President Obama standing in a Prague square on an April day in 2009, in a telecast speech to millions of people around the world, raised their hopes b...

President Obama standing in a Prague square on an April day in 2009, in a telecast speech to millions of people around the world, raised their hopes by stating: “So today, I state clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”

This call by American and many other world leaders has been echoed for decades since World War II’s first explosion of a nuclear bomb revealed its tremendous destructive power. In fact, the United Nations General Assembly’s very first resolution in January 1946 called for “the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons.” In 1968, this global wish was given serious hope by the signing of The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), two years later in 1970, the Treaty came into force, after all the State signatories to the treaty also obtained their national legislative ratifications. NPT is the only and the largest multilateral treaty on nuclear non proliferation and disarmament. With 188 state signatories, it is only four countries (India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan) short of the full UN membership.

To one side of the stakeholders to the treaty, there are only five countries, – the powerful “nuclear haves”, which also happen to be the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council (the Permanent Five), that primarily initiated the Treaty to stop the race of other countries going nuclear and prevent proliferation. That they have achieved with relative success; NPT in its first thirty years was very successful in not letting any new member country proliferate. Further, some countries with known nuclear weapon programs in advanced stages, such as Brazil and South Africa, once members of NPT, abandoned their nuclear weapons programs. The last decade, however, witnessed also the proliferation case of North Korea, and Iran is also on that threshold.

To the other side of the stakeholders to the Treaty, there is the majority, the 183 nuclear “not-haves”; their primary stake is “the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament”, by means of the “good faith” promised in Article VI of the treaty. This commitment primarily applies to the nuclear “haves”, since they are the holders of the nuclear arsenals which they must get rid of. The “not haves”’ promise is not to seek or ever produce such weapons.

The Treaty founders assumed that the treaty will complete its mission in twenty five years, thus the expiration clause of 25 years going into effect starting in 1970. The mission being not accomplished at the 1995 Five year Review Conference, the nuclear “have-nots” proved their loyalty to the treaty by making another major concession to the nuclear weapon States, which was to extend the treaty indefinitely, with no termination date. As their contribution to the bargain, in the final joint statement the nuclear weapon States party to the Treaty agreed to some major steps in escalating the Article VI disarmament clause and taking concrete steps in implementing it.

The substantial Package of Decisions, the output of the 1995 Conference, included Decision 4, Section (C): “The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of elimination of those weapons.”

Once the legal issue came up as to the interpretation of Article VI and whether the nuclear weapon States should wait for one reason or another, for example a “general disarmament”, to start their “nuclear disarmament”, and whether “good faith” in doing something really means doing it, the World Court judges, in The International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion of July 8, 1996, unanimously ruled: “There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects, under strict and effective international control.” Thus further setting the stage, and clarifying the legal commitment for nuclear disarmament.

The high point in the NPT’s history was the Review Conference of 2000, where the planned commitment toward disarmament was further reinforced, and agreed upon by all the members of the treaty in its 13 Points Declaration, transforming the 1995 Package of Decisions into concrete further steps towards achieving disarmament, including the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), banning “the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons use” under the Conference on Disarmament, and calling for more transparency and reporting by member states.

The Declaration also put additional emphasis on “an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.” In other words, the nuclear weapon States were reminded of their obligation to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

The decade following the NPT Review Conference of 2000 proved to be one of crisis for the Treaty. The US Senate rejected the CTBT Treaty, which President Clinton had signed. President Bush’s Administration policy was not in favour of CTBT, and decided not to pursue its ratification. No Conference on Disarmament activities was held in Geneva as planned, and therefore no progress on the banning of production of fissile materials was made, and no other multilateral treaties on “irreversible” nuclear disarmament were initiated, as had been intended in the 2000 agreements.

In the first decade of the twenty first century, not only was the “good faith” commitment toward nuclear disarmament by the nuclear weapon States in Article VI not translated into action, but in fact the nuclear “haves” went in the opposite direction, by publicly announcing plans to bolster their nuclear arsenals.

The United States Department of Defence declared that improvements were needed in the quality of its nuclear weapons and their gradual replacement. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev revealed major upgrading plans for its nuclear weapon arsenal by 2020. Prime Minister Tony Blair said it would be "unwise and dangerous" for the United Kingdom to get rid of its weapons in such an uncertain world, and the UK announced it would keep and possibly upgrade its Trident nuclear submarines.

The NPT regime in the first decade of the 2000s was weakened on another front by a conspicuous crack in its non-proliferation regime. The NPT has been relatively successful in controlling the spread of nuclear arms among its non-nuclear-weapon States. However, in 2003, the world witnessed North Korea’s nuclear weapon tests. Put under pressure for its treaty obligations, North Korea found it easier to terminate its obligations and leave the NPT Treaty. The other proliferation challenge to the NPT is the Islamic Republic of Iran, which, like North Korea, might cross the line and become a nuclear weapon State. The Iranian regime, being surrounded by US occupying forces to its east (Afghanistan) and to its west (Iraq), and within easy reach of its arch enemy (Israel), may very well decide to go nuclear. After all, a popular belief in international relations is the premise that once your country goes nuclear, no country dares invade you.

The other major hurdle for the nuclear weapon States party to the Treaty (which they have not been able to resolve for the past 40 years) is to bring in the three nuclear weapon States outside of the treaty and thus make the NPT universal. India, Israel, and Pakistan did not join the NPT treaty at its onset in 1968, nor did they join it in its 40 years of existence.

Dr. Hans Blix, the former Swedish foreign minister and former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), headed an independent Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Commission’s final report in 2006 expresses concern over the vital role these freewheeling nuclear states have in the success of any nuclear disarmament process, and expresses concern over their growing nuclear arsenals. The Commission reports that Israel, with its nuclear arsenal estimated in the hundreds, may have already surpassed the UK in terms of the number of nuclear warheads. The existence of these nuclear state countries outside of the Treaty severely undermines the viability of the NPT Treaty for two reasons. First, after forty years, the Treaty’s member states have failed to bring in the other three nuclear states under its umbrella and make it universally binding. The second point is the precedent of North Korea, where a member state violated NPT rules, proliferated and then simply abandoned the treaty. The double failure for NPT in relation to this group is therefore not only the Treaty’s inability to integrate this group, but also its letting its members proliferate as well.

The next NPT five-year Review Conference, scheduled for May 2010, with all the above challenges, seems to face the same fate as its predecessor, the 2005 Review Conference, where not only did the nuclear “haves” and “have-nots” fail to conclude an agreement, but they failed even to issue a joint statement.

After the crises of the last decade, it seems that the non-compliance of the Permanent Five, and how serious they are about their “good faith” in the Treaty, is now out in the open. Are the nuclear weapon States of the Treaty really serious about disarmament? Will they take concrete steps to implement the previously agreed Decision 4, Sect. (C), of the 1995 and the 13 Points of the 2000 Review Conferences? Can they herd the nuclear weapon States outside of the treaty into the treaty, and thus make a future nuclear disarmament universal?

It seems that non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and disarmament are two sides of the same coin. Their successes are interdependent. Although the NPT treaty has both components, it seems unbalanced toward its minority members, who are the nuclear weapon States and their goal of non-proliferation. It appears, in view of the lack of concrete advances in disarmament, that the minority Permanent Five members, while stopping other countries from acquiring nuclear weapons within the framework of the Treaty, are simply ignoring the wishes of the non-nuclear-weapon States regarding nuclear disarmament.

The limited, reversible nuclear arms reduction achievements of the past 40 years, mostly by the United States and Russia, have occurred as a result of bilateral agreements or unilateral actions. As a Chinese Major General Pan Zhenqiang (retired), now a security expert, points out, these US and Russian limited arm reductions of the past have mainly been a matter of convenience, aimed to shedding the economic and security burdens related to the highly inflated nuclear numbers of the cold war era, without affecting the striking capabilities of their respective countries. The number of weapons has decreased, but the quality and potential destructive power and precision have increased. If, after North Korea, Iran goes nuclear, it might touch off a series of new countries wanting to do the same, and the treaty will see a breakdown of the non proliferation regime.

Therefore, the NPT Review Conference in May 2010 is expected to fail to provide an agreement regarding concrete steps toward disarmament. In fact, all the future review conferences will also fail as long as the NPT, in the eyes of its key stakeholders, namely the Permanent Five, is seen merely as a nuclear arms control regime rather than a nuclear disarmament treaty. For the treaty to work, the “disarmament” clause of Article VI must be transformed into concrete actions. To start with, it can take the output of the 2000 Review Conference, and implement its 13 Steps action plan.

The United States, as the most powerful economic and military power in the world, and the only country which has actually used nuclear weapons in the past, must take responsibility and leadership. This year is President Obama’s chance, through his personal attention and the US leadership, to revive the Treaty from being merely a non-proliferation and arms control regime, and to direct it to its main objective of nuclear disarmament. This year’s Review Conference is President Obama’ s chance to show his and America’s “good faith” in the NPT, and start delivering on the US commitment of “a world without nuclear weapons”.