European integration and the creation of supranational structures of governance in Europe in the years following World War II without any doubt represent the most advanced case of postmodern and postnational politics.
Many theorists have written about the postmodern nature of European integration and the functioning of the European Union (EU). Among them was Robert Cooper, who distinguished between pre-modern, modern, and postmodern states1. According to Cooper, there are several factors that distinguish postmodern states from all others: first, the blurring of the distinction between foreign and domestic politics; second, voluntary mutual intrusiveness and mutual verification; third, a complete repudiation of the use of force in settling disputes; and fourth, security is built on transparency, mutual openness and interdependence.
Political and sociological discourse on postmodernism is not new. Postmodernism developed over the 20th century, mainly in Europe, in large part as a reaction to two world wars and out-of-control nationalism that led to mass atrocities not only in Europe but across the world. One of the most important features related to postmodernism has been the weakening of central forms of social organization that have been the hallmarks of the modern age, such as nationalism, the nation state, sovereignty and national markets.
Many trace the origins of the modern international order to the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648. Foreign policy in the Westphalian modern age was characterized by states as main actors, by a clear distinction between foreign and domestic politics, by the protection of sovereignty and by the pursuit of national interest and power using mainly “hard power” instruments.
Postmodern foreign policy represents an historical shift, in the context of which nationalism and the national markets become increasingly replaced by cosmopolitanism (or, as a counter-reaction to globalization and cosmopolitanism – focus on local identities) and the globalized economy; national interest is complemented by humanitarian and environmental concerns; Realpolitik, as an underpinning political logic, is complemented (to an extent even superseded) by ideational/ normative considerations.
More generally, in a post-Westphalian order foreign policy transcends the state-centric view of international relations and there is a wider spectre of foreign policy actors, ranging from nation states of contingent sovereignty to international (or supranational) organizations to non-governmental actors. Postmodern foreign policy players prefer to build their security relationships on cooperative grounds and focus on soft and structural power. They seek to promote strong multilateral institutions and are willing to be bound by international legal norms2.
EU as a postmodern foreign policy actor
Contrary to what some foreign policy thinkers in Europe have wished for and advocated3, the EU has to a large extent projected its postmodern identity in its external dealings as well. Because of the limited scope of this paper, I will only focus on a few key developments related to EU’s external action.
One such development has been the gradual, yet consistent integration in the area of security and defence. If one analyzes the nature of European overseas operations and the goals that have been set, one will see that these operations have been very different from the traditional military actions of modern great powers. The EU has rather become a pioneer in developing non-violent forms of conflict management. At the early stages of the creation of EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), four types of civilian intervention areas were identified: the police, the rule-of-law, civilian administration and civilian protection – core areas of the civilian crisis management capability. The concept of civilian crisis management – with the rule-of-law or police-like ‘rapid reaction forces’ – is a very innovative crisis management phenomenon on the world stage.
Since the first CSDP mission abroad, which was a police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2003, the EU has conducted in total 24 missions (including the completed and the ongoing ones)4. All of these missions had a strong international backing and were mandated by the UN. Out of the 24, more than half (14 missions) were purely civilian; others were either military or civilian/military missions. The military operations were mainly mandated for such tasks as peace-keeping, maintaining corridors for humanitarian assistance or training.
A document that can be largely seen as outlining the “grand strategy” of EU’s external action is the European Security Strategy (ESS), adopted by the European Council in 20035. It is not hard to spot the underlying postmodern foreign policy logic in this document:
- The document clearly outlines that the EU is committed to upholding and developing International Law, calls the United Nations Charter a fundamental framework for international relations and expresses its commitment to the International Criminal Court;
- It stresses the importance of acting through the UN system and states that strengthening the United Nations, as well as equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority;
- It points out that the EU should strive for an international system based on effective multilateralism and indicates that at a global level Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral order6;
- Among key foreign and security policy goals, the ESS mentions the building of human security, reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity7;
- It also talks about the need for the EU to export its own experience of increasing security through confidence building and arms control regimes – instruments that can make an important contribution to security and stability in EU's neighbourhood and beyond.
Another very important feature of EU’s influence abroad has been its transformative, structural power. This power has manifested itself most clearly in the context of the EU’s enlargement process. During the 1990s and early 2000s, the EU exerted an overwhelming transformative and stabilizing influence in Central and Eastern Europe. It has a similar potential now in the Balkans and has already contributed to the process of modernization in Turkey (even if no end to the accession negotiations process is in sight). Other policies of similar nature are the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), reinforced by the Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership, and development aid (the EU, together with its Member States, provides around 55% of the overall development aid in the world), which is almost always conditional on standards of, inter alia, good-governance, democracy and human rights.
On the other hand, as much as the EU has acted in a postmodern way abroad, some of its Member States have not. Examples in this case are not hard to find; the decision of a number of EU Member States to start a war against Iraq in 2003, based on questionable motives and not mandated by the UN, being the most controversial one. Even in the case of the most recent conflict in Libya all military actions were taken by individual Member States and later under NATO’s command. The EU has been only considering a humanitarian mission, and employed its traditional “civilian” power in the form of economic sanctions and pledges to provide post-conflict development and reconstruction support.
In a way, the EU acts as an umbrella, placing EU Member States under a postmodern framework. When EU countries want to act in a “modern” way, they go on their own. In other words, in those areas where the EU is acting as a single actor, EU's action is postmodern. The emphasis on the single actor is not accidental, since the issue with EU's foreign policy is not so much with its postmodernism as with its actorness. Even though one could argue that the actorness problem is decreasing with passing years and updated EU treaties, the reality is that the EU remains divided on so many foreign policy issues, and this has limited EU's ability to be a force for good in international politics.
There are certainly more issues on which the EU cannot find a common position than those on which it can. And quite certainly EU Member States have not managed to agree on those issues that are most urgent and politically most controversial – as in the case of policy vis-à-vis Russia, the Middle East process or the most recent divergence of views on whether to intervene militarily in Libya or not. The EU manages to come up with a single position only on essentially non-controversial issues, those that do not require much effort and carry little, if any, political cost.
The European External Action Service (EEAS), created after the Treaty of Lisbon, has not been a game changer on the foreign policy scene. The choice of a rather inexperienced figure to the post of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy can also be seen as a deliberate move to reduce the effectiveness of this position. In a certain way, the EEAS can even be seen as a step backwards, as it has an even stronger intergovernmental dimension than in the previous structures governing EU’s external action.
Why do we need a strong postmodern European foreign policy?
Consider that by the middle of this century the Western world will represent only 12 percent of the world’s population, with Europeans reduced to 6 percent. Economically, the West will account for around 30 percent of global output – a level that corresponds to Europe’s share in the eighteenth century and down from 68 percent in 19508.
New rising powers are set to take over the leading economic and political positions. Some predict China will be the world’s number one economy by the middle of the century, while others say it might happen even sooner. According to a study by the Carnegie Endowment, China will become the world’s largest economy in 2032, and grow to be 20 percent larger than the United States by 20509. The BRIC+M economies10 will grow at an average rate of 6.1 percent per year, raising their share of G20 GDP from 18.7 percent in 2009 to 49.2 percent in 2050. Economic development will inevitably change the patterns of military spending as well. Over the next decades, Europe will see its relative voice in international relations even more diminished. At the same time, the voices of countries like China, India, Brazil, and Mexico will be heard louder.
The choice Europe faces in the 21st century is very simple: either Europe remains fragmented and therefore increasingly irrelevant (at least from the (geo)political point of view) in world affairs, or it must solve its external actorness problem and advance a coherent and effective foreign policy, which would defend European interests in every region of the world and would employ all necessary means available – ranging from the military to economic to soft power ones. If it fails to do so, it will simply be left on the margins of the big decisions made in the world by the great powers of the 21st century.
And yet, EU’s foreign policy must be a very special one, i.e. one that maintains a truly distinctive postmodern foreign policy identity. This type of foreign policy should not only be pursued as a matter of conviction but also for pragmatic reasons.
One reason is that many of today’s rising powers espouse a vision of the world that clashes with Western liberal ideals. Countries like China or Russia have in many ways adopted an extremely realist perspective on international relations, that respects sovereignty in the absolute, to the detriment of common causes like addressing climate change or international financial cooperation. Some of these rising powers have crushed democracy at home and developed strong authoritarian, yet partly capitalist systems, as in the case of Russia and China. These countries are now spreading undemocratic models of governance outside their borders.
But the world of the 21st century is a very different place compared to that of 19th or 20th century. One of the most obvious and arguably most important macro-trends is globalization. The increasing interconnectedness and interdependence of the world has transformed the way international politics is being conducted and has changed the nature of global challenges we all face. Just consider some of these challenges – such as climate change, increasing economic interdependence and financial volatility, the spread of WMDs or terrorism. Tackling them requires unprecedented levels of international and transnational cooperation. And these challenges will not be overcome if power arrangements of past centuries persist. Another thing is clear – EU’s security and prosperity in the 21st century is directly linked to the positive resolution of these global problems.
The EU needs to shape the international system in the 21st century, so that it would be beneficial to it and not the other way round. Europeans need to strive for a postmodern international system based on the postmodern principles outlined in this paper. The more "modern" the international system is, the less chances there are for the EU to exert its international clout. The more postmodern it becomes, the easier it will be for the EU to have an influence in the world.
But for this to happen, European leaders must solve the problem of EU’s actorness. The EU needs to increase its cohesiveness and to retain its postmodern foreign policy characteristics. This would provide the EU with a distinctive foreign policy identity and would create the conditions for Europe to shape international politics in the 21st century.
1 Robert Cooper, The Postmodern State and the World Order, Demos, London, 2002
2 For a more thorough discussion on the differences between modern and postmodern foreign policy see Rokas Grajauskas and Laurynas Kasciunas, “Modern versus Postmodern Actor of International Relations: Explaining EU-Russia Negotiations on the New Partnership Agreement”, Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, 2009 (22): http://www.lfpr.lt/index.php?id=120
3 When it comes to EU’s foreign policy, Robert Cooper himself has advocated for the need to apply double standards. Hence his famous dictum: “among ourselves, we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we also must use the laws of the jungle” , Cooper 2000, p.38
4 All CSDP missions can be found on the website of the EU Council: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=en
5 European Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a Better World, Brussels, 12 December 2003: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showpage.aspx?id=266&lang=EN
6 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, Providing Security In A Changing World, Brussels, 12 December 2008: http://www.consilium. europa.eu/showpage.aspx?id=266&lang=EN
7 Ibid.
8 Dominique Moisi, "The Final Decline of the West", Project Syndicate, 15 February 2010: http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/moisi51/English
9 Uri Dadush, Bennett Stancil, "The G20 in 2050", International Economic Bulletin, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 2009: http://www. carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=24195
10 Brazil, China, India, Mexico and Russia
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