The failure of the intergovernmental conference to adopt the European Constitution last December proves that the intergovernmental method has become obsolete and unfit to reform the European Union's institutions. The survival of the right of veto in the institutional revision procedure - and in other key issues such as foreign, security and fiscal policies - is the symbol of the old Europe of the nation-states. Bestowing on a single State the power of blocking the other twenty four is clearly incompatible with Europe's present degree of unity. In the building of the European institutions it does not suffice to say "no".
We can draw a lesson from the success of the Convention method in drawing up constitutional documents such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Constitution. A body made up of the people's representatives (national and European Parliaments), national governments and the European Commission, working in public meetings, can succeed where intergovernmental conferences have failed.
Of course, the European Constitution is a stage of an unaccomplished process. It does not eliminate the contradictory character of the European institutions' architecture, even though, after ratification of the Constitution, the Union will be stronger and more democratic. But what is more important is the incorporation of the Convention method in the body of the Constitution and the bestowal on the European Parliament of the power to convene the Convention, although the Intergovernmental Conference retains the last word in the constitutional revision. In future, there will be a need to solve the ambiguity that so far allows the coexistence of two heterogeneous systems: the national which wants to perpetuate a deceptive sovereignty in vital sectors like those of taxes, foreign and security policy and constitutional revision, and the European, that wants to exert its sovereignty, i.e. its power to govern in place of the States in those vital sectors, as already happens for the currency.
A rule must be introduced that allows the Constitution to be amended without the agreement of all the States. No rigid Constitution, and more specifically no federal Constitution, provides such strict conditions for its revision: the vote is always by qualified majority. Even for amending the UN Charter a two thirds majority is required. Likewise, for the coming into force of multilateral international treaties the ratification by a given number of States is required, but not by all, and often not even by the majority of those who participated in the negotiations.
The serious disease of the European Union lies in the right of veto. Only a Constitution can heal it. The old European institutions must be reformed to pave the way to a "more democratic, more transparent and more efficient Union". This is a quotation from the Laeken declaration that summoned the Convention, which drew up the European Constitution. This means that even governments are aware that a deep institutional reform is necessary to allow the European Union to fill the democratic deficit, to manage the European economy, to keep the enlargement to the Central and Eastern European Countries under control and to speak with one voice in the world.
Failing a European Constitution, the intergovernmental logic is destined to prevail and the spirit of the Founding Fathers of the European Community will end by being forgotten. The danger of this prospect lies in the fact that the Franco-German leadership cannot suffice for the purpose of steering an enlarged Europe made up of 25 member states. The change in size of the European Union demands that France and Germany seek the support of the United Kingdom, in order to reach the critical mass that is necessary to lead the European Union. The problem is that the United Kingdom is ruled by a eurosceptic government. Since the Anglo-Franco-German directoire is conceived as acting out of the European Union's rules, it represents a real alternative to a European federal Constitution.
This means that small states, if they want to exert an influence on the European Union, have a vital interest in the ratification of the Constitution. Indeed, the replacement of relations of force with law always aims to protect the weakest. Also within the Philadelphia Convention, which framed the United States Constitution, small states played a decisive role. They did not only confine themselves to accusing big states of seeking mastery over the other states, but also proposed a formula of representation of citizens and states within the federal institutions (the Connecticut compromise), which was deemed satisfactory by the contending parties. It is noteworthy that the disagreement on the majority voting formula brought about the failure of the intergovernmental conference on the European Constitution.
Thus, a group of member states can refuse to proceed at the speed of the slowest and decide to adopt the Constitution. This, therefore, should be ratified by a qualified majority of member states. Of course, this avant-garde group should leave open the door for the other member countries. Likewise, the United States Constitution was ratified when nine out of thirteen states approved it. Afterwards the other states followed the core group.
But a grouping of governments, however large it may be, is not enough to provide the necessary impetus to assure the adoption of the Constitution. New actors should make up for the lack of governments' leadership: above all the European Parliament and national Parliaments. If they have the courage to exert their power, they can decide to adopt the Constitution. This decision can become the resolutive element for carrying out the constitutional design.
Outside the framework of the Constitution, the European Union is going adrift. The European elections, which will take place next June, represent a unique opportunity. In fact, it is hard for political leaders to win the consent of the citizens with a failure behind them. After the elections it will be much more difficult to relaunch the constitutional process. This is the reason why a commitment for the ratification should be taken before May 1, when the ten new members will enter the European Union. If this goal is achieved, it will become easier to convene a new Convention according to the rules of the Constitution, in order to accomplish the construction of federal institutions.

Working under the Presidency of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing the Convention has ended with a remarkable achievement. This is all the more remarkable given the contradictory demands of governmental representatives of the present and new Member States, not to mention the problem of arriving at a consensus between the 105 members of the Convention. The diversity of opinions and concepts failed to win out over the unanimous desire to agree on a draft with a good chance of consensual support. This was achieved under the masterly chairmanship of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing thanks to the support of national members of parliament and the awakening conscience of governmental representatives to the common interest.
A first observation hits one in the eye: the text is long and complicated, in spite of the efforts of its drafters. So it does not meet the criteria of legibility and transparency. Along with the succinct and clear articles on the institutions sprawl long and technical pieces on the Court of Justice, the internal market and common policies. The result is a disequilibrium, the text being difficult to read when it should be succinct, clear and comprehensible to the European electorate. The principles governing the distribution of competences and operational responsibility should stay, whilst the more detailed definitions and rules on the common policies, which can vary according to political majorities, should be moved in the form of basic laws to an annex to the central text of the Constitution. It should be the same for the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) and for the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Without modifying the balance of powers and without making the text easier to understand, the impact of its central message to the citizens would be at stake. These changes would enable the present text to be retained, one part being the European Constitution as such, concise, simple and readable, the other consisting of an annex containing the basic laws, protocols and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
The Preamble is concise and forceful. Apart from the absence of the regions, many positive points should be appreciated: the primacy of Union law, its legal status, and the distribution of Union competences, which clarify the respective roles of the Union and the Member States. As could be expected, shared competences extend over the largest number of areas. A second positive feature is the flexibility clause of Art. 17 which, as in the Rome Treaty, foresees the unforeseeable. A third concerns the general method: (the Union) shall exercise in the Community the competences they (the Member States) confer on it.
The single institutional framework does not exclude a diversity of roles but also provides for the decision-taking process of the institutions and the place of the Commission in areas of Community competence, as those of the CFSP and the CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy). In the long run, this diversity could give rise to malfunctionings in the Union and an artificial separation between economic and social operations, and sovereign, or pre-eminently political ones. More especially, as the single currency and the co-ordination of economic and budgetary policies straddle these areas of competence, the Union is subject to tensions and differentiated speeds, in particular those arising from the Monetary Union and Schengen. Certainly the role given to the European Minister of Foreign Affairs should contribute to a more coherent and harmonious functioning of these areas of high policy. However the Iraqi war has revealed the impact that these divisions between Member States can have on the solidarity and capability of the Union. The observation that the Union is torn apart between the communautaire and intergovernmental approaches does not seem to have lost its pertinence. To this axis of tensions now has to be added a difference of conceptions and attitudes accentuated by the enlargement to 25 members. The Union is seeking an effective and coherent framework. It can well be asked if the draft Constitution adequately responds to this.
As for the institutions, progress has been uneven. The European Parliament emerges strengthened from the Convention, thus bringing a more democratic dimension to the Union. Apart from the legislative and budgetary functions and its powers of control over the Commission, it will henceforward elect the President of the European College. In this way it consolidates its authority. It exercises a power of initiative through the Commission, it receives petitions, it nominates the European mediator and has the power to set up commissions of enquiry. This panoply of instruments which brings it closer to the citizens, remains incomplete failing the power to hold auditions allowing it to examine the heartbeat of society.
The leading innovation concerns the President of the European Council elected by qualified majority. The President directs and animates the work of the European Council, assures the preparation and continuity of its work in co-operation with the President of the Commission, based on the work of the General Affairs Council. In addition, it works to facilitate cohesion and consensus within the European Council. It represents the Union in its external relations at the level of Heads of State or Government regarding common foreign and security policy, without prejudice to the competences of the Union's Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Here one could add: "nor those of the President of the Commission". Indeed, frequent meetings require the presence of the two Presidents and that of the Foreign Minister. All the more so as foreign policy has an important economic dimension, while in its turn security goes far beyond the narrow concept of military security and tends also to involve economic, social, cultural as well as scientific and technological activities.
Even if the European Council prefers to act by consensus, voting as such is not excluded: qualified majority is foreseen for the election of the President and simple majority for the adoption of rules of procedure. The confidence acquired through the practice of collaboration should allow the European Council in the future to widen the use of qualified majority voting.
In its turn, the Council of Ministers undergoes a number of innovations. Jointly with the European Parliament, the Legislative Council exercises legislative and budgetary functions. It consists of one or two Ministers per country, depending on the subject to be discussed. Certainly, it is a step towards the formation of a second legislative Chamber, the Council of States. However, ambiguity is not wholly removed, the General Affairs Council perpetuating a certain confusion of powers.
One small step consists of a new system of equal rotation for the Presidency for periods of at least one year, which takes account of European political and geographical equilibria and the diversity of Member States. One exception: the Foreign Affairs Council is permanently presided over by the European Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Unanimity is demanded as regards fiscal policy, as well as in cases expressly provided for by the Constitution, notably for CFSP and CSDP. It is a Damocles sword even more threatening in a Union of 25. From which the need for a flexibility clause allowing progressive resort to a qualified majority vote. Beyond the simple majority, the new qualified majority is supposed to enter into force from 2009. This implies the majority of Member States representing at least three-fifths of the Union's population, in cases where the Council takes position on a proposal from the Commission or the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union. On the other hand, in the absence of such proposals, the qualified majority will require the vote of two-thirds of the Member States. This distinction corresponds to a traditional practice based on the idea that the proposal incorporates a guarantee that the interests of the small and medium-size states will be protected and that the general equilibrium, notably among the large Member States, will be taken into account. In addition, the proposals of the Commission engage its responsibility before the European Parliament.
In its traditional role the European Commission promotes the general European interest as a whole, takes initiatives, keeps a watch on the application of joint decisions and represents the Union, with the exception of matters covered by the CFSP. Taking account of experience, the Constitution confirms that a legislative act can only be adopted on a proposal of the Commission, except in special cases. Contrary to the general rule, the other acts are adopted on a proposal from the Commission only when it is explicitly provided by the Constitution. In order to ensure, in the future, more efficacy and democratic control an evolutionary clause could prevent a continuous succession of reforms.
The importance of the Commission is testified to by the debate arising over its composition and the strengthened authority of the President. Without calling into question its independence and its high level of competence, which form the basis of its authority, contradictory demands fuel the discussions regarding its being composed of 15 members from 2009: the President, the Union's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vice-President, the 13 European Commissioners chosen according to an "equal rotation system" indiscriminately among the Member States. So as to preserve the general equilibrium, each of the successive Colleges should reflect the whole demographic and geographic gamut of the Union's Member States. In the same spirit, the President of the Commission will choose the non-voting Members coming from all the other Member States.
This formula is intended to simultaneously guarantee the efficacy, the competence and the authority of the Commission. It aims to avoid neglecting certain countries while providing for an increased familiarity with a more diverse Union, creating a core of 15 decision-takers supported by 10 other members with the right to speak but not to vote. The question that remains is to know if this equal position of the States in the allocation of Commission members does not risk weakening the Commission. Indeed, the members from Malta will be present as often as those from Germany, the two countries with the maximum disparity in terms of population. The insistence on equality in rotation embodies the underlying idea, purveyed by the media, according to which Commission members are "representatives" of their countries. And yet, the independence of the Commission is the keystone of the European institutional system.
The solution proposed by President Prodi consists of having one member per country, but in compensation for the unwieldiness of the 25-member Commission, in setting up a sort of ministerial cabinet of seven, each of whom would preside over a group bringing together a series of sectors. Although this would be a concession to the need for equality, this formula would leave a margin of choice for the leaders of the sub-groups and would allow an allocation of responsibilities taking account of competence. As a result, while maintaining its contacts with all the Member States, the Commission would be well-placed to operate effectively, with a strengthened political authority prefiguring a European government.
Independently of the formula adopted by the IGC, the essential point is that the choice of Commission members and the allocation of their responsibilities should be made with uppermost the criteria of a high level of competence and of sound knowledge, but also of influence and European commitment. In order to carry out its role of federator, the Commission should be able to count on political personalities of high-standing. Past experience of the Commissions demonstrates the central role played by the personalities who have led the European Colleges: such figures as Monnet, Hallstein, Davignon, Delors have strongly influenced the building of Europe. In view of this lesson from European history, shouldn't the President of the Commission be granted a wider margin of manoeuvre?
The Constitution confirms the practice of consultations with concerned interest groups and the general public, thus strengthening their proximity to the decision-taking centres. The preparation of the directive on chemical products is an example of the divergent pressures of industry and environmental protection organisations. At the institutional level the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions are spaces of participation. The latter, consisting of regional and local elected members, is destined to a political future in so far as it is able to reduce the distances between the institutions of the Union and local collectivities. Each in its own way responds to the need for consultation and proximity.
The principal weakness handicapping the Constitution remains the cleavage, even the ditch, separating Community affairs from a common foreign, security and defence policy. In these sovereign spheres the Commission can act via the intermediary of the European Minister who, furthermore, can make proposals in the name of the Commission. In this way the door is open to more responsibility before the European Parliament. But there remains none the less the case that on sensitive matters consensus is an imperative. The President of the European Council and the European Minister presiding over the Foreign Affairs Council have the task of promoting consensus. This will in turn contribute to keeping the decisions within the institutional framework and to avoiding their being by-passed by resorting to such external channels as the letter of the Eight, that was written to support the Iraqi war. If it is admitted that the only instance capable of conducting a real common foreign policy is the European Council, the role of its full-time President and of the European Minister will help to bring about a Union foreign policy, at the same time limiting the domination of the Big Countries which tend to prefer extra-Community actions. The Community framework will allow the small and medium-sized Member States to make their voices better heard and have some influence over the decisions. The essential goal is strengthening the role of the Commission in the preparation and follow-up of decisions of the European Council. Is it necessary to recall that long experience shows that the Commission is the best guarantor of the common interest and the democratic equilibrium within the Union?
Flexibility enabled significant progress in the past, witness the Euro and Schengen. At the outset a tacit clause has made provision for enhanced co-operation, according to which a group of member countries can decide to go ahead as a sort of avant-garde or pioneering core group with the approval of the others and on condition that the door is left open for them. It would thus assume the role of pioneer aspiring to attract in its wake those member countries hitherto lacking the will or the means to participate from the outset. It is a promising approach for the future.
On the other hand the procedure for approval and ratification of the European Constitution appears to be in contradiction with the spirit of flexibility. Indeed this procedure requires unanimity at two levels: on the adoption of the draft Constitution, and then at the time of ratification by the Member States.
This requirement goes even beyond the conditions of entry for international intergovernmental organisations. Should only one of the however-many Member States refuse, two possible scenarios arise: the Constitution is dead in the water or the States which have ratified it set up a sub-group equipped with a new Constitution. The national referenda make the unanimity requirement even more difficult to attain: for example, another negative vote from Denmark or Ireland would distort the democratic rules in the entire Union. Clearly, a minimum proportion of the Union's citizens voting negatively in one of these countries could block the wishes of the millions of voters or parliamentary majorities favouring the Constitution. The decisive choices for the future that the Convention was designed to make are not always clear. Often they represent compromises between Community desiderata and intergovernmental pressures. A balance seems to be outlined between the European Council and the Commission, between their two Presidents who, while respecting a division of responsibilities, are condemned to close collaboration. And, in its turn, the European Minister of Foreign Affairs builds a bridge between the intergovernmental institutions and the Commission. In addition, wearing his Vice-President of the Commission's hat, he can make proposals in the name of the latter to the European Council, thus opening the way to parliamentary responsibility as regards the CFSP. This represents an uncertain step towards the democratisation of the Union.
The Iraqi war has opened up a fissure between present and new members which has affected the cohesion of the Union. In the light of this experience and under the pressure of European public opinion, the wounds are healing, witness the meeting of the three, Germany, France and the United Kingdom. Owing to their responsibilities and political weight, their leadership in the sphere of the CFSP is unavoidable; but it would be better accepted if it was exercised within the European Council and with the support of other Member States. With the present international disorder, more than ever the USA, NATO and the UN need a United Europe as a contribution to stability and equilibrium. This is the mission of the Union in the world, which is working for a return to multilateralism and the emergence of new regional and world powers. These profound changes facing us pave the way for regenerating the UN on the basis of respect for federal principles and dialogue between cultures. Apart from the attraction that the Union has for its neighbours, it is developing a vast network of partnerships and associations making recourse to its "soft powers", to the dialogue based on respect for different identities, as well as voluntary participation. This outlook confers the adoption of the European Constitution all its significance in this decisive moment for the future of the world.

Mankind has always been confronted with the challenge of eliminating the divisions in it, which are more psychological than physical, and more social and political than natural. These divisions have obviously been created and successfully utilised by the vested interests to serve their narrow selfish ends. The divisions will not, therefore, end until the scope for utilising them for the selfish purpose is eliminated. The need is to evolve a social order which will leave no such scope. Can we devise such social order internally in each country, and internationally the world over to tackle these common problems of the world?
Nationalism was once a force which served to unite the sub-national groups, to form a nation for united effort for common development and progress, and to eliminate the group conflicts and bring about peace and tranquillity for a large section of the humanity. But the narrowly conceived national interests soon gave rise to misguided patriotism and jingoism, resulting in wars between nations, one more deadly than the other.
The first and the second world wars, which were the result of misdirected spirit of nationalism, led to the half-hearted attempts at organising the nation-states first into the League of Nations, and then into the United Nations, for preventing future wars and for the common development of mankind. The first body, on account of its loose constitution, feeble structure and ineffective operation was never taken seriously by anyone, whether the strong or the weak. The constitution and the operations of the second organisation have more than proved the worst fears that were expressed at the time of its establishment. The dice were heavily loaded, by its constitution, in favour of the strong, and with their veto power, they were free not only to defy the assembly of the nations, but also to resort to any unilateral action for their own advantage. The forum so far has failed to prevent wars, give relief to the needy and to uphold the rights of the weak and the just. On the other hand, the forum has been used by the powerful for justifying the unjust, for blocking the desirable measures, for promoting their selfish interests, and for deriving the maximum benefit to themselves.
The constitution and the functioning of the present UN is power-oriented and not people-oriented, and they have, in fact, accorded power a legal status above that of the people. The adage that might is right has been legally sanctified, and power is granted a licence for its unbridled play. The assumption that those with greater economic and military power have a higher sense of wisdom and responsibility betrays a feudal tendency. It is neither rational nor democratic. On the other hand, the psychology of man works to the contrary, and history has proved it more forcefully in international life.
History repeats itself because man commits the same mistakes. In spite of the horrendous experience of the power play of the past, we have been forced to create the structure of the UN giving primacy to power. The result was foregone. Even since its establishment, no less than 130 small and big regional wars have taken place, many times more human beings have been killed, injured and maimed, property destroyed, the environment ruined and resources wasted, than the two world wars together did, and the process goes on unrequited every day. What is worse, there is the emergence of an absolute power, figuratively called the super power, which has arrogated to itself the power of policing the world and has virtually displaced the UN.
Power is being ostensibly used in defence of democracy and humanity, but is in effect being unashamedly exercised for self-aggrandisement. The uncontrolled naked dance of this power has become an international terror. No nation state, no section of humanity nor even democracy in any part of the world is safe, unless it pays its obeisance at its altar. Along with it has come a pile of the deadliest nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and the increased insecurity for the entire planet.
We were forced to accept the power-based structure of the UN for without it the powerful nations would not have joined it, and without them, the purpose of the organisation would have been frustrated. But even with them, one now experiences the futility of the organisation every day. How can one create a world organisation devoted to world peace and progress, disarmament, security of life, to raising the standard of living of every human being, devoted to the protection and promotion of the environment, to bringing about equitable distribution and consumption of resources, and to the planning of population, and which, at the same time, is democratically organised both for policy-making and its implementation, and maintains effectively the rule of law and punishes its violations through democratic process.
There is no problem without a solution. A world parliament consisting of the representatives elected by the people from the constituencies drawn on the basis of the population spread across the nation-states and a world government elected by such parliament seems to be an obvious answer. But in such an arrangement it may be feared that the populous nations may have an undue advantage, unless the value of the votes from such countries is suitably reduced to ensure a balanced representation.
This done, parliament so constituted, and the government elected by it, should have all the powers to devise measures to solve all common problems facing mankind, and to enforce the solutions. The international judicial forum suitably structured can help the parliament and the government, wherever necessary, to implement the objectives of the world organisation.
The obstacles to this desirable measure will be many. The powerful nations will not cooperate, the nation-states will refuse to forego their sovereign power, the regions rich in resources will not share them with others, the vested interests in the present economic, political, social and religious orders will resist the changeover, and the militarists will refuse to part with their privileges. Fortunately, the European Community has shown the way, though that experiment is confined to a limited area. To facilitate the eventual establishment of the world parliament and the world government, we may begin with the constitution of the organisations on the pattern of the European Community, across the appropriate regions of the world with suitable modifications, if necessary, to accommodate the regional peculiarities.
What is most necessary is to change the fossilised mindsets of the peoples everywhere. The most difficult thing in the world is to change the human mind, and when the concepts such as those of the world parliament and the world government demand of the people to switch over their minds from the age-old beliefs, biases and prejudices, the resistance is bound to be stronger.
But on the positive side, we have the instances of the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the UN and the European Community. Even these ideas were new and unfamiliar when originally conceived. The threat of common dangers to mankind, which cannot be averted except by common efforts, has also been dawning on the minds of the people everywhere for some years now. The time is ripe for an intellectual revolution to push the world towards a new era by launching such a revolution. Only a revolution of this kind will help us eliminate the present malignant forces, and realise the goal of the world parliament and the world government for the benefit of all.

Mumbai, World Social Forum, 16-21 Jan 2004

The 4th World Social Forum has been held in Mumbai between 16 and 21 Jan. This World Social Forum, the first to take place outside of Porto Alegre, Brazil, featured over 1,000 events including workshops, lectures, and panel discussions. For five days more than 100,000 delegates from 132 countries crammed into vast, dusty exhibition grounds on the outskirts of Mumbai, united in the dream that Another World is Possible.
Mumbai is a city of ugly contrasts between the filthy rich and the wretchedly poor, which has given up on the ideal of building a relatively equitable, shared community in which there is social opportunity for all. Mumbai, India's financial capital, with its gleaming chrome-and-glass buildings in affluent enclaves, generates more than a fourth of the country's direct tax revenue. But two-thirds of Mumbai's people live in indescribably dirty shantytowns, where there are no water taps or toilets in most homes. The people's present is sordid, their future bleak. Mumbai in some ways is a microcosm of India, although its urban existence bears sharp contrast to the rest of the country, 70 percent of which is rural. The main reason to organize the world social forum in Mumbai has been the widening to the Asian movements of new global effort to build a different world.
Federalist participation in the World Social Forum aimed to find new alliances for global democracy. With respect to the previous editions an increasing number of events concerned global democracy, international institutions, democratic reforms and world parliament issues. Many movements self-organized events on these arguments. Movimento Federalista Europeo, the Italian section of WFM, promoted a World Parliament initiative following the proposal made by Italian federalists during the last Copenhagen WFM Council, in October 2003, concerning the importance of WFM participation in World Social Forum that is considered the right place where to find allies to create a coalition of global civil society movements for a World Parliament.

On January 19, 2004, from 9 am to 1 pm "Towards a World Parliament. Let's create a network for glocal democracy" workshop has been organized by Movimento Federalista Europeo. 50 persons from 20 countries participated in the discussions. Nicola Vallinoto of the World Federalist Movement, from Italy, was the convenor. Leo Rebello, Co-President of World Constitution and Parliament Association, from India, chaired the session. The following persons spoke: James Arputharaj, Sri Lanka, World Federalist Movement; Rasmus Tenberger, Germany, The Global Democracy Experiment;
Dick Burkhart & Mona Lee, USA, Bike for Global Democracy; Sichendra Bista, Nepal, eParliament.org; Rob Wheeler, France, Forum for a World Parliament; Carmo D'Souza, India, Lecturer in Goa Law College; Mikael Nordfors, Norway, Vivarto Co-operative; Troy Davis, USA, World Citizens Foundation; Werner Bulling, Germany, Citizens Initiative for For the Europe of the Citizens; Andrew Strauss, USA, Widener University, School of Law; Manuel Mononelles, Campaign for Indepth Reform of International Institutions; Seshrao Chavan, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Aurangabad Chapter, India; Shishir Srivastava, World Unity and Peace Education Deptt. CMS, Lucknow. The talks were followed by comments from the audience in which every one participated. The following resolutions were adopted unanimously: 1) Establish World Parliament by 2010. 2) World Democracy as the main theme at the next WSF. 3) Website on World Parliament with web-links to other Mundialist organisations. 4) Network or Federation of World Democracy Organisations. 5) World Parliament E-Forum to evolve World People's Basic Manifesto. During the workshop The Federalist Debate has been presented and distributed. Some of the participants will contribute to the next issue of the review with an article about global democracy.
At the same time of the workshop the British writer and activist George Monbiot addressed the plenary session titled "Globalization and its alternatives". He told delegates that "without global democracy there could never be national democracy". Monbiot gave the example of Luiz Iñacio Lula da Silva (popularly known as Lula), the Brazilian President, who won last year's presidential elections mainly on a promise of delivering basic services to the poorer sections of the society and implementing policies that would close the gap between the rich and the poor. Monbiot argued that it is not enough to have good local policies and intentions while the current global system is skewed in favour of policies that are aimed at enriching developed countries and the rich sections of many countries. He called for more organised global action that will enable the establishment of a 'new world order'. "It is not enough to think globally and act locally. We also have to act globally," said Monbiot, also calling for the dismantling of the IMF and the WB and the transformation of the United Nations. According to Monbiot, in his latest book titled The Age of Consent: A Manifesto for New World Order1, which was widely circulated at the forum, there must be a world parliament where representatives will be elected by citizens in all countries and held publicly accountable for the decisions that they take. This will replace the current United Nations. Turning to the WSF itself and whether the forum can be a stepping stone towards a 'world parliament', Monbiot said that the forum is important but not enough. The WSF, according to Monbiot, is not enough "(because) we self-select ourselves. We have passports, money and time to attend this kind of gathering". While the WSF is important, the parallel platform of the 'world parliament' must be initiated which will have more "moral authority." It is this moral authority that brings about real people's power. "Power lies where moral authority is," said Monbiot to loud applause.
The last day of the forum debates all global democracy activists decided to organize a common event just to find the way to cooperate for the common aim. On January 20 evening, a "Workshop on Global Democracy" was held with the topic "Organizing a Coalition for a World Parliament". Approximately 40 people stayed for this meeting after a panel between two expert advocates for world parliament, Professor Andrew Strauss and author George Monbiot. This meeting was a culmination of several forums, workshops, and organizational meetings held throughout the World Social Forum. Participants at this meeting were committed activists who favour a world parliament and want to carry forward a series of initiatives to see that goal realized in the not-too-distant future. Rob Wheeler facilitated the meeting, assisted by Dick Burkhart and Mona Lee. Rob Wheeler gave a brief summary of several current initiatives on World Parliament that the coalition could choose to support: World Citizen Campaign, City Montessori School, 27,000 students educated and promoting world parliament, World Student Assembly modelling how a WP could work, several direct democracy initiatives, several E-Parliaments.
The following initiatives were suggested at earlier workshops for the coalition to focus on for the coming months:
A. Establish global democracy as a focus of the World Social Forum: 1) request to include world democracy as a primary theme for the World Social Forum; 2) include speakers on world parliament at plenary panels on World Democracy; 3) participate in international commission committees to lobby for these; 4) focus on deepening democracy, especially global democracy; 5) hold a "World Democracy Forum" or "Global Peoples Assembly" at each World Social Forum.
B. Planning for World Social Forum at Porto Alegre 2005: 1) include different themes on different days. Relate these to other thematic events at the Forum; 2) attract and interest people in our events by various means such as include more countries, not just big countries; 3) include Eastern Europe as well; 4) contact people who support democracy in non-democratic countries; 5) concentrate on Universities with many foreign students; 6) organize workshops in Universities; 7) introduce the concept of world parliament to local communities; 8) advocate for improvement of simultaneous translation systems; 9) provide more opportunities for people to speak out; 10) prepare a brief flyer explaining what we mean by world parliament.
C. Develop a call for a World Parliament Referendum, which should be as widely circulated as possible; 1) diversity should be a major consideration in circulation; 2) take referenda to local media and public officials; 3) take signatures via a web site.
Details of structure and functioning will be decided by means of a democratic process via the internet and/or at face-to-face meetings. The following basic framework was generally accepted: 1) We are a network of assemblies, partner organizations and individuals. 2) We will have a delegates council with a liaison representing each organization. This would be the governing body, subject to review by larger plenary sessions. 3) We will have a coordinating team to move the process forward and obtain non-profit status for fund raising. 4) We will conduct a membership campaign. A minimal membership fee may be requested to carry our initiatives forward.
Initial communication and decision-making processes will take place via the internet. Germa Pelayo of the Alliance for a Responsible, Plural, and United World offered to serve as translator to French and Spanish. Rasmus Tenbergen offered to develop his Democracy Experiment web site as our central means of communication. The web address www.world-democracy.org met with approval. We will also hold alternative face-to-face meetings as needed. The following alternative face-to-face meetings were suggested as preparatory to the next World Social Forum (These meetings would likely have more regional representatives than global, so Internet validation / modification will be necessary): 1) San Francisco, CA, June 2004, to piggyback off a Conference on UN Charter Review to be held there. Use of facilities has already been offered for our meeting by the conference convener, Dr. Lucille Green, a very dedicated and senior promoter of world parliament. 2) Lucknow, India, December 2004, where facilities have also been offered to "piggyback" off the Chief Justices meeting conducted by City Montessori School. 3) A meeting in conjunction with the European Social Forum in November was suggested.
The name of the coalition has not yet been decided. The following possible names were suggested: Coalition for a World Parliament, Coalition for Global Democracy, Coalition for a Global Peoples Assembly, World Democracy Movement and others. This coalition would replace, or relaunch, the prior efforts of the Global Peoples Assembly movement under the name and mission chosen by a new Charter discussion. Rob Wheeler has been appointed as coordinator. This is the partial list of the organizations and initiatives that expressed an interest in becoming a member of the coalition for a world parliament: Alliance 21 for a United, Plural and Responsible World (www. alliance21.org), Bike for Global Democracy (www.world-democracy.org), City Montessori School Lucknow, India (www.cmseducation.org), EParliament.org (www.eparliament.org), Global Democracy Experiment (www.tgde.org), Global Peoples Assembly Network (www.world-democracy.org), Mehr Demokratie (www.mehr-demokratie.de), Sammondano (www.sammondano.org), Student World Assembly (student.worldassembly.net), Vivarto Co-operative (www.vivarto.com), World Citizen Foundation (www.worldcitizen.org), World Federalist Movement (www.wfm.org), World Parliament & Constitution Association (www.worldparliamentgov.net), World Parliament Experiment (www.world-parliament.org).
The final consideration about the federalist participation in Mumbai is that it has been very positive. The following are the two main aspects: the first is that most of global democracy organizations and initiatives now are starting to work together under the umbrella of the coalition for a world parliament. The second is that, even if global democracy activists continue to be a minority group inside the newglobal movement, the idea of a World Parliament is becoming more and more popular thanks also to George Monbiot's support. Many Indian newspapers, such as The Hindu, The Times of India and The Tribune, published articles about the World Parliament during the WSF.

When Federal Union was launched in London in 1938 it had extraordinary success, with membership rising rapidly to ten thousand and support from leading politicians, academics and newspapers. The background to this was, for many British people, the perception of an existential challenge to the nation-state from the ruinous impact of the international economy in the 1930s and the rise of aggressive fascism leading to war. But the second world war was won and the British emerged confident that their nation-state had served its purpose and future challenges could, like that of the war, be overcome under American leadership. So Britain dragged its feet at the start of European unification and has, with some exceptions, done so ever since.
On the European Continent, to the contrary, federalist movements before the war were generally weak, whereas the war brought home the existential challenge to the nation-state and its citizens in the clearest possible way; and this led to the growth of strong federalist movements together with widespread acceptance of the idea of a federal Europe to ensure peace and security for the future. So the European Community was established by six core states, with pre-federal powers and institutions to provide a framework for that purpose; and it has been deepened to deal with other problems of interdependence, notably in the economy and the environment, as well as widened to include most European countries. The United Kingdom came to participate as a reluctant and anti-federalist member state, with governments which never understood that the stepwise but radical reform of powers and institutions to create a working federal system was required in order to deal with the challenges of increasing interdependence in Europe and the world.
New existential challenges have, however, become more and more evident, in the fields of security, climate change and economic globalisation. British people feel as strongly as other Europeans the need to improve the world system in order to overcome them. But they lack a clear idea of what to do about it. They sense that American hegemony is not the answer but have scant conception of what, beyond protesting, can in fact be done. There are however two ways to avoid absolute hegemony of the United States, which in the not-so-long run would be as disastrous for the Americans as for the rest of us.
One is to wait a decade or two in the expectation that China will become an equivalent superpower which, even if it happens, would be a dangerous delay in an explosive world and a dangerous combination in view of the profound differences of political culture and international experience between Americans and Chinese.
The other is to convert the European Union into a power at least equivalent to the US in all respects save military capacity, while substantially developing the Union's military strength as well.
Altiero Spinelli, in his speech to the founding congress of the UEF at Montreux in August 1947, observed that Marshall Aid was a remarkable manifestation of liberal America which gave Europeans the chance to unite. But he predicted that, if a European federation was not established which could become an equal partner, the United States would become an imperial America. Slowly but surely his prediction has been fulfilled.
In its internal affairs, the EU has moved far towards becoming a federal polity, and the Constitution drafted by the Convention should take it some steps farther. But in foreign policy and defence it remains overwhelmingly intergovernmental, thus ineffective and undemocratic. The British and a number of other governments insist on keeping the veto over decisions on a common EU policy; and they resist any adequate role for the Commission and the Parliament, together with the creation of essential common instruments for policy in these fields. So long as this is the case, the Union will be unable to bring balance into the global system and the attempts of member states to exert substantial influence on American policy will remain fruitless, as will American efforts to bring order into the affairs of the world. It is naive to suppose that Europeans can have such influence without the power that can be exercised only by effective and democratic common institutions endowed with the necessary competences backed by policy instruments: in fact by a federal European Union.
Only a federal EU can convert American hegemony into partnership and lead a multipolar world in building effective multilateral institutions. The Union does already possess quasi-federal powers and institutions in the fields of trade and aid; and here it is at least an equal partner with the United States. It has also used its environmental powers to lead the world, despite intransigent American opposition, in the first steps towards controlling greenhouse gas emissions enough to avert potentially catastrophic climate change. With the euro it has an instrument that should give it similar weight in the international financial system. But not only is it weakened by the opting out of Denmark, Sweden and the UK; the member states have also failed to give the Union the powers it needs to conduct an effective external monetary policy.
These examples illustrate the Union's potential to become not just equal to the United States but a more powerful actor in fields other than military might, i.e. in most of the fields that determine whether the world will become a safer and more prosperous place: in short, the EU can be the principal partner in matters of 'soft security' just as the United States is in 'hard security'; and the EU can use its strength to influence a multipolar world to accept the need for increasingly effective multilateral and global institutions.
But there is a vast gap between the potential and the performance, due to the inadequacy of the Union's powers and institutions which would be remedied by reforms going beyond those in the draft Constitution to a properly federal Union. Underlying the Union's failure to undertake these reforms and use its powers to good effect is a failure of vision as to what a European federation could achieve.
For the influence of a fully federal European Union offers the world's best hope for dealing with the existential challenge to a civilised life, and perhaps even to life itself, on this planet. If this is understood, the British will surely join other Europeans who are determined that, having exported to the rest of the world Europe's nation-state system and the wars it generated here, we shall now complete the process of converting the Union into a truly democratic and effective federation, and thus together play the key part in meeting the challenges that confront the world, including the eradication of mass poverty, the stabilisation of the climate and the establishment of permanent peace.