The world summit, meeting in New York on the occasion of the UN's 60th anniversary, ended in failure. In the wake of the speech by President Bush the debate focused for three days on terrorism, while other crucial issues such as disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, poverty, human rights and the protection of the environment were largely neglected.
The summit's final document does not even mention arms control, or nuclear non-proliferation. Mostly, it confines itself to statements of principles. The Millennium Development Goals have been reaffirmed, but with the exception of an EU pledge to double its development aid for Africa no mention can be found regarding the means to pursue international justice. If we take into account that only a few developed countries will commit themselves to pursue the goal of 0.7% of GDP for development aid, the achievement of the aim of halving poverty by 2015 has been mainly entrusted to the free market. This is wholly unrealistic. After a time-span of five years from the solemn announcement, the Millennium Goals now seem to be yet another of those broken dreams that have scarred the UN's history.
The summit did decide on the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission, a Human Rights Council and a Democracy Fund. But despite these objectives being in accord with the current US Administration's policy of spreading democracy, positive action to achieve them failed to materialize.
For the first time a political commitment has been made to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, though when the question arises of how to assess the right moment to intervene, it is foreseeable that divisions among member states will inevitably emerge.
Terrorism was condemned once again, but no agreement was reached on a shared definition. Most Islamic countries asked that the notion of violence against civilians by fighters for freedom and independence should be excluded from the definition. This has the effect that the necessary conditions for entrusting the task of combating terrorism to the UN do not at present exist.
Lastly, the summit failed to produce a new architecture for the global system. Kofi Annan's proposals for Security Council reform met with strong opposition. The Big Five will continue to be the UN's masters, even though they have been weakened by the emergence of new powers.

* * *

What obstructs progress towards UN reform is the asymmetry of the current world order characterized by the overwhelming political, economic and military superiority of the US. The US aims to submit the UN to its will whenever possible. Otherwise it acts unilaterally, free from any international discipline, as was shown by its decision to attack Iraq.
The fundamental lesson which can be drawn from the history of international relations is that only power can limit power.
This means that only when states are able to keep each other in check there is space to ensure the rule of law. This balance of power - that is, the mechanical interplay of opposing forces - can act as a brake on the aspirations of every member of the states system and thus play the role of deterrent against violations of international law. On the other hand, when one state acquires a dominant position, as was the case with the US after the end of the Cold War, it will act solely in accordance with its own interests, possibly infringing international law and disregarding the rights of other states. Relevant examples can be found in the fact that the US - at least in relation to itself - opposes the Kyoto protocol, the International Criminal Court, disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and a specific level of development aid.

* * *

To propel the US along the multilateralist road the formation of one or more large regional actors is an inescapable pre-condition. In Europe this process has begun. The EU is the most intensively regulated region of the world. It is based on a stable balance of power. Its political institutions impose restraints on what sovereign states may do in their relations with each other, and in this it shows the way to what the UN could become in the future: namely, the guardian of international law and the framework of a process of constitutionalization of international relations.
The EU is not only a model for the UN reform. It is also the motor. In the monetary sphere the euro has triggered a process of evolution towards world multilateralism. A recent step forward was the decision of the Chinese Central Bank to unpeg the yuan from the dollar. This means that the emergence of a monetary multipolarism opens the way to a reform of the international economic organizations, i.e. a new Bretton Woods. The ECOSOC should be transformed into an Economic Security Council, in order to co-ordinate the various UN institutions and agencies dealing with economic matters, finance, trade, development, labour and environment.
But monetary multipolarism is not enough. A single EU foreign and security policy is the paramount condition of any move to defeat the pretension of the US to act unilaterally and to consider itself above the international community. To confront the present imbalance the way must be opened to a single European seat within the Security Council and to transform this body into the Council of the great regions of the world. With this reform, the US would eventually become the equal of other regional actors and therefore obliged to respect new rules of the game.
The EU's international prestige has, however, been considerably weakened by Germany's campaign, supported by France and the UK, to obtain for itself a permanent seat in the Security Council. In this attempt to revive anachronistic nationalist ambitions, the EU has made a pitiful spectacle of itself, and at the very moment when it should have been able to speak with one voice in the cause of the construction of world peace. Nation states in this age of globalization are little more than remnants of a bygone epoch. The future belongs to the great regional groupings of states and their co-operation within the UN.
At this summit, the African Union was the sole regional organization to challenge the Big Five's monopoly of the power of veto. It claimed two permanent African seats in the Security Council, with the right to veto. On the other hand it refused to support the ambitions of the four Security Council aspirants - Germany, Japan, India and Brazil - although they did not ask for veto rights. In the debate on Security Council reform Africa proved able to speak with one voice and demonstrated its ability to free itself from its condition of dependency and to participate in the crucial decisions concerning the future of humankind.

* * *

In an article published in The Boston Globe on September 12, 2005 Newt Gingrich, former Speaker of the US House of Representatives, recently put forward a characteristic argument against UN reform, namely that: "The UN must be a fundamentally limited institution because it has no democratic accountability but has at times pretensions of asserting legitimacy akin to that of a democratic nation state".
It is true that the UN is not accountable to the people. But what distinguishes the neocon viewpoint from that of world federalists is that, for the former, the UN is not, cannot and should not be a democratic institution. We should therefore ask what future would democracy have in a world where the significant decisions are taken at global level, while democracy itself does not reach beyond state borders. It is unacceptable for genuine democrats to leave these important decisions solely in the hands of big powers and of private actors, such as multinational corporations or criminal and terrorist organizations. In a globalized world, democracy is destined to decline unless it too becomes international.
That it is feasible to extend democracy to international level has been demonstrated by the European Parliament, which proves that it will be possible, in the not far distant future, to build a UN Parliamentary Assembly, conceived as a step toward a World Parliament.

Democracy has only been widely accepted, at least in theory, as the proper basis of government, for the past 100 to 150 years. The runaway explosion of population poses new and serious challenges to political ingenuity. But the resulting problems have been so pressing that they seemed to demand immediate and, usually, local and improvised solutions.
Constitution-mongering
So the constitution-makers have, in general, felt that the time is not right for their work, deciding, probably correctly, that once the political will to achieve a federal solution for the world is evident, the work of thrashing out a constitution will become urgent. Then it will be undertaken, but the political in-fighting and manoeuvring will be immense and prove more important than the good or bad points of constitutions then on offer. It is rare to find foresight exercised in political affairs: desperate haste to deal with pressing crises is more common.
The benefits of preparation
That is certainly true, but that overlooks the value of having had work already done on federal plans and even complete constitutions. The last 50 years have seen an immense outpouring of political ideas that will make the task of new constitution-makers not only easier, but more fruitful. This is observable in the discussions about a constitution for the European Union. The federalists engage in the discussions with clear ideas about principles and cardinal rules for the creation of new institutions, in a way that was hardly imaginable in 1945 when the United Nations Charter was being written.
The example of Europe
The creation of the European Union, through its successive stages, constitutes the greatest political innovation since 1945 or 1919, perhaps even since 1787, although its final development has yet to be assessed. Certainly the various experiments and devices that have been tried and tested over the past 50 years exemplify new ways of federal power-sharing that are invaluable guides to what can and should be done to build the new institutions that will enable larger societies to live in peace and harmony.
The work of the federalist theories
Beginning before the Second World War, a bevy of political writers have worked at giving theoretical answers to the creation of new federal institutions. Is a constitution for the European Union now the answer to the present problems of enlargement? Only, one may suspect, if it makes provision for the Union to continue enlargement, seek a new type of relationship with its neighbours, and offer itself as a model and catalyst for the establishment of a universal constitution. It would be a betrayal of the principles of the founders and of their federalist supporters if the EU did not try to point the way and act as a pilot plant for a greater union - a federal union of the entire planet.
What shall we need?
One lesson lies in the process which has brought the EU so far. It is only now, after half a century, that the EU is ready for something like a constitution. But it has not got so far by accidental incremental intergovernmentalism. Thwarted, in the 1950s, in the attempt to draft a federal constitution or political union, Europeans adopted instead what can be called the Monnet method - of agreeing specific steps to deal with real common needs, but doing it in a way which contained an enduring federal element. Thus the founding of the Coal and Steel Community dealt with the need to permit Germany's industrial recovery in a federal partnership of equals under a High Authority, and with a parliamentary assembly and a court. The next key step, the economic community or common market, retained these key federal elements for the economy as a whole, and prepared the ground for the later key step of the direct election of the Parliament. The Single European Act in turn led to the completion of the Single Market and opened the way to a Monetary Union. The Monetary Union and enlargement in turn forced an increase in the Parliament's real powers.
A world federal government is also unlikely to be brought suddenly to birth by agreement on a global constitution. Rather, key incremental steps are needed towards the long-term goal of an effective, democratic world government. One such step has been the creation of the International Criminal Court. Another might be a series of steps towards a world parliament. Another might be the creation of a global community to counter the devastation of climate change, and yet another some breakthrough on nuclear disarmament and reform of the Security Council.
The second lesson from the EU is that the world is too large and its problems too complex to deal with all of them from the centre. What the EU has done and is doing is providing an example for other regions. If the world is to be united in a peaceful and lawful future, it will be necessary to achieve elsewhere the same sort of regional unity that has already been achieved, if slowly, in Europe. That, in some ways, could be easier. For example, unlike Europe, South America has only two principal languages that are used throughout the entire continent. Africa is also an area where three colonial languages (English, French and Arabic) have been imposed and are used by the elite everywhere.
Means of progress
The route to such regional unions cannot be left entirely to the regions. For example, unless the spread of nuclear weapons is brought under control at global level, there is little hope that India and Pakistan will be ready to engage in negotiations together with the other members of South Asian Regional Cooperation for a unified sub-continent. Nor is there any hope that Israel and its Arab neighbours will bring about the much-needed unity of the Near East that will be necessary until the United States ceases to use Israel as its permanent and favoured military ally in the region.
Even in the economic field, hegemonic outside powers can hold back regional unity by upholding wider arrangements which they dominate simply by the divide and rule concept. Thus the US deliberately blocked Japan's initiative for an Asian Monetary Union, which might have rescued its neighbours from the 1998 financial crisis. Instead of a residual neo-colonial relation with a former imperial power, warm cooperation between Britain and France to support Africa's federal aspirations would be a help. Until the United Nations is able to keep a semblance of peace or at least moderate our current arms-races, there is little scope for many regions to manage their necessary steps towards unity. A world Community of Communities needs to be born, both through diverse initiatives in the regions and a strategic effort to transform the UN into an effective federal authority, meeting the common challenges that demand global solutions.
Untidiness is all - principles not theory
The world will not be united in uniformity. Diversity in unity has to be the watchword. This will require tolerance and toleration, not something that many societies find easy to bestow upon rivals, or even upon their own citizens. But until they do manage to live and let live, their story will be a continued sorry tale of conflict and chaos. The meek may inherit the earth, but they will have a hard time until the bruisers have battered each other into quiescence or learnt through crisis that better ways must and can be found to resolve differences, and give expression to common interests through institutions and the rule of law.
Conclusion
The growing interdependence of humans and our dependence on the ailing natural world require us to achieve a hitherto unwonted political unity of purpose and of action. Since human unity is the urgent need of our time and the most serious failure is of political unity, we should concentrate our efforts in the direction of remedying that political failure. And, since an authoritarian unity will be neither acceptable, nor durable, we should seek federalist solutions to the creation of unity. This entails working with likeminded movements and offering help to federalist thinkers and activists.
We should seek to bring the lessons and principles of democratic federalism to bear on all routes to human unity: the need for a reform of the economic system and the management of the world's physical environment. Moreover, it is to be appreciated the value of working with civil society as a whole. This will require cooperation, creative thinking and joint efforts by millions of people: world citizens in spirit if not in name.

Excerpts from John Roberts, Federalism: A Testimony, The One World Trust, London, 2005. The whole pamphlet can be obtained by contacting The One World Trust.

When discussing security it is worth recalling that the European project began with what today we would call "soft security" measures. Prompted by the devastation caused by World War II and the widespread desire for peace and justice, the debate initially concentrated on the need for a new approach to international relations. For federalists meeting in Montreux in 1947 this meant working for a world federation, though some saw the need to rebuild war-torn Europe in a new, federal mould as both more urgent and more likely to achieve early success. Essential guidelines were already available in the Hertenstein proposals drawn up the previous year.
The Hague Congress (1948), chaired by Winston Churchill, set the process in motion. Its task was to lay aside "the petty rivalries of national states" and to "look forward to the development of a harmonious society in Europe"¹. The agreed solution foresaw regular intergovernmental meetings and the drawing up of a Charter of Human Rights - essential after the murderous behaviour of fascist regimes -, plus a Court of Justice, and a European Assembly. These aims were realised in the foundation of the Council of Europe which first tackled the roots of conflict in its Convention on Human Rights, and later extended its work to such ground-level areas as education, local government, and the treatment of minorities. As an intergovernmental organisation it followed the pattern suggested by many earlier political thinkers² and is structurally similar to the League of Nations or, in a later strengthened form, the United Nations.
However, with the sharpening by 1949-50 of the perceived threat from the Soviet Union - they now had the atom bomb - and talk of re-arming Germany sending shivers down the backs of every Frenchman, a more federal arrangement was clearly needed. Thrice during the previous eighty years their two countries had fought each other. To avoid a repetition, France and Germany together with the Benelux countries and Italy now undertook preventative action by agreeing in the Paris treaty of 1951 to place the two key resources on which the armaments industry relied at that time, coal and steel, within a common legislative order administered by common institutions which would include a Court of Justice to rule on disputes.
Its principal aim was "to substitute for age-old rivalries the merging of their essential interests; to create, by establishing an economic community, the basis for a broader and deeper community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts; and to lay the foundations for institutions which will give direction to a destiny henceforward shared"³. On the military side, and roughly in parallel with the Paris Treaty negotiations, agreement was also reached on the establishment of a "hard security" European Defence Community with a common European army. This was torpedoed by the French National Assembly's negative vote. It was a step too far.
Yet the soft security approach was still alive. Economic deprivation had led in the inter-war period to extreme nationalism, populist dictatorships, and war. It was no surprise, therefore, that the six states decided next to merge their interests over a much wider range of economic activities in order to "ensure the development of their prosperity in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations ... thus pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty"⁴. Again progress was achieved by the use of soft security measures to avoid a resurgence of armed conflict between the ex-combatants in western Europe.
The military dimension
Already in 1948, preliminary moves towards establishing a European security structure had been agreed by Britain, France and the Benelux countries in the Brussels Treaty of Economic, Social & Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, later renamed the Western European Union. Its military responsibilities were soon to be incorporated within NATO⁵ as part of the Atlantic Alliance's defensive bulwark against Soviet expansion. But by 1992, and against the background of the Yugoslav crisis, the European Community grew increasing aware that its economic success brought with it other responsibilities which it was ill-equipped to handle. The Maastricht reforms of that year therefore endowed the Union some limited competence in the field of Foreign & Security Policy and at the same time declared the Western European Union (WEU) to be "an integral part of the development of the Union"⁶ whose task would be to organise and plan military activities with the stated objective to "preserve peace, and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, ... to promote international cooperation, [and] to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms"⁷. Despite these worthy aims, peace in ex-Yugoslavia was only achieved under American leadership.
Nevertheless, the WEU Council of Ministers did succeed in agreeing the basic rules which should govern EU security policy, namely that troops would be deployed only for humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, and the use of combat forces in crisis management, including peace making. These so-called Petersberg principles of 1992 were incorporated into later EU treaties⁸ and have been respected. At the time of writing, for example, the EU has six thousand peace-keeping troops in Bosnia. Police missions have also been undertaken in Macedonia and Kinshasa (Congo), with 'rule of law' missions to Georgia, Iraq, and Aceh (Indonesia). EU representatives have also participated in negotiations for a coordinating office for Palestine Police Support. A paper entitled European Security Strategy (December 2003) gives the general policy outlines.
Deployment of armed forces is not without its critics. One commentator has pointed out that the EU's acquisition of "deployable military and civilian capabilities for crisis management operations has been frustratingly slow"⁹. Others feel that an emphasis on military means "will push Europe away from the moral high ground" and that reliance on civilian rather than military power distinguishes the EU from NATO and the US¹⁰. The Commission publishes Country Strategy Papers relating to those areas where help is deemed necessary, but the final decision to act lies solely with the Council - that is, with member states' governments - voting by unanimity, although a state may opt to abstain without blocking common action by the other members. The European Parliament has no say in the decision. Despite all the fine rhetoric there is a clear absence of EU-level democratic control over security policy.
Nor does the EU have its own army. For its operations, often conducted in collaboration with NATO and/or the United Nations, the necessary military units must be supplied by those member states willing and able to take part. Eurocorps, which might one day form the nucleus of a future EU army, is described on its website as "A force for the EU and NATO" and includes participants from Turkey and Canada as well as EU countries. Europe's defence against external aggression still rests with NATO, but that body - highly sophisticated and successful though it is - now undertakes "out of area" operations, such as in Afghanistan, with which the EU might not always collectively agree.
Nineteen EU member states are also members of NATO and, with the Union's increased economic and political influence in the world, a more reasonable balance between Europe and North America, with possibly a revision of the present treaty arrangements, might be expected. Yet to strengthen Europe's voice requires a greater willingness among its member states to respect their existing EU treaty commitment to coordinate their foreign policy and work more coherently together in international organisations such as NATO and the United Nations¹¹.
The internal threat
Since the end of the cold war the main threat comes not from uniformed armies but from international terrorism. This poses a double-headed danger - "double-headed" because the security measures now being hastily introduced are potentially more damaging to democracy than the terrorist attacks in themselves. EU-level agreements under the so-called Pillar Three provisions are strictly inter-governmental with no parliamentary input even where they directly affect individual rights and freedoms. For example, the security services' proposals for the long-term storage of all emails, details of telephone calls, access to bank accounts and credit card dealings could lead - from the best of motives - to a more thoroughly effective police state than ever before, thereby undermining the principles on which the European project is based and constituting a breach of the EU's commitments on human rights.
Soft security
It is time the EU returned to the fundamental principles upon which the European project was founded. Our continent's devastating experience of the ravages of war, most recently repeated in the Balkan conflicts, should have taught us the need to identify the underlying problems and take steps to deal with them before they become too acute. Better control of the arms trade must be the first soft security policy to be put into place. The Draft Constitutional Treaty provided for an improvement in "military capabilities" and the establishment of a European Defence Agency to strengthen "the industrial and technological base of the defence sector"¹², yet it dodged the question of how the arms trade feeds conflict elsewhere in the world. While a Commission communication On Conflict Prevention¹³ emphasizes the need to control the supply of small arms and an EU Code of Conduct on Arms Export is in place, EU companies and governments are nevertheless busily competing for contracts to sell everything from pistols to missiles and military aircraft.
Armed forces may provide a defence against aggression and protection against disorder, but the lessons of our own history show that the roots of peace lie deeper. Our philosophy should be to use EU expertise, investment, technical facilities and resources to combat such known sources of conflict as 3^rd world poverty, malnutrition, and the spread of communicable diseases, as well as to promote education and training in the skills necessary for modern democracies to function effectively and - to put it bluntly - to survive. Only by the establishment of stable societies and improved living standards can the problems of population flows and human trafficking be solved.
Without waiting for the USA, the EU should also have the confidence to take a lead in applying the Kyoto Protocol provisions aimed at halving CO2 emissions and should assist 3rd world countries to make use of the technologies required for sustainable development. By such positive action the EU would demonstrate that it is not simply the world's largest trading bloc but also a political union made up of countries and peoples who have voluntarily put centuries of internecine warfare behind them in order to build a future based on the principles of peace, justice and respect for human rights. The EU's own internal development - namely, of a common institutional framework within which to work out solutions to any tensions which may occasionally occur between its member states - offers a suitable blueprint for conflict resolution elsewhere.

1 Congress of Europe 1948, Economic & Social Resolution
2 See for example An Essay towards the present & Future Peace of Europe by the British Quaker William Penn, first published in 1693
3 Preamble, Treaty establishing the European Coal & Steel Community, Paris 1951. My italics
4 Preamble, Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Rome 1957
5 See NATO Handbook, Chapter 15; also Willem van Eekelen: Debating European Security, 1998
6 Maastricht Treaty, Title V, Article J.4. See also The Declaration of Western European Union attached to this Treaty
7 Maastricht Treaty, Title V, Article J.1
8 See, for example, Title V, Article 17-3 of the post-Nice Consolidated TEU
9 "The Strategic Culture of the European Union," International Affairs, July 2005
10 op.cit. pages 801-2
11 See Title V, Article 19 of the post-Nice Consolidated TEU
12 Draft Constitutional Treaty, Article I-41
13 COM(2001) 211 final

On May 29, 2005, the French voted in a referendum not to ratify the proposed European constitution. Three days later, Dutch voters did the same. In both cases, the margin was solid. Since then, the world press has been filled with discussion about the future of Europe as a vision and as an institution. But the consequences of these votes are in fact extremely ambiguous.
Take the French vote. There were three groups which hailed the vote as a victory: the neo-cons in the United States, large segments of the French left (and particularly the alterglobalists), and rightwing Euroskeptics throughout Europe. In the U.S., William Kristol, editor of the leading journal of the neo-cons, the Weekly Standard, ended his editorial on "A New Europe?" with "Vive la France." The proponents of the "no" on the French left celebrated in the streets of Paris. And rightwing Euroskeptics were delighted at last to win a round in their efforts to derail Europe.
Could they all have been right? Let us see what they were celebrating. For the U.S. neo-cons, the French "no" (and the Dutch "no") were defeats for arrogant, anti-American European elites, and no doubt particularly for the current prime nemesis of the neo-cons, Jacques Chirac. "This is a moment of hope - for the prospects of a strong pro-American, pro-liberty, more or less free-market and free-trade, socially and morally reinvigorated Europe," said Kristol.
For French alterglobalists, the "no" vote represented quite the opposite - both a rebuff to Anglosaxon conservative values and a rejection of neoliberalism as a program, as incarnated in the proposed Constitution, and as represented by the members of the European Commission and the bureaucracy in Brussels (and represented for them as well by Chirac's government in France). And for the rightwing Euroskeptics, the vote represented a blow against this same Commission and this same Brussels bureaucracy, which stood in their eyes for imposing socialism on Europe. There was also a strong xenophobic element in the French "no" (and even more in the Dutch "no") - a rejection of the possible future admission of Turkey into the European Union, and an attack on the policies that had admitted so many Moslem immigrants into Europe.
Obviously, as in all referenda, the "no" vote put together very different groups with very different objectives. What seems to have provided the additional "no" votes to previous referenda in France were an increased percentage of Socialist and Green voters who were angry about the state of the economy and fearful of further "globalization" - a view they expressed by defeating the treaty. And what seems to have provided the additional "no" votes in the Netherlands is an upsurge of fears about Muslim immigrants in their country caused by recent very notable acts of violence.
Whatever the explanation of the votes, what are the consequences? The "no" votes mean the definitive end of the proposed Constitution, since it required unanimous ratification, and there is zero likelihood that France or the Netherlands will have a second vote to undo the first. This does not, of course, mean the end of institutional Europe. The EU is left with the structure it has. The problem is that the existing structure was considered by most people to be inadequate to the needs of an expanded Europe, and the Constitution was supposed to improve the situation by reducing the need for unanimity in a number of areas, and by creating two central posts (a president and a minister of foreign affairs) to increase political solidity. It may be some time before European governments try again to improve the present institutional structures.
Since one of the main problems that led both to the attempt to write a new Constitution and to the rejection of this very Constitution was the expansion of Europe from 15 to 25 members, further expansion may well be on hold. Bulgaria and Romania were scheduled to join the EU in 2007. The chances of Croatia, Macedonia, Ukraine, and of course Turkey to be allowed to join seem even thinner for the moment.
There are those who are quietly happy. One of them is Tony Blair. The French "no" has various positive consequences for him. It saves the United Kingdom from holding its own referendum in 2006 as promised, and therefore a probable public defeat for him. Blair can now contend that he was in favor of the defeated Constitution but that a British referendum is now irrelevant. Furthermore, Blair cannot be unhappy about the rebuff to Chirac (as well as to Schröder in the separate and earlier German regional elections). It is welcome relief from his difficulties at home because of his Iraq policy. Blair may now try to put himself forward as the leader of Europe.
Kristol's editorial no doubt reflects the mood of the Bush regime. They have been trying for four years to throw a monkey-wrench into a stronger Europe. The rejection of the Constitution and the confusion that it is causing is the first good news they have had in two years on that front. In the long run, Europe will no doubt continue to pull away from U.S. domination, but Bush at this point is more concerned with the short run, and in the short run the French "no" is definitely helpful to him.
As for the French alterglobalists, what have they gained? They have demonstrated an increased strength within the family of all those left-of-center in France. Indeed, the French Socialist party and the Green party are both in turmoil as a result of the vote. There may be important realignments and it is not at all sure that the French rainbow coalition of the left can reconstitute itself in a way that will enable it to win the 2007 presidential elections, especially if the center-right coalition manages to get its act together better than the center-left coalition.
Have the alterglobalists made a major impact on the struggle against neoliberalism in the world-economy? They were already doing well due to the rise of protectionist sentiment throughout the countries of the North (North America, western Europe, east Asia). The vote in France is a reflection of this. But will this vote accelerate the movement? That depends on two things. One is whether the alterglobalists can separate in the popular mind the fight against neoliberalism from the xenophobic, anti-Islamic sentiments that are overtaking much of Europe. And the second is the degree to which the position of the Bush regime continues to erode in the geopolitical arena, and it is therefore unable to capitalize on the setback to European political integration.
Many people in Europe are saying that now is the moment to "start over" in the whole exercise of European unity. The problem from the beginning has been that a more social Europe is not possible unless it is a more federal Europe. But significant segments of the European left (and not only the left in France) have always been afraid that a more federal Europe meant an undermining of the social achievements in their own country. Until the European left is ready to test its strength and fight its fight within a more federal European structure, it is going to go from confused referendum to confused referendum, find itself weakened internally in the struggle to maintain national social achievements, and find Europe unable to play the world geopolitical role vis-à-vis the United States that the European left wishes it to play.

Fernand Braudel Center, Binghamton University, Commentary No. 163, June 15, 2005

The European Parliament,
- having regard to the Treaty of Nice,
- having regard to the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe,
- having regard to its resolution of 12 January 2005¹ on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe,
- having regard to the Declaration by the Heads of State or Government on the ratification of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, European Council, 16-17 June 2005,
- having regard to the opinions delivered by the Committee of the Regions on ... and the European Economic and Social Committee on ... at the request of the European Parliament,
- having regard to Rule 45 of its Rules of Procedure,
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs and the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Budgets, the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Regional Development, the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, the Committee on Culture and Education, the Committee on Legal Affairs, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, the Committee on Women's Rights and Gender Equality and the Committee on Petitions (A6-0000/2005),
Whereas
A. The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed by the twenty-five Member States of the European Union on 29 October 2004,
B. The Constitution was drafted by the European Convention which achieved new levels of openness, pluralism and democratic legitimacy,
C. The European Parliament endorsed the Constitution by a majority of over two-thirds as "a good compromise and a vast improvement on the existing treaties ... [which] will provide a stable and lasting framework for the future development of the European Union that will allow for further enlargement while providing mechanisms for its revision when needed"²,
D. Fourteen Member States, representing a majority of the population of the Union, have since ratified the Constitution according to their own constitutional requirements³,
E. France and the Netherlands, following referendums held on 29 May and 1 June respectively, have failed to ratify the Constitution - with the result that the ratification process has subsequently stalled in most of the remaining nine Member States,
F. Article 48 of the Treaty on European Union provides that the Constitution will not enter into force unless and until it is ratified by all Member States,
G. It is necessary to respect the verdict of those Member States and their peoples which have ratified the Constitution as well as those which have not,
H. The No votes appear to have been rather more an expression of dissent at the present state of the Union than a specific objection to the constitutional reforms, but that, paradoxically, the result of the Noes is to maintain the status quo and block reform,
I. The European Council in June decided on a "period of reflection ... to enable a broad debate to take place in each of our countries, involving citizens, civil society, social partners, national parliaments and political parties"; the heads of government agreed that in the first half of 2006 they would "make an overall assessment of the national debates and agree how to proceed"⁴,
J. The heads of government declared that the ratification process could continue, although they also agreed that the original timetable for the entry into force of the Constitution (1 November 2006) would be extended,
K. The European Council, however, failed to give a clear focus to the period of reflection or to define methods, and has since been seen to lack both the political will and the capacity to stimulate and manage the European dialogue,
L. The European Commission is preparing to re-launch its communications policy without, however, giving a decisive political lead to a campaign to save the Constitution,
M. The national parliaments have declared their support for a series of joint parliamentary meetings that will 'stimulate, steer and synthesize' the European dialogue⁵,
N. There is in theory a number of options available to the Union - ranging from abandoning the constitutional project, seeking to continue with the present text, or embarking upon a complete re-write; a clear majority of French and Dutch voters seem to be in favour of a modification of the text⁶,
1. Confirms its commitment to reaching without undue delay a constitutional settlement of the future of Europe which strengthens parliamentary democracy and the rule of law, anchors fundamental rights, and enhances the capacity of the Union to act effectively at home and abroad; fears that without such a constitutional settlement it will not be possible for the Union to expect the loyalty of its citizens, to maintain the momentum of integration or to become a respectable partner in world affairs;
2. Recalls that the political problems and institutional weaknesses that the Convention was set up to address will persist - and, indeed, grow - unless and until there is a good settlement along the lines of the proposed Constitution;
3. Acknowledges that the ratification of the Constitution has now encountered insurmountable difficulties;
4. Rejects the establishment of core groups of certain Member States bound together by size or wealth; recalls that the Treaty of Nice does not facilitate enhanced cooperation between integrationist minded Member States across the whole range of policy; deplores any suggestion that coalitions of certain states could be formed outside the EU system;
5. Warns that a strategy based on the selective implementation of the Constitution risks destroying the consensus between the institutions and among Member States, thereby aggravating the crisis of confidence; supports exclusively, therefore, certain democratic reforms that could be introduced by revision of rules of procedure or inter-institutional agreement - such as transparency of law making in the Council of Ministers, introduction of a form of citizens' initiative, improvements to the comitology procedure, and the more rigorous scrutiny by Member State parliaments of EU affairs;
6. Proposes to use the current period of reflection to re-launch the constitutional project on the basis of a large public debate about the future of European integration; resolves that this European dialogue should clarify, deepen and democratise the consensus around the Constitution and address criticisms and find solutions where expectations have not been met;
7. Welcomes the beginnings of a fresh debate about the Union's policy direction but stresses that this must take place within the context of overcoming the constitutional crisis, and that policy prescriptions at EU level must relate directly to the rules, powers and procedures of the EU institutions as well as to the competences conferred on the EU by the Member States;
8. Insists that the dialogue should be conducted and coordinated across the Union, structured by common themes and in realistic stages according to an agreed framework for evaluation, and designed to lead to decisive political choices;
9. Warns that uncoordinated, narrowly focussed national debates will serve only to harden national stereotypes and accentuate divisions; and an imposed dialogue without political goals will be nebulous, even vacuous, thereby giving rise to public cynicism;
10. Proposes that a series of conferences between European and national parliamentarians - 'Parliamentary Forums' - should be organised in order to stimulate the debate and to shape, step by step, the necessary political conclusions;
11. Recognises the critical importance for the Parliament of avoiding a second failure of the constitutional project; commits itself therefore to playing a leading role in the European dialogue, in particular by publishing 'European Papers' on each of the big issues facing the Union which may be used as a common European template for the national debates and which should be used as the basis for the deliberations of the Parliamentary Forums;
12. Proposes that the first Parliamentary Forum be convened in the spring of 2006, in advance of the June meeting of the European Council, in order to hear reports from the French and Dutch parliaments about the negative referendum results and to discuss, on the basis of this Resolution, the structure of the European dialogue; the aim of this Forum is to make comprehensive recommendations to the European Council about how the Union should proceed to find the way out of the crisis;
13. Proposes that the outset of the European dialogue should analyse where the original consensus enshrined in the Constitution holds good and where the controversial questions lie;
14. Proposes to organise other Parliamentary Forums to address four priority questions about the future of Europe, as follows:
(i) what is the goal of European integration?
(ii) what role should Europe have in the world?
(iii) in the light of globalisation, what is the future of the European social and economic model?
(iv) how do we define the boundaries of the European Union?
15. Believes that a rich debate on these fundamental issues will open up new perspectives for European integration and prepare the ground for reform of the common policies in those areas where dissension exists;
16. Believes, moreover, that the European dialogue will only overcome the constitutional crisis if it engages not only each EU institution but also state and regional parliaments, local government, political parties, social partners, civil society and the academic community; puts particular value in this regard upon practical contributions from the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions;
17. Requests Member States to organise a large number of public meetings and media debates on the future of Europe - 'Citizens' Forums' - at national, regional and local level, structured along the commonly agreed themes, with the assistance of the Commission; urges the social partners and civil society organisations to get engaged in these debates;
18. Expects political parties to give much more prominence to the European dimension in both their internal debates and electoral campaigning;
19. Would welcome citizens' petitions that contribute to shaping the debate;
20. Urges the Commission and Council to give a greater priority to EU cultural and educational policy, and reiterates its budgetary proposal for increased funding of the PRINCE programme;
21. Suggests that the conclusions of the period of reflection should be drawn in the second half of 2007 according to the criteria set out in paragraph 1, and that a clear decision is reached at that stage about whether improvements to the Constitution are needed and, if so, how they should be undertaken;
22. Insists that if the outcome of the European dialogue demonstrates that the text of the Constitution has to be modified in order to renew consensus and facilitate ratification, the negotiation should treat the 2004 Constitution as a good first draft, seeking to maintain the key reforms that will improve the system of democratic governance of the EU and which have not proved controversial during the ratification process;
23. Insists, further, that if it is decided to revise the text extensively a mandate should be prepared for a new Convention to be held during 2008;
24. Calls on the members of the European Council to accept both individual and collective responsibility for bringing into force an eventual constitutional settlement; and insists that they coordinate more closely both the content and timing of the national campaigns and give evidence to the citizen of their political will and mutual solidarity;
25. Takes note of the European Commission's 'Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate', but calls on the Commission not only to deliver its communications strategy but also to show decisive political leadership to help the Union emerge from its current constitutional difficulties;
26. Urges that any revised Constitution be submitted to a consultative ballot across the EU at the same time as the next European Parliamentary elections in 2009 so as to give a popular verdict on its outcome;
27. Demands in any case that every effort is made to ensure that the eventual Constitution enters into force during 2009;
28. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and Commission, and to the Parliaments of the Member States, the Committee of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee, the former Members of the European Convention, and the Parliaments and Governments of the accession and candidate countries.
1 OJ C 247 E, 6.10.2005, p. 88
2 European Parliament Resolution of 12.1.2005, see above
3 Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain
4 SN 117/05, 18 June 2005
5 XXXIV COSAC meeting, 10-11 October 2005
6 For example, 62% of the French and 65% of the Dutch say they want 'renegotiation' for a 'more social text'; Flash Eurobarometer 171-172
Draft report: Motion for a European Parliament resolution on the period of reflection: the structure, subjects and context for an assessment of the debate on the European Union (2005/2146(INI)

The negative outcomes of the French and Dutch referendums have made the ratification process of the European Constitutional Treaty very difficult for two clear reasons: firstly, the no votes prevailed in two of the founding countries of the European Community, particularly in France, and it is well known that without France there can be no further development in the European integration process; secondly, the no votes strongly point out (in Holland nearly two-thirds of the voters opposed the ratification) a great disappointment with the results of EU performance, particularly after the start of the monetary Union. From here we probably need to start again, if we want to relaunch the integration process on a federal basis, which is still essential if Europe wants to be able to play an active role in the promotion of peace and prosperity worldwide. On the other hand, the figures show that the euro generates more employment than the dollar: inhabitants being approximately equal, the number of employees from 2000 to 2004 increased by more than 4 million in the euro area, and by 2.3 million in the US. It is nonetheless clear that the economic performance has been particularly disappointing in recent years.
In Europe it is widely held that, in the current phase of moderate but prolonged stagnation, a coordinated investment plan should be promoted to close the infrastructural gap existing in many EU countries stemming from the restrictive policies necessary to respect first the Maastricht parameters and then the Stability and Growth Pact obligations; moreover an expenditure plan must be undertaken in order to strengthen European productivity competitiveness on the basis of the decisions made by the European Council in Lisbon in March 2000.
This plan should roughly consist of:
a) investments to complete the European network in the telecommunications, energy and transport sectors, taking into account the connection needs related to enlargement;
b) a plan of research and development and higher education expenditure, to strengthen the competitiveness of European production;
c) public and private investments in advanced technologies and to foster the creation of European champions in key sectors;
d) the financing of a series of projects to improve the living standards of EU citizens (sustainable mobility, water purification, renewable energy, new clean energy sources, etc.);
e) investments to ensure the preservation and promotion of the cultural heritage and natural resources.
Such a plan would lead to a strong acceleration towards the achievement of the objectives fixed by the Lisbon Strategy, which so far seems very difficult. This is due to the fact that the national accounts must comply with the Maastricht parameters and, although the recent adjustments to the Stability and Growth Pact allow greater flexibility, they are not able to support a budget expansion to finance the Lisbon Strategy. On the other hand, the European budget is not only limited but also many resources are absorbed in agricultural expenditure, and the disastrous outcome of the European Council in Brussels has clearly shown that a radical reform of its breakdown is not feasible.
In this situation the only serious way out to implement the Lisbon Strategy is connected to the recourse to a Union bond issue, that is, EU bonds guaranteed by the European budget (and by the national budgets) to finance the Lisbon Agenda. Considering the EU world reputation and the euro's current strength, these bonds could be issued at a low interest rate and would contribute to the strengthening of the European financial market absorbing some liquidity excess actually present, and could support the financing of the European development plan by attracting a large share of the world savings which currently is, without good alternatives, placed in the US market despite the progressive depreciation of the dollar.
The French and Dutch no votes force Europe to make a choice that cannot be postponed: the stop to the ratification process requires a turnaround in the economy to restore trust in the EU to the European citizen; on the other hand, the euro's strength could be exploited to attract external capital in order to support the financing of a European growth plan. Hic Rhodus, hic salta: Union bonds could represent the essential tool to implement the Lisbon Strategy and to relaunch growth; if that happened the integration process towards a federal completion could be relaunched. This would mean enforcing the golden rule not at a national level, but at a European level so that the investments needed for the implementation of the Lisbon Agenda can be financed by the issue of Union bonds, while forcing at the same time every Member State to guarantee respect for the Stability and Growth Pact obligations.
Thus the infrastructure investments could be financed by the European Investment Bank in partnership with private investors. In regard to R&D and higher education expenditure, and the other investments envisaged by the Lisbon Agenda to foster European productivity competitiveness and to boost growth, the Member States of the eurozone should appoint a "Minister for Lisbon" charged with first working out and then attending to the implementation of a "Plan for Lisbon", which, after European Council approval, could be co-financed by a "European Agency for Lisbon" by Union bond issues. However, part of the debt would be charged to individual national accounts, as it happens with Structural Funds, whereas the debt burden would be only partially charged to the national accounts as the interest on Union bonds would be covered by the EU budget.
To restart the process leading to overcome definitively the democratic deficit, which would characterise the EU even after the final approval of the Constitutional Treaty, the European economy needs to be boosted through a big bond issue aimed at growth. However, the renewal of the unification process in the political field is also inevitable if we want to proceed towards a multi-polar world, able on the one hand to foster peace exploiting all the available soft power resources of Europe, thus avoiding a further resort to military force, and on the other hand to assure the EU the necessary power to manage the European economy successfully, to plan the growth of those countries where Europe exerts an influence, and to negotiate on the same level with the US and the other regional areas a sustainable world economic growth plan.