ambit of their possession has undergone alarming variations. In practical sense, one can discern identifiable differences between various levels of thinking and behavior, along with the real circumstances in which we live today. Though the goal of nuclear weapons elimination is to be preferably pursued, it is an uphill task and, as rightly encapsulated in the “Project Base Camp”, is at the top of the mountain.

What is of decisive urgency is the inclination of engaging all nuclear weapon states (NWS) in the debate over nuclear disarmament. The ensuing debate is often confined to strategic arms reductions between the US and Russia, thus making it a bilateral concern. The need of today to accentuate that nuclear disarmament is a collective task and all nuclear weapon states (NWS) are required to join their hands together towards attaining this goal. The prime focus of the “Project Base Camp” is that it provides leverage to all the stakeholders to think creatively and gainfully towards a nuclear weapons-free world. It gives a conceptual background for the immediate steps, which can be harmonized with those measures that are far-flung on the climb to the top of the mountain. In the “Project Base Camp”, the idea of proportional reductions will bear positive results whereby the dilemma of “you go first or I go first” can be addressed creatively and constructively.

Following this approach, different states will be disarming at varied rates so that at the end of a pre-determined time all states will have to remain content with the same number of reduced weapons. The primacy of nuclear weapons has to be de-valued as a currency of power or, in other words, nuclear weapons have to be de-legitimized. There has to be brought out a general disincentive towards nuclear weapons and in this task a normative vision of a nuclear weapons-free world (NWFW) would gear up the process significantly. Such delegitimization has to be coupled with doctrinal shifts and transformations where a comprehensive restructuring of NWS national security strategies and military organizations would be required in all probabilities. Further, the delegitimization processes will accentuate an ethical aspiration which would necessitate some sort of sacrifices from all stakeholders.

Eventually, the emergence of that situation is extremely significant in which the world succeeds in getting the elimination of all nuclear weapons. The most serious apprehension at that point in time would be the risk of someone amongst the stakeholders deceiving in the process. To appreciate the dream of a nuclear weapons-free world (NWFW) these problems need to be tackled right now. In this context, first the nuclear weapon states (NWS) and the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) have to function in unanimity to enforce agreements in letter and spirit that are already concluded. This will necessitate stricter enforcement measures, and defiance of any sort need to be tackled more seriously and conclusively.

In the contemporary nuclear world scenarios, due to the awesome nature of nuclear stockpiles which nine states (the US, Russia, UK, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea) possess, decision-makers can be complacent in the presence of defiance, but in a world free of nuclear weapons any infringement has to be strictly checked by all means. Nuclear weapons can possibly be dismantled, but it is absolutely impossible to make zero the possessor’s scientific knowledge and technical know-how of making these weapons and therefore to debate that irreversibility is an ideal goal is very likely to enlarge the logic too far. In all such cases, transparency will be irrevocably required in their behavior and actions.

Conceptually, the “Project Base Camp” is pre-occupied with a number of issue-oriented challenges. First, the issue of shared responsibilities. For example, it can gain renewed momentum through the NPT Review Conference, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) framework or the special sessions of Disarmament in the UN. However what needs to be observed is that very often mutuality of shared responsibilities is confronted with a predisposition of biased responsibilities. Mutuality of shared responsibilities without structuring the individual responsibilities of different NWS and NNWS can culminate into elusive roles. Just like the discourse on global warming and climate change, the emerging issues of nuclear disarmament in the current situations encompass responsibilities especially on the part of permanent members of the UN Security Council to pursue negotiations in good faith to disarm. The US and Russia have to go ahead on both qualitative as well as quantitative cuts and others may join them later on the road to nuclear disarmament. The issues of how and when others contribute to the inputs of the US and Russia need to be ascertained.

Moreover an Asian discourse on nuclear disarmament is the need of the hour, especially when 21st century is marked as the century of Asia due to the rise of China and India as economic giants, without elaborating on regional instabilities and contradictions in the nuclear and other fields in the post-9/11 situation. The nuclear discourse in Asia should be one which is all-encompassing in nature and should not be limited to NWS, because the possession and proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Asian continent may not be free from the challenge of covertness adopted by the possessors and threshold proliferators. There can be threshold states possessing the technology to go nuclear and therefore their inclusion is very important.

Second, there are needs for removing functional ambiguities and implementing credible measures by the nuclear weapon states (NWS). This may lead to feeling among the NNWS that concrete steps are being taken to insure progress towards nuclear disarmament. Hence, substantial preparation has to be made for the success of the forthcoming NPT Review Conference in 2010.

Third is the challenge of proportional cuts or numerical reductions of nuclear weapons and capabilities on the part of the states to reach the point “global zero”. The real challenge facing the world today is not of going ahead towards a fixed cut in the nuclear arsenals, but that of averting any employment of nuclear weapons anywhere by states or any non-state actors. Presently, the non-use of nuclear weapons can be a contentious issue in any nuclear debate, but making a distinction between civilian combatants and non-civilian combatants is an uphill task and, therefore, substantial steps to appreciate the moral issue on a relative basis should be discussed by analyzing different targeting plans.

Fourth, delegitimization essentially involves devaluing nuclear weapons as currency of power to deny their eventual use. The issue which then needs to be tackled is why the delegitimization has not witnessed progression with nuclear weapons. The simple reason is that nuclear weapons have provided exclusive political and security dividends by their internationalization as the currency of power for over six decades. The debate on nuclear disarmament in the past has been encapsulated in a very strict framework of a cut within some pre-determined time, or has been negotiated within the confines of moral overtures and therefore delegitimization needs to follow a balanced approach.

Fifth is the impinging uncertainty in the behaviors of non-state actors, especially after 9/11. In the post-9/11 situation, a new dimension of global insecurity is persistent on account of growing dangers of nuclear terrorism, whose cadres are not worried about earthly punishments. The diffusion of technology and the smuggling of radioactive materials and items through illegal channels can increase the possibility of clandestine spread and use of “dirty bombs”. More significantly, the threat of nuclear terrorism looms large in South Asia, given the nuclear proliferation history in the region, especially Pakistan and AQ Khan connection, Al Qaeda network and the probable diffusion of nuclear materials and technology through illegal channels in the region. In such situations, the Asian dialogue process on nuclear disarmament must involve the need of developing appropriate nuclear forensic techniques, as well as overcoming important strategic, political, diplomatic and organizational challenges in the region.

Lastly, an incessant challenge is that there will be changes in the global politico-strategic milieu and it remains uncertain how the “Base Camp” approaches will cope with such changes and consequential shifts to reach the Top, i.e. the elimination of nuclear weapons. Notably, disinvention of nuclear weapons is not possible. But their possession and production can be curbed by building a global, comprehensive, non-discriminatory inter­national regime of nuclear disarmament. This sort of regime should find a viable way to ensure de-legitimization and de-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The US President Barak Obama’s decision to shelve the East European missile shield must be taken as a positive step towards the US-Russia shared mutuality and nuclear reductions in the years to come. The East European missile defense system planned under the Bush Administration in 2006 has been a major irritant in the US relations with Russia. This missile shield was to have been built by installing 10 interceptors in Poland and a radar system in the Czech Republic, which are East European nations at Russia’s doorstep and once under Soviet sway. Moscow has already argued vehemently that the system, if installed, would undermine the nuclear deterrent of its vast arsenal. In the US view, it was intended to protect Europe and the US from a rogue missile attack from Iran or North Korea and not to undermine Russia’s strategic deterrent.

Clearly, the US President Barak Obama’s decision to abandon the Bush administration’s missile defence plan came about because of a change in the U.S. perception of the threat posed by Iran. The Obama Administration perceives that short- and medium-range missiles from Iran now pose a greater near-term threat than the intercontinental ballistic missiles that the Bush plan addressed. Further, this decision can be taken at least in part as an attempt to conciliate Russia at a time when its support against Iran’s suspected nuclear programme has been irrevocably required. Given the world economic crisis, Obama’s pragmatic decision is appreciable, because this project would have given nothing but trouble for the US-Russian relations in this part of the globe.

Obama’s step is now going to serve as a predictable move of key importance towards a new strategic arms reduction treaty (START) to replace the soon-to-expire 1991 START agreement. Now the US and Russia can seek the ways through which the new START agreement will be completed on time, because the thorny issue of missile defense and its influence on the strategic balance has been removed for the time being. As a process of positive reciprocity to Obama’s decision of scrapping the East European missile shield, the available opportunity has contributed substantially to a warmer dialogue between Moscow and Washington and has induced Russia to offer reciprocal concessions as a specific “No” to the deployment of Iskander missile systems in Kaliningrad. That’s quite a significant step towards nuclear disarmament. The issues of how and when others contribute to the inputs of the US and Russia need be ascertained. Others will only join in when these two principal nuclear weapons states (NWS) cut their nuclear stockpiles and delivery systems drastically.

It is impossible to sum up in a few lines the many themes treated in Benedict XVI's encyclical letter Caritas in Veritate (Charity in Truth), which in effect raised a notable interest in many circles. We will skip, of course, over the religious, or, to be more precise, confessional dimension of the Pope's document, and will focus instead on its more genuinely political, social and economic aspects.

A word must be said, however, to situate this encyclical letter in the corpus of the Church's social doctrine, a concern actually present in many of its pages. Although stating several times that this text wants to place itself within a tradition that dates back to at least the Rerum novarum, Benedict XVI singles out the Populorum progressio, to which an entire chapter and many citations are devoted, as a turning point. In fact, Paul VI “clearly understood that the social question had become worldwide and he grasped the interconnection between the impetus towards the unification of humanity and the Christian ideal of a single family of peoples in solidarity and fraternity” (para. 13). For that reason, “the Populorum Progressio deserves to be considered as the Rerum Novarum of the present age, shedding light upon humanity's journey towards unity”. (para. 8). So, to sum up what the Pontiff is only hinting at: Leo XIII provided a first answer to the social question during the industrial revolution, which at that time was affecting only western Europe and the United States; Paul VI underlined that at that moment, after the attainments of the Welfare State in what Hobsbawm defined the golden age of the western world, the real scandal had become the ever growing gulf between the “peoples in hunger” and the “peoples with abundance”; Benedict XVI intends to bring up to date the Church's social thought in the globalization era, marked by “a picture of development that has many overlapping layers” that make “the demarcation line between rich and poor countries no longer as clear as it was at the time of Populorum Progressio” (para. 22).

Two additional preliminary observations are required. The text shows an in depth knowledge of today's culture and, in particular, it makes use of many reflections of the German philosophy of the 1900s. Although, besides the canonical St. Augustine and St. Thomas, the only mentioned philosopher is Heraclitus of Ephesus, one makes no big effort to recognize a series of concepts taken from Max Weber (the disenchantment of the world), Martin Heidegger (the absolutism of technology), Hans Jonas (the principle of responsibility), Juergen Habermas (the divorce of ethics and politics). In addition, one cannot but observe how the restated conviction, written down in the first pages, that “the Church has no technical solutions to offer and does not claim to interfere in any way in the politics of States” (para. 9), is later on contradicted by a series of concrete proposals, sometimes even in detail, on the institutional, political, social and economic plane.

Those proposals are correctly introduced by an articulate analysis “of the malfunctions and dramatic problems, highlighted even further by the current crisis: …the technical forces in play, the global interrelations, the damaging effects on the real economy of badly managed and largely speculative financial dealings, large-scale migration of peoples, often provoked by some particular circumstance and then given insufficient attention, the unregulated exploitation of the earth's resources” (para. 21). Although it is recognized that globalization “has lifted billions of people out of misery – recently it has given many countries the possibility of becoming effective players in international politics” (para. 21), the Pope denounces that “a complete re-examination of development was needed” (par. 23) after the collapse of the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe and the end of the so-called opposing blocs. Instead, the economic activity has been separated from the political and, even more so, from the moral one. “It must be remembered – Benedict XVI adds with accents that remind us of Alexander Hamilton and Luigi Einaudi – that the market does not exist in the pure state” and that the economic sphere “must be structured and governed in an ethical manner” (para. 36).

The consequences of the one and only thought which, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, has driven and oriented the globalization process are also analyzed with great attention. At the economic level, “lowering the level of protection accorded to the rights of workers, or abandoning mechanisms of wealth redistribution in order to increase the country's international competitiveness, hinder the achievement of lasting development”. Thus, “tendencies towards a short-term economy – sometimes very short-term” (par. 32) prevail, an economy that takes no care of human costs or the Planet's ecological well-being. Further on it is better explained that the emergence of new, ever bigger enterprises, ever less connected to “a stable director who feels responsible in the long term, not just the short term, for the life and the results of his company (…) can weaken the company's sense of responsibility towards the stakeholders – namely the workers, the suppliers, the consumers, the natural environment and broader society – in favor of the shareholders, who are not tied to a specific geographical area and who therefore enjoy extraordinary mobility” (par. 40). At the political level, “the State finds itself having to address the limitations to its sovereignty imposed by the new context of international trade and finance, which is characterized by increasing mobility both of financial capital and means of production, material and immaterial” (par. 24). The erosion of the power of States has brought about the crisis of the protection and welfare systems, forced to “downsize social security systems as the price to be paid for seeking greater competitive advantage in the global market, with consequent grave danger for the rights of workers, for fundamental human rights and for the solidarity associated with the traditional forms of the social State” (para. 25). The Pope, of course, is very careful not to use the categories of historical materialism, but the contradiction between an ever more globalized economy and politics, still confined in states' boundaries, is clearly delineated. When Paul VI wrote the Populorum progressio, “economic activity and the political process were both largely conducted within the same geographical area, and could therefore feed off one another” (para. 24), whereas today the two spheres tend to diverge more and more, making it so that economic globalization “actually undermines the foundations of democracy” (par. 41). To say it in terms of an alternative more familiar to federalists: either we will succeed in democratizing globalization, or globalization will end up wiping democracy out.

The most innovative part of the Encyclical is for sure, however, in the proposals contained in the last chapters. In fact, “the significant new elements in the picture of the development of peoples today in many cases demand new solutions” (para. 32). It is a matter – Ratzinger argues a little later – of “broadening the scope of reason and making it capable of knowing and directing these powerful new forces” (para. 33). Not by chance these words are underlined in italics, because, as Paul VI had already realized, “among the causes of underdevelopment there is a lack of wisdom and reflection, a lack of thinking capable of formulating a guiding synthesis” (para. 31). And the present Pontiff does not surely shy away from such “an altogether new and creative challenge, one that is certainly vast and complex” (para. 33).

I do not think that I am giving a distorted interpretation if I say that in the propositional part of the Encyclical the issue of a world government has an absolute centrality, in the conviction that there is a “shortage of social resources, the most important of which are institutional” (para. 27). In the text, care is taken to suitably remind that already John XXIII in his Pacem in terris, and the Second Vatican Ecumenical Council in its Gaudium et spes had raised that need. Compared to those precedents, the Caritas in veritate contains two important novelties. First of all, it underlines that a world government, beside being necessary, is indeed urgent: “ To manage the global economy; to revive economies hit by the crisis; to avoid any deterioration of the present crisis and the greater imbalances that would result; to bring about integral and timely disarmament, food security and peace; to guarantee the protection of the environment and to regulate migration: for all this, there is urgent need of a true world political authority” (para. 67). The most important novelty, which contradicts, as we said above, the promise not to provide “technical solutions”, lies, however, in a series of precise advices accompanying the proposal: “Furthermore, such an authority would need to be universally recognized and to be vested with the effective power to ensure security for all, regard for justice, and respect for rights. Obviously it would have to have the authority to ensure compliance with its decisions from all parties, and also with the coordinated measures adopted in various international forums. Without this, despite the great progress accomplished in various sectors, international law would risk being conditioned by the balance of power among the strongest nations” (para. 67).

We know that the only institutional model capable of realizing those objectives is the federal one. Well, in the text there is nowhere any explicit reference to federalism, but Joseph Ratzinger, for many years a citizen of the German Federal Republic, proves to know very well the federalist theory of the State when he writes: “In order not to produce a dangerous universal power of a tyrannical nature, the governance of globalization must be marked by subsidiarity, articulated into several layers and involving different levels that can work together. Globalization certainly requires authority, insofar as it poses the problem of a global common good that needs to be pursued. This authority, however, must be organized in a subsidiary and stratified way, if it is not to infringe upon freedom and if it is to yield effective results in practice” (para. 57). Then, having in mind, perhaps, the distortions the principle of subsidiarity has been subjected to in recent times, he adds: “The principle of subsidiarity must remain closely linked to the principle of solidarity and vice versa, since the former without the latter gives way to social privatism, while the latter without the former gives way to paternalist social assistance that is demeaning to those in need” (para. 58).

Thanks also to the impulse of environmentalist and ecologist movements, the federalists in the last decades, along with their traditional attention to institutional aspects, have carried out a series of reflections on the new development model, that have made federalism a political doctrine able to give a not-only-institutional answer to the serious problems of today's world. It must be said that in the Encyclical this dimension is also present: “It is likewise incumbent upon the competent authorities to make every effort to ensure that the economic and social costs of using up shared environmental resources are recognized with transparency and fully borne by those who incur them, not by other peoples or future generations” (para. 50). “This invites contemporary society – it is recommended more precisely a little later – to a serious review of its life-style, which, in many parts of the world, is prone to hedonism and consumerism, regardless of their harmful consequences” (para. 51). We cannot dwell here on the many suggestions put forward to give substance to those new life-styles, inspired by “more moderation”: reforms to give dignity to labor, development of workers unions and cooperatives, micro-finance, social responsibility of savers and consumers, a new model of international tourism, to mention just a few. We will limit ourselves to mentioning the strong censure against an economic development that “is exposed as a destructive sham if it relies on the “wonders” of finance in order to sustain unnatural and consumerist growth” (para. 68).

Our analysis of the Caritas in veritate would not be complete if we do not point out two serious limits. First, one remains really puzzled noting how the Pope limits himself to calling for “a reform of the United Nations Organization, and likewise of economic institutions and international finance” (para. 67) adding no additional suggestions. One has almost the impression that the hoped-for World Political Authority shall replace the United Nations rather than originate from its radical reform, as the WFM recommends instead. Even worse is the fact that no mention is made of the European Union and the other regional organizations which, following precisely the EU example, have been formed in all continents and should constitute the bastions of the new world order and the new UN architecture.

The first round of the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (broader version of the SEDs started in 2005) was held in Washington, D.C., from 27 to 28 July, 2009. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton (who during the presidential primary campaign declared that the US relationship with China would be the "most bilateral relationship in the world in this century") and Secretary of the Treasury Timothy F. Geithner, as special representatives of President Barack Obama, and Vice Premier Wang Qishan and State Councilor Dai Bingguo, as special representatives of Chinese President Hu Jintao, co-chaired the Dialogue, which included Strategic and Economic tracks under this framework. President Obama opened the meeting by declaring that the two countries share a responsibility for the 21st century, and should strive to cooperate not only on economic matters but also on key issues such as climate change, nuclear proliferation and transnational threats. This was in fact the aim of the enlarged formula of the SED, with the two sides exchanging views on a wider range of topics, including security: they pledged to enhance anti-terror cooperation and cooperation on regional (North Korea) and international security issues, welcoming recent improvements in military-to-military relations; they agreed that the two militaries would expand exchanges at all levels and gave a positive assessment of the results of the recent Ministry of National Defense- Defense Department co-led Defense Consultative Talks (DCT) in Beijing, and noted that Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission General Xu Caihou is going to visit the United States within this year at the invitation of Defense Secretary Robert Gates.

No matter whether this is going to be a formal G2, which is very unlikely, in a planet under pressure of global threats the fact is that China and the US are doomed to dialogue as the biggest political subjects on the scene; their de facto hegemony relies not only on their mutual economic and financial dependence: China has already the second-largest military budget. But, starting from the financial and economic field, their relationship is uneasy and not exclusive: in Washington, China asked for more representation of the developing countries (starting from Brazil, Russia and India) in the International Financial Institutions, and it was the head of China's Central Bank who proposed a new world reserve currency. In the Joint Fact Sheet they released upon conclusion of the Economic Track, the two sides agreed on both of them taking measures to promote balanced and sustainable economic growth in their domestic economies, to ensure a strong recovery from the international financial crisis. In other words, on the one hand, China asked the United States to protect its investment assets, taking measures to increase US national savings as a share of GDP and adopting policies that will encourage household savings, and the United States declared its commitment to reduce the federal budget deficit relative to GDP to a sustainable level by 2013; while, on the other hand, the United States asked China to implement structural and macro-economic policies to stimulate domestic demand and increase the contribution of consumption to GDP growth, to further enhance access in its service market and expand areas and channels for non-governmental investments, with a view to expedite the development of its services industry and increase the share of services in GDP; China should also deepen social safety net reform, including strengthening its basic old-age insurance system and enterprise annuities.

Even more important, the two sides negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to Enhance Cooperation on Climate Change, Energy and the Environment . The MOU "establishes a mechanism for climate change policy dialogue and cooperation, to promote (i) discussion and exchange of views on domestic strategies and policies for addressing climate change; (ii) practical solutions for promoting the transition to low-carbon economies; (iii) successful international negotiations on climate change; (iv) joint research, development, deployment, and transfer, as mutually agreed, of climate-friendly technologies; (v) cooperation on specific projects; (vi) adaptation to climate change; (vii) capacity building and the raising of public awareness; and (viii) pragmatic cooperation on climate change between cities, universities, provinces and states of the two countries".

President Barack Obama will visit China this year at the invitation of President Hu Jintao and the second round of the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue will be held in Beijing next year. The two main actors of the world policy have definitively moved "from hostility to engagement", but who is going to help them avoid the temptation of making G2s?

Within the Arab context, two questions normally arise when addressing the issue of economic integration in the Arab world: Why would rich states agree to integrate with poor ones, and what would be the economic benefit from this integration? The failure to adequately and practically address such an issue was one of the main reasons behind the demise of the Arab nationalism project, despite its rhetoric of creating one single Arab state that would integrate the region’s economies for the benefit of all.

Difficulties with such a scenario fall between structures and policies. The structure factor refers to the disparities in economic power and population and the similarities of modes of production; while the policies factor refers to political conflict of interests and international influences on individual states through bilateral agreements. In terms of GDP, GDP per capita and population (see tables 1 to 3), the GDP of Saudi Arabia is 250 times that of Mauritania, the GDP per capita of Qatar is 90 times that of Mauritania, and the population of Egypt is almost 100 times that of Qatar. Modes of production (labour intensive) and composition of foreign trade are similar. The Gulf countries, because of the oil factor, are more vulnerable to foreign influence. Kuwait has kept its currency based on the US dollar, while others made currency baskets, Oman has opted out for the time being from the process of a unified Gulf custom union, signing a free trade agreement with the US. Several Arab countries, including Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan, have also signed partnership agreements with the EU, which provide for preferential treatment for their products.


Table 1
GDP in 2004
in US Dollars in millions    Table 2
GDP per capita 2004
in US Dollars    Table 3
Population 2004
in millions   
Mauritania    1,345.6    Mauritania    451    Qatar    0.67   
Bahrain    11,066.5    Yemen    620    Bahrain    0.71   
Jordan    11,514.4    Sudan    655    Oman    2.26   
Yemen    12,908.0    Egypt    1,143    Kuwait    2.65   
Lebanon    19,754.0    Iraq    1,242    Mauritania    2.99   
Sudan    22,019.3    Syria    1,307    Lebanon    3.87   
Syria    23,501.0    Morocco    1,636    Emirates    4.37   
Oman    24,824.4    Jordan    2,163    Jordan    5.32   
Libya    27,608.8    Algeria    2,411    Libya    6.42   
Qatar    28,451.4    Tunisia    2,946    Tunisia    9.93   
Tunisia    29,252.4    Libya    4,300    Syria    17.98   
Iraq    33,700.0    Lebanon    5,108    Yemen    20.83   
Morocco    50,031.0    Oman    10,965    Saudi Arabia    22.53   
Kuwait    55,721.5    Saudi Arabia    11,122    Iraq    27.14   
Egypt    78,491.8    Bahrain    15,631    Morocco    30.58   
Algeria    84,799.8    Kuwait    21,067    Sudan    33.60   
Emirates    103,832.5    Emirates    23,771    Algeria    35.17   
Saudi Arabia    250,558.3    Qatar    42,656    Egypt    68.65   
Source: Arab Monetary Fund, Economic Indicators, 2005

Fiscal and asymmetrical federalism could provide a framework and mechanisms for dealing with such disparities, which are also common to other federal systems. Germany has one large central pool for all incoming revenues. Out of this central pool, the federal government makes its distribution to Länder governments. However, because the latter are highly represented in the federal decision-making structure and are responsible for the implementation of policies, they can greatly influence which policies are adopted and how these are carried out. Western Australia wanted to secede from the Commonwealth in 1932, because of the high burden it carried in financing other poorer states since the establishment of the Federation in 1901. The matter was only resolved after the Federal Government made generous concessions. Provinces in Canada get their funding as a percentage of the national tax, and they have more freedom in designing and implementing programs than their German counterparts. The Arab states’ disparity in wealth and population could also be translated, within an Arab federal union, into asymmetrical representation, veto power, more control of natural resources, different taxation systems and social benefits, opt-in or opt-out or time bound restrictions.

The arguments for the economic benefits from a federal union could be traced back to the Federalist. Hamilton, in Federalist No. 11, 12 and 13, outlines the basic utility of the Union in commerce, revenue and taxation, and the need for a strong Union Navy to protect American trade routes, ships and interests. By creating a Union, Hamilton argues, “we may oblige foreign countries to bid against each other, for the privileges of our markets,” and “Commercial enterprises will have much greater scope from the diversity in the productions of different States. When the staple of one fails from a bad harvest or unproductive crop, it can call to its aid the staple of another. The variety, not less than the value, of products for exportation contributes to the activity of foreign commerce. It can be conducted upon much better terms with a large number of materials of a given value than with a small number of materials of the same value.”

Other benefits include the harmonization of government policies, reduction of bureaucratic administrative costs, diversification of productions, and internal equalization. The UNDP Arab Human Development Report 2002, citing high population growth rates, rising unemployment, and modest economic growth coupled with increasingly intense competition from emerging markets in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia, has identified regional economic cooperation as essential for national regional development. The following paragraph best illustrates the UNDP approach to economic development in the region: “No Arab country alone can adequately achieve dramatic social and economic progress based on diversification of sources of income and acquisition of competitive capabilities in the fields of accumulated knowledge and industry. However, by coming together, Arab countries can reap the benefits of size and scale, diversify their combined economies, and open up opportunities for investment that would be unavailable in the absence of coordinated efforts and cooperation”.

All the preceding arguments have been used in the Arab context, but more on ideological grounds than as a functional approach to fit the Arab nationalism project. The success of European economic integration, despite two World Wars, presents a sharp contrast to the failure of the Arabs to do the same, and adds another practical incentive in the age of regional economic blocks. However, some doubt the feasibility of modeling Arab economic integration on the European model.

Whether or not federalism is conducive to economic development in the developing world is an open question, but what is clear is that while Arab nationalism, because of its centralist tendency, has failed to accommodate the disparities between Arab states, the Arab League, because of its weakness, has also failed to coordinate regional cooperation, development and integration plans. Federalism, with its ability to accommodate diversity and with the fiscal and asymmetrical tools available to it could provide a more successful framework.

The Campaign for the United Nations Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA) is a global network of parliamentarians and NGOs that defend and struggle for citizens representation at the United Nations. It is based on the idea that the great challenges facing humanity, such as global social inequality, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and environmental degradation, can only be overcome by a joint effort of all human beings.

To achieve this, the Campaign proposes the creation of a consultative Parliamentary Assembly within the UN system, which does not need the reform of the UN Charter as a requirement. This would create an important link between the UN and its agencies, governments and national parliaments and civil society. Thus, the Parliamentary Assembly would operate as the voice of citizens, giving them a democratic space of representation.

The Secretariat of the campaign, led by the Committee for a Democratic UN, formally began its work in 2007. It started working steadily to achieve its objectives, which are related to the creation of networks of local individuals and national organizations, governments and parliamentarians demanding a UNPA in their sphere of influence, the establishment of a coalition between them and the civil society, facilitating contacts and discussions with governments and parliaments. Thus, the Secretariat of the Campaign helps define objectives, develop policies and strategies to realize these goals.

Within this framework, on Thursday 6th of August, 2009, the Argentine Chamber of Deputies approved unanimously a draft statement that supports the creation of the UNPA (Parliamentary Assembly at the United Nations system). Such a support came from legislators across the whole political spectrum: the Civic and Social Coalition party, the Frente para la Victoria party, the party of the Concertación, and Unión PRO party. This evidences the large range of principles that support this initiative. Last November 2008, the Senate had already approved a similar legislative statement. Therefore, the Argentine Parliament became the first one in the world to support this global campaign.

The statement claims that the creation of a Parliamentary Assembly at the United Nations will strengthen “the effectiveness, transparency, representativeness, diversity and legitimacy of decisions of the institutions of the UN system” and it argues that the establishment of an institution composed of “parliamentarians and NGOs that defend the representativeness of citizens” is “a decisive step in strengthening the United Nations system”.

It must be highlighted that in this part of the world there is no supranational federalist tradition like there is elsewhere, say in Europe. This makes such an initiative particularly significant in a region that lacks supranational regulations and limitations able to check the negative aspects of globalization, like Latin America is – an area of extreme vulnerability –.

The UNPA Campaign has toured worldwide from its inception in 2007, and since then the Committee for a Democratic UN (the organization that directs it) came in contact with Global Democracy-Movement for the South American Union and the World Parliament (DG), an NGO currently leading the campaign in Argentina. DG began to spread the voice of those who believe that it is necessary and possible to create a World Parliament where all the citizens of the world would be represented and that would complement the existing State representations in the UN system.

The spirit of the campaign is in line with Global Democracy's vision and mission, based on the idea that the nation-state system is no longer consistent with the purposes for which it was created, as a result of the progress of the interchange of people, information, technology and knowledge that globalization brings about.

Considering that, as the DG declaration of principles says:
-    Humanity faces global challenges that affect the lives of everyone, like the existence of an ecological, economic and demographic crisis, as well as the loss by national states of the control of technology and the monopoly of violence;
-    The scientific and technological revolution and the globalization of economic processes have led to profound social changes, that generate a manifest imbalance of power between global economic organizations and political institutions;
-    The progressive difficulty of nation states to perform the functions for which they were created and to promote a world ruled by Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, and view the consequences of the erosion of their capacities in terms of loss of legitimacy of the representative democracy;
-    In a global world there is no room for national democracy alone, without building democracy beyond the nation-state in each of the levels at which there is an urgent need of political decisions to meet the challenges of globalization.

We believe it is essential to promote a participatory body in a world that seems ready for further work for a greater democratization of existing supranational institutions, and for creating new ones.

In this context, Fernando Iglesias, Executive Secretary of DG, has promoted, as a member of the House representing the Civic Coalition, the main opposition force in the country, this draft resolution that strongly supports the global campaign.

This achievement was not only a result of the continuing effort of the members of DG and the support of the global campaign (without which it would not have been possible) but of an international situation that clearly shows the need for global citizens to feel represented in a pluralistic and democratic space, together with the obvious flaws of national states. A historic opportunity to create new democratic entities capable of diminishing the negative aspects of globalization and of reinforcing the positive ones is presented to us.

Furthermore, this resolution paves the way for further work in Latin America towards the creation of supranational parliamentary spaces where the political power democratically discusses issues that concern every citizen, as well as for empowerment of the existing institutions, such as the Parliament of Mercosur, the Latin American Parliament, the Andean Parliament and the Central American Parliament, having in mind that these last two already have a system of direct election of their members, like the European Parliament.

It is a joint commitment by all of us who are part of this planet, and our effort will not be possible without the union of federalists to build a democratic world that binds us together and represents us, beyond our different regions.

Lawrence S. Wittner
The Struggle against the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 3 vols. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1993, 1997, 2003
Confronting the Bomb: A Short History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2009

In the building of a world federation, as in that of the European Union, when will the people be ready to exercise their responsibilities no less than to enjoy their rights as world citizens? If global democracy is to be the form of a world union, ruling by law, can its citizens be relied upon to do more than occasionally voting for representatives to a world legislature or for world executives – leaving the day-to-day work of government to national politicians and their diplomats? When will they become a true body politic of humanity, animated by concern for justice, no less than interest, in the making of the world laws? If we imagine that a world republic, representative of the people, would, as Thomas Paine argued, be more peaceful than the separate states today – for to make war they would have to approve hostilities against people just like themselves – then can the world constitution provide safeguards not only against the old privileged élite but also against a hysterical public? Our world federation must be both effective in abolishing war and safe in laying its foundation on the sovereignty of the people. It must be a good world government.

To ask these questions is almost to answer them in the negative, for national passions are now very strong, and the degeneration of a world government into world tyranny will always be a threat no matter what the constitutional safeguards and the eternal vigilance of the people. But the reasons for confidence must be laid out. The book under review – Lawrence Wittner’s history of the nuclear disarmament movement, from Hiroshima to the present – demonstrates that what has prevented nuclear war is not just “peace through strength”, mutual deterrence, but also, as he says in the preface to his one-volume abridgment, a “massive nuclear disarmament movement … that has mobilized millions of people in nations around the globe” and forced government officials to compromise with this public opposition. The use of A-bombs and H-bombs has been delegitimized, their only official function is for deterrence, their proliferation to the 44 actual and potential nuclear weapon states that are identified in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty slowed, the Euro-missiles (SS-20s, Pershing IIs, and cruise missiles) withdrawn, the neutron bomb and MX missile cancelled, SDI restricted to sites guarding North Korea and Iran, and START III talks opened.

Wittner concludes on world federalist note, “Why have nations not taken the logical step of abolishing these weapons of global annihilation? The answer lies in the pathology of the nation-state system”. What will be needed to complete the work of abolition? Creation of an “effective international security system”. The millions of people in his account took up the same purposes as the United Nations, principally the maintenance of international peace and security, and then, without any institution provided for their participation, mobilized in ad hoc groups, associations, and non-governmental organizations to express public opinion, shame the nations, and prepare the way for a nuclear free world. If we interpret the international nuclear disarmament movement as an historical stage in the formation of a responsible, independent world citizenry, necessary for a safe and effective world federal government, the hard question is, Does the movement exhibit signs not only of the negative work of resistance to national policies of reliance on nuclear weapons for national security, but also of the positive work of creating just such an effective international security system?

Here the answer must be that, as Wittner shows, the nuclear disarmament movement, though it did show the readiness of millions of people to take up issues of international peace and security, was never able to do the positive work of construction of more effective international institutions alone. The popular movement was always complemented by enlightened national leadership that made the decisions to curtail the production of new arms or negotiate the treaties of arms control. The national bureaucracies were divided – particularly in the first half of the Carter administration or the second half of the Reagan administration, and then when led by the world statesmanship of Mikhail Gorbachev – until, in times full of contradictions, the balance of decisions shifted first to unilateral steps of Soviet disarmament, and then to general agreements to reduce intermediate nuclear forces and conventional forces in Europe. The Cold War ended.

So it must be in any foreseeable, practical world federation: The nations must be preserved as subordinate authorities, ruling by law in their more local jurisdictions, even while the union government is vested with supreme powers of world law to achieve their general purposes beyond the capacity of the nation states to achieve separately. Wittner acknowledges that, although the organized World Federalists had mostly dropped out of effective opposition to the Bomb by 1954, many of the remaining leaders were in principle world federalists or globalists: Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russell, Norman Cousins, Hideki Yukawa, Lord Boyd-Orr, E. P. Thompson, Jawaharlal Nehru, and, under the influence of “New Thinking”, Mikhail Gorbachev. Both John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev saw, even before the Cuban missile crisis, that nuclear weapons had made necessary the abolition of war itself. “Mankind must put an end to war – or war will put an end to mankind”, said Kennedy to the United Nations in 1961. Khrushchev, in debate over the Third Party Program of that year, argued that in a nuclear war “the victor will be barely distinguishable from the vanquished. A war between the Soviet Union and the United States would almost certainly end in mutual defeat”.

Because nuclear weapons were illusory for national defense – as Clarence Pickett of the American Friends Service Committee said in 1957, “We are relying on means of defense which threaten to defend nothing and destroy everything” – it could be objected that the nuclear disarmament movement took up the easy negative work of dispelling an illusion, without coming to grips with the positive task of providing the nations with the necessary effective international security system to abolish war itself. Indeed, as Wittner recounts, national leaders realized that nuclear weapons offered no quick victory in war, which might be dated to public outcry against Truman’s casual mention of using the Bomb in Korea in November 1950 (before MacArthur suggested it). But then they had recourse not to abolition but to conventional war. Hence, the Vietnam War and wars since have been fought with “conventional” weapons, while weapons of mass destruction remain in development. It must be admitted, therefore, that the popular movement, even if it is seen as a step in forming a responsible world citizenry, has yet to join with those national leaders, in divided bureaucracies, who might actually create the third generation world organization.

Here is where all those friends of global democracy have their work cut out for themselves. Wittner mentions no definite plan for a new international security system, with the possible exception of Labour MP Frank Beswick’s Towards World Government (1961). Clark and Sohn’s World Peace through World Law (1958) and Hutchins and Borgese’s Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution (1948) get only passing mention. Where is the plan that might guide the next round of the movement? Thomas G. Weiss, president of the International Studies Association, has recently opened up discussion of world federalist alternatives (“What Happened to the Idea of World Government?” International Studies Quarterly [2009] 53: 253-71). Weiss refers at length to my own two-volume history, The Politics of World Federation (2004), which has a bibliography of plans.

The books of Daniele Archibugi on cosmopolitan democracy have drawn attention, but in his recent book, The Global Commonwealth of Citizens (2008), reviewed in these pages by Lucio Levi (The Federalist Debate, July 2009), Archibugi shrinks from global government. Raffaele Marchetti has written a big book, Global Democracy: For and Against; Ethical Theory, Institutional Design and Social Struggles (Routledge, 2008), which deserves a reader with the stamina of a reader of Wittner’s three volumes. In the United States, much attention is rightly focused on Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss’s shrewd proposal for a Global Parliamentary Assembly to be introduced parallel to the U.N. General Assembly. Their thinking is that, if the people could participate by electing representatives to such an assembly, they might become able to contribute safely to a more effective United Nations. There are also proposals to give the people more direct access, such as the World Citizens Party, Massachusetts Branch, which aims to bring about a U.N. general conference in accordance with Art. 109 of the Charter, leaving the details of amendment to the national delegates. David Wylie, former elected Cambridge city councilor, has written a novel proposal, City, Save Thyself! (2009), to extend working democracy at the level of cities and towns to that of an international “municipal security assembly”.

For scholars and readers looking for a compendium of citizens’ actions around the globe since World War II to build a more united and peaceful world, Wittner’s Struggle against the Bomb will repay patient reading. It is international history at its best. Not only Europe and America are covered, but so are the Communist countries, east Asia, south Asia, Latin America, and Africa south of the Sahara. Why did Ghana’s finance minister Agbeli Gbedemah become a president of the World Association of World Federalists? Because that was part of Africans’ resistance to French nuclear testing in the Sahara. What prompted Albert Schweitzer to issue profound warnings, suppressed in the U.S.A., against development of nuclear weapons in 1957-58? Norman Cousins’ visit to him in Lambaréné to urge him to take up the larger cause of world law, like that of Clark and Sohn. Who broke through the Iron Curtain to enlist brave and liberal minded Soviets in the anti-nuclear cause? Scientists by 1955 in the Pugwash movement led by Joseph Rotblat, and physicians Bernard Lown and Evgenii Chazov in International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War after 1979. What was the movement’s response to the Helsinki Accords of 1975? Daring individuals who formed Moscow Trust and Charter 77 to exercise the promised rights, which gradually undermined Communist tyranny. What was END, European Nuclear Disarmament’s contribution to the building of united Europe? It questioned NATO’s lockgrip on the region, if it meant general nuclear destruction. Wittner’s account of Mikhail Gorbachev, a “convert to the antinuclear cause”, is invaluable. President H.W. Bush, by comparison “did not have a foreign policy”.

In the United States, if one wants to keep straight the many organizations and leaders of the movement, this is the book to do so: Admirals Gene LaRocque and Eugene Carroll in the Center for Defense Information; Helen Caldicott in Physicians for Social Responsibility; the Mobilization for Survival, which organized the massive demonstration of one million people in New York in 1982; SANE, led by publisher Norman Cousins, Socialist Norman Thomas, and Unitarian Homer Jack; Jeremy Stone of the Federation of American Scientists; the Freeze campaign led by Randall Forsberg and Randy Kehler; and many others, like Women Strike for Peace and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom. Wittner sums up: “It was the largest, most dynamic citizens movement of modern times”. The one-volume abridgment will surely make this a popular book in history and political science courses.