Democratic peace theory holds that democracies do not wage war against one another. Two false consequences are drawn from this theory. The first is that the spread of democracy to every state would in itself be sufficient to achieve universal peace. The second is that spreading democracy should then be the first foreign policy priority of all democratic states. These views ignore the fact that historical conditions may either promote or hamper the success of democracy and its stabilization. As asserted by James Madison at the Philadelphia Convention in 1787, "The means of defense against foreign danger have been always the instruments of tyranny at home". This law of politics explains not only the erosion of freedom in the US after 9/11, but also the collapse of democratic institutions in Italy, Germany and Spain between the World Wars, and more generally the authoritarian degeneration of political regimes caused by the political and military pressure they experienced on their borders. The lesson we can draw from historical experience is that peace, or at least international détente, is the principal prerequisite of democracy.

A more recent lesson can be learned from the setbacks in the US doctrine of bringing democracy to the Middle-East and from the experience of failed states such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. Efforts to establish democracy in this region are frustrated by the climate of insecurity, violence and corruption prevailing in those countries, which worsened after the US military interventions. This experience shows that an additional preliminary condition is needed in order to pave the way to democracy: namely, a stable government that assures the rule of law. Moreover, regrettable as it may be for the idealist, there are material requirements for a democratic society, i.e. the eradication of poverty, disease and illiteracy. They enable people to become rational and intellectually aware actors in the decision-making process.

And yet, in spite of these obstacles on the road to successful democracy, past decades have seen a sweeping advance of democracy in the world since the Portuguese revolution in 1974. It has spread to Southern and Eastern Europe, the ex-Soviet Union, Asia and Latin America. For the first time in UN history a majority of member states' governments are elected through a democratic procedure. According to the latest Freedom House Report (January 2008), there are 121 electoral democracies in the world, among which liberal democracies number 90, partly free countries 60 and only 43 not free. This extraordinary progress of democracy depends to a high degree on two parallel processes: the effect of globalization and the end of the Cold War.

Nevertheless, we should recognize that democracy has never shown such worrying signs of weakness as today. At world level there is a widening gap between the market and civil society, which have become global, and politics, which remain substantially confined within national borders. Consequently, the decisions on which the destiny of peoples depends, such as security, control of the global economy, international justice or protection of the environment, tend to shift away from representative institutions.

The feeling widely shared among citizens is that the most important decisions have migrated away from institutions under their control and towards international power centers free from any form of democratic supervision. Globalization thus brings about the crisis of democracy. In fact, seen from a global viewpoint, the decisions made at national level, where democratic powers exist, are relatively minor. At international level, on the other hand, where the most important decisions are made, there are no democratic institutions.

The danger we are facing is the depletion of democracy. More precisely we should ask ourselves how long democracy can last in a world where citizens are excluded from participating in decisions which determine their destiny. Globalization must be democratized before it destroys democracy entirely.

International relations, which are still the jousting ground for diplomatic and military rivalries among states and antagonism between non-state actors, can only be brought under popular control by international democracy. Analysis of the structures of international organizations shows that they are diplomatic machines within which governments pursue co-operation. Recently some of them have been endowed with parliamentary assemblies which represent their national parliaments' response to the globalization process but are also an admission of the erosion of their power. In other words, they attempt to shift parliamentary control of governments to international level. Most such multinational assemblies are made up of national parliamentarians, although the European Parliament, which represents the most advanced evolution of this category of international assemblies, is directly elected.

The European Parliament is the laboratory of international democracy. Since the introduction of direct elections it has increased its legislative and control powers over the Commission - that is, over what is potentially the European government. This means that the democratization of the European Union has been a mighty tool for strengthening European institutions. It is worth recalling that the dilemma which arose during the process of European integration, namely whether to concentrate on strengthening the European Community first or to democratize it first, has been solved in favor of the second option. The same question can be formulated as regards the problem of democratizing the UN.
The plan to bring globalization under democratic control is meeting with formidable opposition not only from states with authoritarian regimes, but primarily from the US government which is unwilling to let its own freedom of action be lessened by the international organizations to which it belongs, nor by movements arising in the global civil society. This is a further demonstration of the premise that, to be a promoter of international democracy, it is not enough to have a democratic regime - a necessary, but insufficient condition. To overcome US opposition, a centre of power must emerge, capable of supporting the plan for a world democratic order. It is reasonable to believe that Europe will play such a role. For instance, the European Parliament supports the project for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly. The significance of European unification lies in surpassing the nation-state, a form of political organization that develops power relations with the other states. Therefore, it is fairly safe to assume that the EU does not have hegemonic ambitions, nor will any future European Federation. Although the EU aspires to independence in its relationship with the US, its objective will not be to replace the US as the stabilizer of world order. Europe will rather pursue a policy of co-operation with the US with the prospect of joint management of the world order, open to participation of other regional groupings of states. On the other hand, Europe will hold sufficient power to relieve the United States of some of its overwhelming world responsibilities and thus have the authority to persuade it to support the democratic reform of the UN.

According to many superficial observers of European reality, the widening of the European Union (EU) would mean the end of all perspective of federal evolution. On the contrary, the increase of the number of its members leaves no choice but between either paralysis or federalism. Some people, for example in France, believe they can find an alternative solution in a directorate of the bigger States. They forget that such an orientation is rejected by the others and that its efficiency is far from being guaranteed. Its first result would be to foster inner tensions and push smaller states towards an extreme pro-American attitude. This return to interstate tensions would be a definite step backward. It would not allow Europe to achieve a real political presence.
Federalism is the organizational form the best adapted to the community of peoples and States of Europe, which corresponds the most exactly to the motto proposed for the Union, "Unity in Diversity", combining the greatest autonomy of the federated entities, in other words subsidiarity, a federalist term par excellence, and a supra-state authority in the fields of common competence. However, to federate nations several of which in turn have occupied firstrank positions in the world and which still believe themselves to be first rate powers, is a difficult undertaking. The federal systems of the American States, of the German Länder, of the Swiss Cantons, of the Canadian provinces, of the States of Australia or India, while they provide useful examples, cannot simply be transposed to Europe.
In the present period of constitutional crisis we are going through, it is not without interest to consider the lessons offered by historical experiences in federalism, but also to define the peculiar features of a future European federal model.

The lessons we can draw from historical experiences
The historical examples are first to be considered from the point of view of the institutions. But how much freedom of choice is kept by the federated entities in their inner policies is also a matter to be carefully considered.

Institutions
The first experience to be considered is ours.
The distribution of competences between different levels, some being exclusive and others shared, the decision-taking by majority vote, the primacy of community law over States' law, the existence of a common currency managed by a Central Bank are the federal elements to which the EU owes its main achievements.
In the same way, the semi-proportionality of citizens' votes in the Council and representations in the Parliament is not far different from the current systems of representation of federated entities in existing federations. Some combine equal representation in one assembly (the Senate in the US, the Council of States in Switzerland) with the representation of populations in another assembly (the House of Representatives in the US, the National Council in Switzerland). Others add to the assembly representating the populations another chamber where the federated States have a semi-proportional representation; such is the case in Federal Germany. The provision in the European Reform treaty of a double majority of States and population in the Council of Ministers is inspired by the same philosophy.
Indeed, the ambition of federal systems is to find a balance between the equality of States and the equality of citizens. History tells us that this equilibrium is not easy to reach nor to preserve. The crises of federalism may lead to conflicts; the most bloody was the one which tore the US during the Civil war. The adversaries of federalism put forward these crises to support the thesis that all federations are threatened by a sudden breakdown. They quote the example of the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia. So doing they forget that those federations were purely formal constructions which hardly masked the dictatorship of a single party and a crushing hegemony in the former USSR as in the present Federation of Russia. There remains that keeping the balance between the influence of the most populated and less populated States is as essential as the balance between the federated States and the federation. The tensions peculiar to federal systems result most of the time from the sharing of competences and their exercise. The feeling that "Brussels" meddles too much in minor matters which could remain in the field of responsibility of the States, or even local entities, feeds the demand for a better respect of the subsidiarity principle. The Reform treaty gave national Parliaments a power of caution in this field, the last word pertaining to the Court of Justice. The existence of a strong judiciary is necessary to the good functioning of federalism. The greatest merit of federalism is to substitute judicial arbitration to armed conflicts. This substitution means that the arbiter must be recognized as independent of the federated entities and of the federal institutions as well. The independence of judges depends as much on the duration of their mandate and the conditions of its renewal as on the authority who designates them. The extreme solution is the appointment for life, as in the Supreme Court of the USA. Until now the member-States of the EU have refused to extend the competence of the Court of Justice to matters of defence and foreign policy; in the same way they refuse to extend the competence and the power of initiative of the Commission to these same fields. As it had been remarked by the founder of the College of Bruges, Henri Brugmans, until now Europe has just practised federalism the wrong way round. Without competence for the questions which normally pertain to federalism, it often deals with matters which, somewhere else, concern the States themselves. The formula contemplated by the Reform treaty that creates a High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy linked to the Council and the Commission, with a diplomatic service of its own, would be a real step toward a federalism going in the right direction.
Another lesson drawn from federal examples: the necessity to have a strong executive at the head of the federation, strong meaning legitimate and visible. In this respect the Reform treaty marked only a limited progress. The creation of a President of the European Council with a larger mandate and no longer fulfilling national functions is useful, but the appointment procedure is far from democratic and creates a duality with the president of the Commission. However, the supporters of a Federal Europe must see to it that these dispositions are adopted, whatever the fate of the Reform treaty.

What Autonomy for the States?
The promoters of federalism have to answer the fundamental question posed by their adversaries: what autonomy will be left to the federated States in a European Union? From this point of view the experience of the other federal systems deserves to be considered.
Everywhere education remains the concern of the federated entities, as well as, for an important part, the tax system, welfare policies and protection of the environment. We may, for instance, notice the choice by California to endorse the Kyoto Protocol that the USA government has not ratified. Be that as it may, political and social choices are basically made or arbitrated by the federal elections in the Federal State. In a European Federal Union these choices will be decided, for a large part, as they are now, by national elections, but the importance of European elections should increase together with the competences of the Union. However that may be, European states will keep more latitude in the choice of their economic, social or environmental model. For example, differently from other federal states, there is a consensus about maintaining at the national level the mechanisms of social welfare and to exclude the taxes on individuals from a fiscal harmonization, however advisable the latter may be. The system of ownership of firms will equally remain a national competence, even if the necessity of a fair competition, essential condition for the single market, remains under the competence of the Union.
Nevertheless, there is the field of ethical values and fundamental rights where, even today, the EU has greater powers than the US. Such is the case, for example, of the abolition of the death penalty. However, the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court in Washington tends to place the fight against discrimination above the traditional States' rights.

The Specifics of a European Federalism
The particular character of a European federation will be to be pluri-national. The US, Germany, India, Switzerland, in spite of the latter being plurilingual, conceive themselves as forming one nation. Only the Belgian federation is bi-national, but its recent and very complex structure combining regions and linguistic communities makes it a model difficult to transpose. Rather than a federal State, Europe will define itself as a federal "Union of States and Citizens", a formula which seems to me more accurate than Jacques Delors' "federation of Nation States" - which was coined to appease the "souverainistes". Indeed, to quote Jean Monnet: "we do not form a coalition of States, we unite men". Moreover, several members of the EU, for example the United Kingdom, are pluri-national.
The first consequence of the pluri-national character of the EU is that it must foster a patriotism of values, of citizenship, a constitutional patriotism, and, in no case, an ethnic or geographical patriotism. This form of patriotism seems to me of a superior ethical level and certainly better adapted to the aspirations of younger generations, consequently it will be easier to make them share it. It is also a response to the perpetual adversaries of the EU who like to caricature it as an empire designed to be dominated by Germany, while one of its essential values is the refusal of any hegemony.
A second consequence concerning the institutional organization of the federation: national organs, governments and parliaments will have to work together with the federal government, especially in the fields of foreign policy, defence and domestic security. In existing federations, federated entities only partake more or less in the Union government through their representative assembly: the US Senate, the German Bundesrat, the Council of States in Switzerland. But neither the Governors of the American States nor the Minister-Presidents of the Länder take part in the definition of the federal foreign policy. It should not be the same in the European federation.
The institution of a President of the European Council relieved of national functions was one of the most important innovations of the Reform treaty. It raised reservations among federalists and supporters of the communitarian method, who could see it as a strengthening of the "Europe of States". We hope that a president who has only European responsibilities will act as the champion of the common interest. His role will be to associate the chiefs of national Governments to the management of EU's affairs.
From this innovation two evolutions seem possible. The more likely, at least for some time, will be the division of the government of the EU into a community domain where the Commission will have the main influence and an inter-governmental domain mostly concerning the States. In the medium term another evolution would be advisable: the two domains progressively coming together. This merging could take place by a progressive community of decisional procedures (an extension of the majority vote to foreign policy and defence, being understood that, as long as no integrated army is in existence, the minority would not be obliged to take part in an armed intervention that they would not approve of), by the fusion of presidencies and the creation of a European Cabinet composed of several ministers with a double function, on the model of the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, another innovation of the Reform treaty. It would be a clever means of conciliating the desire of each State to have a Commissioner and the necessity to ensure the coherence of the Community's Executive.
Each of these ministers would have a vast range of responsibilities and would receive a power of coordination over the corresponding commissioners. In this way it would not just be Foreign Affairs, but also defence, domestic security, the economy, sector policies, the quality of life, including the environment and welfare, education, communication, culture and youth, which would represent seven or eight portfolios. Chosen without consideration of nationality by the President of the Commission, with the approval of the Parliament and the European Council, these ministers would constitute a select cabinet within the Commission. They would be closer to the government but they would benefit from the independence of the Commission; they would, so to speak, realize "smoothly" the passage from the inter-governmental to the community method before the completion of the federal system. The existence of a restricted cabinet sitting under a unified presidency would reduce the risk of incoherence deriving from the multiplication of the number of commissioners. The mode of designation of the federal President and his cabinet is another subject which requires specific solutions. Several formulas can be envisaged according to the system to be preferred: more parliamentary or more presidential. A strictly parliamentary or definitely presidential one would not be well adapted to European complexity. The keeping of double presidencies, a solution retained in the Reform treaty, leads to parliamentarism, the president of the Commission acting as a Prime Minister. Nevertheless, it remains only half parliamentary, the essential role in defence and foreign policy being devolved upon the President of the European Council. The merging of the presidencies would leave the option open.
An evolution toward a parliamentary system could take place through the creation of a real post of Prime Minister, when the conditions of transfer of governmental power in all fields to a Cabinet responsible to Parliament are obtained. On the contrary, the election of the President of the European Council by universal suffrage would lead to a presidential system. A more original formula might perhaps better answer European specificities. It would be to propose to popular suffrage a reduced and collegial team on the model of the Swiss Federal Council. In this hypothesis the federal President designated by an agreement between the governments and the Parliament would keep his (or her) role of representation and arbitration, and the main powers would be endowed to the executive college.
These speculations about the various possible forms of a European government may seem irrelevant in the present day when the EU goes through an existential crisis. But we can also argue that we may seize the opportunity of the crisis to ponder over the medium and longer term institutions. Indeed, one of the causes of today's difficulties lies precisely in the lack of vision and the absence of debates on the future.
The emergence of a strong executive cannot be conceived without the strengthening of the role of the Parliament, which should be endowed with the initiative to introduce laws and the power to control the Executive, which would be conceived according to the more parliamentary or more presidential model which will finally prevail.
Recognizing the part played by national parliaments in the affairs of the EU is already, and will be even more tomorrow, an original feature of the European federal system. Beyond the control of subsidiarity, for which the national parliaments will be called to play an ever increasing role, it would be useful to give them the possibility to deliberate with the European Parliament on the general policy of the Union. In the same way, they could be associated to the process of amendment of the Treaties, thanks to a Convention composed of national and European MPs and representatives of the various Executive authorities. These revisions would not be submitted to the unanimity rule, but to a reinforced qualified majority, for example two thirds of the States and populations; minority states would be allowed to exert their right to opt out.
This right to abstain recognized in the Reform treaty would be another specificity of a European Federal Union, different from a federal State. One of the European values is the settlement of conflicts by law and conciliation. The recourse to force against a member state is not conceivable within a European federation. On the other hand, economic sanctions must be allowed in case of breach of contract and, if necessary, political sanctions in case of severe or persisting default. Indeed, this possibility does exist today. The withdrawal from the EU is not a sanction but a safety valve; it should render it possible a relaxation of the amendment procedure: minority States would have a choice to opt out, and ask for a special dispensation or to transform their membership into an association.
Less radical than withdrawal, the granting of the possibility to opt out could conciliate the desire of a majority to move forward and the timidity of some members. In this way, a vanguard could be constituted, not by selection but by voluntary self-exclusion. The result would be the same, but the political impact would be quite different. Selection is unacceptable for those who are not chosen, but those who exclude themselves must consider it is their own decision and should be able to go back to the majority at any time.
The failure of "enhanced cooperations" can be explained by the fact that this formula is felt as selective rather than dispensational. We must add that the term cooperation was poorly chosen to name ambitious actions. Rather then "hard core" it should have been "soft core".
It would be much better to say consolidated integration. The opting out formula can lead to an improved integration, as can be seen with the monetary union. It can be observed that a temporary exclusion of a country which has the will, but not the capacity, to take part raises no difficulty, since it will be resolved at the proper time. Finally there is the question of the voting right at the Council and Parliament for countries which are temporarily excluded or opting out on the issues in question; it would seem logical, at least, to ask countries who opt out not to exercise their voting right. To reflect upon federal forms adapted to European specificities is all the more useful as in several countries, among others France and the United Kingdom, federalism meets with a hostility which comes from a lack of understanding. For many Frenchmen and Englishmen federalism means centralization, for others, the Germans for example, it offers a guarantee against the encroachments of centralization. Therefore the battle for federalism is difficult. We must rely on a clear vision of what is possible in a Europe which remains more attached to national sovereignties than it was in the post-war years.
The worst criticism from which federalists must defend themselves is that they advocate the death of sovereign States. By devising formulas which will allow the states not to alienate their sovereignty forever, thanks to the right to opt out, to preserve some freedom of choice in domestic policies, especially in social and fiscal matters, and to take part in the definition and running of the affairs of the Union, it may be possible to convince those of our adversaries who are sincere and in good faith.

Democratization is one of the central phenomena of our times. Let us bring together, with the help of an attractive image, some basic facts about it, viewing it as the process whereby democratic practices have been spreading world-wide for a considerable time now. We set out to accomplish this task with the help of the image displayed on page 39 that succinctly summarizes the information about the condition and the progress of democratization at various points in time in the past century and a half.

By condition we mean to indicate the relative importance of democracies in the world picture. With progress we intend to show this to be a dynamic picture that opens out a window to the future. The image "World Democratization" is simple but it displays this crucial information in two ways. First, it shows seventeen discrete data points that depict, at ten year intervals, the proportion of the world's peoples that at that point in time lived in democracies. The first of these data points refers to 1840, and indicates that in that year some 3.9 per cent of the world population lived in democratic countries, and more specifically, in the United States, and the United Kingdom, the only two that could thus be described. By the year 2000, the last of the data points, following the collapse of the Soviet bloc, that figure had risen to 57.1 per cent, and the number of democracies to 87.

The second feature of our table is more analytical, and traces the best part of an S-shaped curve that not only fits our "hard" data quite accurately but also extends well into the future, to the 22nd century. We might call this the learning curve of world democratization.
Here we have two sets of basic information; so what to make of it? Let us highlight four of its features: democratization is a powerful process; it is world-wide, it has a long reach in time, and it might be seen as a learning experience. We then ask: what are the implications of these arguments?

A powerful trend
A glance at the seventeen actual data points confirms, first of all, that these are not scattered or random bits of information but rather a series or sequence pointing to the existence of a trend, and not just any trend but one that is persistent and powerful. Viewed over a time span of 160 years, the trend shows both ups and downs, and registers some setbacks (including a notable one centered on the 1930s, and World War II), but overall it moves clearly, and strongly, upward. In absolute numbers, the expansive force of democracy is simply staggering, from some 40-plus million people in mid-19th century, to close to 3.5 billion at the turn to the 21st. A trend of such power is not easily reversed, or aborted.

A world-wide trend
In our chart, democracy takes off as a transatlantic project, and for a long while, appears, in the main, as a "Western" phenomenon. But over time, and since the mid-20th century, its spread has been to most parts of the world, and (as shown) it now engages more than half of the world's population. It has diffused via a demonstration effect because, by and large, democracies work better, know better how to cooperate, win wars but do not engage in mass killings, fight hunger more effectively, and, on the whole, are more productive and more prosperous. That makes democratization a likely universal process spreading by imitation.

A long-term trend
Our poster "World Democratization" covers more than two centuries, making it plain that while undoubtedly powerful, this is a process whose progress is measured, deliberate, even slow, and not really to be hurried. It took over a century for democracy to move from a "market share" of under ten per cent, to a majority position (in which India plays a large role) a few years ago. We suppose that for the bulk of the world system to be "saturated" with democratic practices it will take many decades, and the path taken by China will be a key factor.

A learning process
Roughly connecting the dots in our chart is a line in the generic form of a learning curve. That curve marks not just the path of world-wide democracy over the past century and a half but also projects that path forward one century into the future, on the assumption that what we are observing is a learning process: humans settling into a cooperative mode; humans learning to live with each other. That strongly suggests that the trend we have charted is not just a summary of events past but a process of some regularity that (jointly with others) is likely evolutionary.

Democracy has for some time been a subject of contention between foreign policy Idealists and Realists. Idealists, advocating the spreading of democracy, speak sometimes in grandiose terms of principle, even morality, point to the record of successful societies and claim to represent the wave of the future. Realists warily eye the problems of the day, discount the future and counsel prudence. Our presentation suggests that both sides score in that argument and that both are in effect right.

Implications
What are the implications, for the next decade or two, of these basic facts about democratization? First, if democratization is indeed such a powerful process then it might be expected to proceed, we might say, under its own steam or, as it might be put more technically, as a form of self-organization. That is, in the ordinary course of world events, humankind seems on track, gradually, albeit slowly, to build a growing domain of democracy, and that is why what is called for, above all else, is patience.

There is no "duty to export democracy" nor is there any requirement for extraordinary measures such as costly military interventions, or risky preventive wars, to foster it. Arguably, such measures are likely to prove counter-productive rather than facilitative. Indeed, as we look at the chart once again, we see that the point reached in the year 2000, a high point of the entire story, and following the spectacular expansion of democracy at the end of the Cold War, is well above the trend line (or the learning curve). That suggests that we may be "ahead of schedule", and that a slowdown of the process could well lie ahead. And that suggests caution. Second, if in fact we are at present "ahead of the curve", then the other watchword must be consolidation. The greater urgency lies with safeguarding and solidifying the gains of the recent past, and building up the links among existing democracies.

That might take two forms: protecting the elements of the emerging global democratic community, and continuing to strengthen the institutions that have proved their value and effectiveness. The elements of an emerging global democratic community are now in place. They include North America, the European Union, India, Japan-Korea, and Australia-New Zealand: components of what might be called an "oceanic" grouping whose linkages are not due primarily to geographical propinquity but rather to participating in long standing networks of social, maritime and air connections.

This is a prosperous and active ensemble now accounting for the majority of the world's population, but its cohesion is not to be taken for granted and must be assiduously maintained in the face of rising pressure on at least two fronts: the demographic and the Islamist. Population might soon start declining both in Europe, and in Japan, reducing their weight in the democratic world. Democracy, moreover, is under challenge from the Islamists and the Jihadists, notably so in the Middle East, but also in Europe and Central Asia. In more narrowly political contexts, the way to consolidate the gains of the past is to cultivate and to strengthen the institutions that have proved their worth in the past century. One example is NATO, that since its inception in 1949 has been animated by strong transatlantic relationships; the organization has expanded its membership and could of course broaden its functions. Then there are the Bretton Woods institutions, and indeed the entire United Nations system that has a strong potential for democratic development. In all of this, of course, the role and policies of the United States remain of key significance.

*The author has submitted this article for Freedom & Union and retains copyright

It is refreshing to read a paper on the long term evolution of democracy and what its author sees as its positive prospects for the future. The quantitative analysis in Professor Modelski's paper is quite interesting. His thesis is that democratization is a major world process, a powerful and long term trend which is bound to come to full fruition in the not too distant future. Soon the entire world will be democratic. If we consolidate all will be well.
I hope he is right. But my own view on the topic, recently published in the Widener Law Review under the title "The Perils of Dumb Democracy" argues that unless there is a fundamental modernization of the concept of Democracy itself, to fit it to 21^st century realities, the democratic gains we are currently seeing around the world can be illusory and short-lived. In that article, I make a distinction between what I call "dumb" or superficial democracy (the caricature of the real thing) and "smart" or sustainable democracy (a political regime which is not only desirable but also efficient and practical and therefore sustainable). My overall forecast is positive but is much more qualitative and conditional than quantitative and categorical. Here then are my specific comments (constructive I hope) regarding Professor Modelski's paper.

1. Trends vs. Cycles
Are the quantitative data presented by Prof. Modelski evidence of a true long term uni-directional process or the upswing of a long cycle, to be later balanced by a future counter-trend? History is replete with cycles that masquerade as unidirectional trends. Herman Kahn, one of the fathers of modern "futurism", argued that there are two major errors in forecasting: the first is to assume that a present trend will continue into the future. The second is to assume a present trend will not continue into the future! Unless we know what are the forces behind the perceived trend we cannot make a judgement as to its future course. Extrapolation is a perilous game and inflection points and trend reversals are the norm rather than the exception. Change is ubiquitous. What goes up must come down and conversely what goes down must come up.

A decade ago "endism" was the flavour of the moment. We were treated to "The End of History", the "End of Work", the "End of War", only to be cruelly contradicted by facts. History did not end, work is still with us and so is war. The current flavour seems to be the opposite of "endism" which I call "birthism". It should also be viewed with caution. What looks like "the beginning of a new age", a "new wave", a "major paradigm shift", etc. may or may not materialize as permanent change. More often, like the seasons, we are experiencing repetitive cycles, some short, some long. Very little seems to be permanent in Nature. Change and mutation including full circles seem to be the rule rather than the exception.

Applied to the evolution of Democracy, with a capital D, the long term historical evidence is, unfortunately, not encouraging. The plain fact of the matter is that Democracy was tried many times in the past only to be subsequently replaced by totalitarian regimes. Fifth Century Athens, the birthplace of democracy eventually succumbed to tyrants and foreign occupation. Roman democracy, led to the Roman Empire with authoritarian emperors. In contrast, the Byzantine Empire, the most successful multinational political regime in history, which lasted a thousand years, was not particularly democratic. The French Revolution mutated into Napoleonic rule, not once but twice, in the 1790s and the 1850s with Napoleon III. The Weimar Republic in Germany was followed by Hitler. Russian liberalization under Gorbachev and Yeltsin is now being replaced by the doubtful credibility of Putin-style democracy. China, with a quarter of Humanity, is still not democratic and many countries of Africa and Latin America have alternated between democratic and authoritarian rule. Finally, we should note that, for a Martian visiting Planet Earth, the most sustainable political regime by far, over the millennia, would appear to be not, sad to say, democracy, but hereditary monarchy. In macro history it is that form of government which Planet Earth's inhabitants seem to have chosen overwhelmingly, with Democracy being a footnote.
For all these reasons, the powerful democratization trend identified by Prof. Modelski must therefore be viewed with great caution. Democratization appears to be not a one-way street but at least a two-way highway with the possibility of U-turns.

2. Democracy is not a homogenous concept.
It is culturally relative
Democracy is not a simple product. It is highly relative and subject to modifications by different cultures and ethnic groups. Therefore, to monitor its long term evolution purely quantitatively, as one would measure say arithmetic improvements in life expectancy, is an oversimplification. There are three reasons for this.

First, we must note the existence of fictitious democracies. Modelski seems to take it for granted that if a country's political regime looks like a democracy it is therefore a true democracy in the Western sense of the word. There are currently 193 countries who are members of the United Nations. Most, if not all, pay lip service to democracy and have some form of parliament, a measure of democratic consultation, sometimes by plebiscites with 99% voting for the reigning regime. Does that make them true democracies? Some observers have argued that the number of true democracies, in the Western sense, is less than 50 in the 193 sovereign nations members of the UN.

Second, it must be noted that even if we shy away from the pejorative adjective "fictitious," even "real" democracies around the world are very different from one another. This has been true throughout history. Fifth Century Athens would probably not be considered a democracy today because the electors, Athenian "citizens," were a small part of the residents of that city. Women and slaves did not vote. By the same token, contemporary US Democracy might be considered suspect by purists because of the excessive link that exists between the electoral process and money. The overwhelming influence of media with spin doctors gives such importance to election financing that there is a danger of moving from a "one-person-one-vote" to a "one-dollar-one-vote" system, winner takes all. In the end, actual democracy, even of the real type, may be as relative as national cuisines. What is tasty and considered good in some cultures may be anathema in others. Like cobblers, democratic engineers must realize that one size does not fit all and a customization procedure is needed for the successful implant of sustainable democracies, especially in non-Western countries.

Third, above and beyond cultural relativity, even if all the 193 countries members of the UN were truly democratic, this would not automatically make the world democratic. Under the UN formula of sovereign equality, all states, big or small, have the same one vote. The operating system is "one state-one vote" independently of size. This tends to over-represent small countries like Luxembourg and Iceland and under-represent the large ones like China and India. The individual voter in Luxembourg exerts considerable more power than the individual voter in India in decisions made by intergovernmental organizations. This counter-intuitive situation tempts the larger under-represented countries to look down or ignore decisions and recommendations made by IGOs. In addition, when one country like the United States exerts such enormous power over the rest of the world, there is a serious democratic deficit. Because of the extent of American power, true global democracy would expect the US President to be elected by the whole world and not just by American voters. "No governance without representation" would be an appropriate extension of the original "No taxation without representation", the well-known motto of American democracy. Yet obviously this cannot be so. Consequently, a world of democratic states would not automatically lead to a democratic world without global parliaments or some forms of global federalism.

3. How successful will the Democratic form of government be in dealing with emerging global issues
Perhaps the most important single criterion of sustainability of the democratic form of government will be how well it can deal with contemporary and emerging global challenges. There is an implicit assumption among idealists that Democracy is a panacea. Once democratic institutions are in place, problems disappear, there is planetary peace, prosperity and security for all. Tout le monde il est beau, tout le monde il est gentil, as they would say in French.

This, unfortunately, is not automatically the case. On the radar, as we speak at the beginning of 2008, there are looming challenges facing the world. These include growing human insecurity (vis-ˆ-vis wars, terrorism, criminality, the threat of unemployment, etc.), natural disasters, climate change, economic inequality, potential pandemics, etc. How effective can Democracy be in dealing with these threats, especially given the fact that problems are global and the democratic institutions, when they exist, are all at the national level? Already we have seen that when faced with the trade-off between civil liberties and security against terrorist or criminal threats, the public's response is to sacrifice some freedom for more security. The same is true for economics, where people will prefer jobs and a decent income, especially at subsistence level, to free elections. In the extreme case of hurricanes, earthquakes, war or pandemics, democracy is temporarily suspended even in Western countries and authoritarian rule takes over at least temporarily. This implies that the democratic form of
government is judged not to be well suited, in its present form, to crisis management, and full executive power concentrated in an individual or supreme ruling body is preferred. Sustainable Democracy requires that it adapts well to crisis management otherwise, as soon as there is a crisis, democratic institutions will be set aside.
In the end, the true litmus test of Sustainable Democracy is like the test for Sustainable Development itself, is durability, not just flash-in-the-pan green, orange or blue revolutions which come and go. Modelski says it himself: "In more narrowly political contexts, the way to consolidate the gains of the past is to cultivate and to strengthen the institutions that have proved their worth in the past century." This is true, but I would add that the road ahead is qualitative, not just quantitative. Plotting the quantitative extension of democracy throughout the world is not enough and actually can be misleading, given the existence of fictitious and pseudo democracies. What is needed is more R&D in order to make this democratic regimes truly innovative and competitive, well beyond the mantras and the clichés. Ideally we need adaptive mechanisms which can translate the will of the people into meaningful strategies and actions for the common good. Such a system is yet to be perfected.

Almost at the same time as a UN commission in New York City was passing the proposal for a moratorium on the use of the death penalty with an historic vote, in Rio de Janeiro the representative of the same United Nations was closing the big Internet Governance Forum stating that the many problems to be faced in this network require an Internet Bill of Rights. These two events, which may look unrelated and qualitatively very distant can be placed side by side for three reasons. In both cases, the importance of a global policy for rights has leapt forward. In both cases, we are not in the presence of a final point of arrival, but of a process requiring ingenuity and political determination. In both cases, the outcome has been made possible by a far-sighted Italian initiative.

As far as the death penalty is concerned, it was a matter of honoring a cultural primogeniture, almost a historical duty, in the name of Cesare Beccaria and Tuscany, the first State in the world to abolish the death penalty, "convenient only to barbarian people", as the Grand-Duke Pietro Leopoldo declared in 1786! The Internet situation is quite different, as Italy can certainly not be considered a leading country in the field of scientific and technological innovation. And yet this is precisely where a movement started from two years ago, that has progressively involved ever wider sectors everywhere, thus demonstrating that a good culture is necessary to a good policy. Which policy? The final outcome in Rio was possible also because a joint declaration was made one day before by the Brazilian and the Italian governments suggesting the Internet Bill of Rights as the instrument for guaranteeing freedom and rights in the widest public space that mankind has ever known.

However, this very significant development now requires adequate capability of taking action. In the discussions leading to the declaration, the Brazilian Minister of Culture, Gilberto Gil, has explicitly mentioned the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. We are faced with a situation that is becoming paradoxical. Still underestimated and opposed by some in Europe, the Charter is becoming a constant reference for those who are committed to the establishment of a new system of rights protection worldwide; so much so that US scholars speak of a "European dream" that is replacing their "American dream". It is time, then, for the European Union to be fully aware of its force and responsibility towards the entire "human community", as explicitly written in the Preamble of the Charter of Rights. Precisely because we are aware of the limits of Europe's influence, its political future is ever more clearly connected to its being able to be the protagonist in this planetary "struggle for rights".

In this perspective, the Internet Bill of Rights provides a valuable opportunity. Just because an unexpected support has come from the UN, the newly-started process must be made strong and concrete. I would list the first stages of its development. The Italo-Brazilian declaration is open to adhesion from other countries. This is not an easy operation. But the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs has proved to be very clever in guiding the process towards the moratorium on the death penalty, so that one may believe that he will not grasp this new opportunity with indifference.

An easier course of action would be, similarly to what happened for the moratorium, to work for turning the Italian initiative into a more general stand of the European Parliament. In this case, however, a more general question arises. While the Charter of Fundamental Rights is going to become legally binding, and is looked at as a model, the European Commission is taking initiatives that, even with the use of questionable procedural expedients, greatly restrict the protection of fundamental rights; one example concerns the collection and storage of personal data. It is necessary to get out of such an institutional schizophrenia, where grand proclamations on rights are too often contradicted by real and significant restrictions, dangerous for democracy and technically unnecessary or disproportionate.

A third path of action concerns the United Nations itself. Not long ago Google, aware of the necessity to ensure better personal data protection, proposed to institute a "Global Privacy Counsel" at the UN. This suggestion was taken up because it gives a concrete opportunity for starting a reflection over the UN presence in that sector in the future. But, above all, this proposal is posing a more general problem. In the course of the past year we have witnessed a vigorous activism in the economic world. In addition to Google's proposal, there was a joint initiative by Microsoft, Google, Yahoo! and Vodafone, which announced the publication by the end of the year of a Chart for the protection of freedom of expression on the Internet. In July, Microsoft presented its Privacy Principles. But is it possible to leave the protection of fundamental rights on the Internet to the initiative of private subjects only, who will tend to provide just the guarantees compatible with their interests and who, in the lack of other initiatives, will appear as the only "institutions" capable to act? Can we accept a privatization of the Internet governance or is it indispensable to have a plurality of actors at the most various levels discuss and work out common rules, according to a model defined, exactly, as multi-stakeholder and multi-level?

The Internet Bill of Rights is not conceived by those who have envisaged and are promoting it, as a transposition into the Internet sphere of the traditional logic of international conventions. The choice of the old formula of the Bill of Rights has a symbolic force, it underlines that the aim is not to restrict freedom on the web but, on the contrary, to maintain the conditions for letting it continue to prosper. To do so, "constitutional" guarantees are required. Let us not forget that Amnesty International has denounced the increase of cases of censure, "a virus that can change Internet's nature, making it unrecognizable" unless adequate measures are taken. But, in conformity with Internet's nature, the recognition of principles and rights cannot fall from the sky. It must be the result of a process, of a large participation of a plurality of subjects, who have already taken the form of "dynamic coalitions", groups of different kind spontaneously born on the web; they have found in Rio the first opportunity to exchange ideas, work together, have a direct influence on decisions. In the course of such a process, it will be possible to achieve partial results, combine self-regulation codes with other forms of discipline, establish common regulations for particular world areas, as once again shown by the European Union, the world region where the protection of rights is more advanced.

Traditional objections - who is the legislator? which judge will enforce the proclaimed rights? - belong to the past, as they do not take into account that "the avalanche of human rights is sweeping away the last trenches of State sovereignty", as Antonio Cassese quite rightly wrote, commenting the vote on the death penalty. At the very moment the Internet Bill's progress accelerates, a change will have occurred already. A new cultural model, originating from the awareness that the Internet is a world with no boundaries, will start to be visible. A model that will further the circulation of ideas and could immediately constitute a reference for the "global community of courts", the crowd of judges who, in the most diverse systems, are currently faced with the problems posed by the scientific and technological innovation; it will thus give voice to those fundamental rights that represent today the only power that can be opposed to the force of economic interests.

It is no Utopia, nor an escape forward. Even today, one day after the Rio Conference, many people are already at work and the program for the coming months is clear: inventory of the "dynamic coalitions" and creation of a platform allowing dialogue and cooperation; inventory of the many existing documents, to find which principles and rights could be the bedrock of the Internet Bill of Rights (a list is already in the Italo-Brazilian declaration); drafting of a first blueprint to be discussed on the web. The sowing was good. But the harvest will come if fervent spirits support future actions.

The Citizen's Agora meeting gathered more than four hundred associations from European civil society. During two days at the European Parliament, participants from all over Europe discussed the Reform treaty and the future institutional challenges of the European Union.

The differences among the issues and interests which have been raised testify to the complex reality of civil society in Member States. Although defining a common framework could be a difficult game to play, there's a good reason for trying to do that. This would considerably help all these fragmented claims to converge and share a common vision when dealing with European issues and making all their important links with local realities enriched by stronger links with other European actors. Agora could be seen as a valuable tool toward the socialization of European civil society, thus strengthening the participation process of citizens in European politics. Nonetheless, Agora - as it has been repeated by many - is not meant to become a second European Parliament nor a substitute of the latter. Could it be a step toward democracy? Even if there is no democracy until the EP doesn't have real powers, the Agora somehow testifies the willing of some MEPs to get advantage of new democratic tools, like the consultation of civil society. This also means a quite strong desire of the MEPs to act autonomously from the intergovernmental game.

Some concerns deal with the selection of participants as well as their representativeness, but the first test of this forum should be considered as positive. What has to be outlined is the strong desire of almost all the associations for a more democratic and transparent way of taking decisions in European politics. This widespread feeling will help federalist solutions to be better listened to. There is a growing awareness of the need to make European institutions closer to the citizens, being the only way to build any further integration. The question dealt with all through the two days was exactly this one: how to make it a reality? The Agora declaration pointed out some important suggestions. One certainty we can retain once back home is that the EU, as a unique experiment of supranational democracy, needs new tools to develop its transparency. Therefore associations throughout Europe should be active in putting them forward. And next time, they will maybe listened to again by the MEPs.

One of the Agora workshops dealt with the democratic deficit of the EU and with the future stages of European integration. The main points on the agenda were: the structure of European civil society and the ways in which it can act; simplifying the machinery of Europe's institutions and making their workings more transparent; a new power enabling the EP to amend the treaties; ways of consulting and informing the people and enabling them to take decisions. Several arguments were raised both in favour and against the institutionalisation of this kind of forum. A minority of the participants thought Agora was not representative of The Citizen's Agora: A Step toward European Democracy? European citizens and thus unable to become a permanent body. On the contrary, with many others we consider this initiative a valuable step toward a more concrete recognition of the role of civil society in Europe. Although not being a representative forum, further Agora meetings could be useful in order to meet a part of European citizens and to let the organisations have a more effective role in the political process. Finally, we agreed on the idea of making the Agora a permanent way for the European Parliament to consult civil society. This should consequently lead to provide a common framework to define what a European association is. The lack of communication in Europe has been outlined and the debate mainly covered the question of the role of the media in fostering European news. On this point, the need of an educational programme to be adapted in each Member state has also been raised.

An interesting point was the request that the EP should convoke a Convention tasked with drafting a social pact for Europe in order to develop more coherent policies on common market, sustainable development and social protection. The final text could be submitted to the citizens through a European consultation in the same day in all the European member states. The working group also discussed the European citizens' initiative as a valuable tool of direct democracy in Europe. The EP was asked to guarantee its full application as well as to state more concretely its procedures. At the same time, the EP should ask for more power and for sharing with the European Commission the presently exclusive right of initiative.

A huge concern of the participants was the unequal application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights: the EP has been encouraged to issue a declaration asking for uniform application. Another fundamental right has been mentioned: the right for citizens to be consulted on any important change of the current treaties. The EP should call for this right and a consultation should be held on the same day all over Europe in addition to national ratifications. It becomes clear that a new way of consulting citizens in Europe should be found. Our previous message of a pan-European referendum assessed the right direction. This need is more acutely perceived on the question of the Constitution. Some participants were simply sceptical about the idea of obtaining a Constitution in the future. The concern is now basically how to succeed in making the next Constitution approved by the people. The only answer is that no government can oblige its citizens to accept it if unwilling, and vice versa. The way out is to abandon the unanimity rule that is at the very basis of national ratifications. Mr. Carlos Carnero, Member of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs of the EP, agreed on this point.

All these reflections should help JEF Europe in being more confident of its role. The whole meeting turned around the question of democratic deficit in Europe, the method of the Convention has been claimed as the best way so far to achieve common results and the idea of consulting people on fundamental issues for Europe has been retained by many other associations. At a time of ever growing challenges for Europe and of weak consensus toward European institutions, the role of our organisation is far more important. Agora is there to show how much our voice is relevant.

Piia-Noora Kauppi, Jo Leinen, Graham Watson, Gérard Onesta
The Case for Global Democracy - Advocating a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly
Somerset, Bagehot Publishing, 2007

The campaign for the establishment of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA) seems to be taking off. Hundreds of political leaders, academics and civil society activists from all over the world have already signed the UNPA appeal launched last year by a group of parliamentarians and NGOs, while the initiatives in its support are multiplying. Among them, the publication of this pamphlet called The Case for Global Democracy - Advocating a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly¹.
The initiative has been taken by the renowned MEP Graham Watson (ALDE, UK), who has co-authored the pamphlet together with three MEPs: Pia-Noora Kauppi (EPP-ED, Finland); Jo Leinen (Socialist, Germany, currently Honorary President of the UEF and member of the steering committee of the European Movement); Gérard Onesta (Greens, France). The introduction has been written by Boutros Boutros Ghali, former Secretary-General of the United Nations (1992-1996).
The four essays included in the brochure express the urgency of "democratizing globalization" by effectively integrating civil society (or rather, "the individual human person, the one irreducible entity in world affairs and the logical source of all human rights", as Boutros Ghali states) into the development of global cooperation and international law. So far, according to Kauppi, free markets and globalization have been able to reduce poverty and solve numerous problems. Nevertheless, they could be made to work better, and that could be achieved by rendering more democratic and open to the public that "hallowed meeting-ground of states" which is the United Nations. As both Leinen and Watson point out, organizations such as the WTO, the IMF or even NATO have dramatically broadened their power and influence, without any parallel development in global democracy to counteract the progressive curtailment of the power of the nation state - the entity around which the international system is based ("an entity mainly formed in the 19th century and, on some continents, the main driver for incessant fighting and bloodshed", using Leinen's words). The result is that not only are individual citizens scarcely represented in international organizations due to the centrality of national governments (instead of representative institutions) in those contexts, but they are also less and less represented even by their own governments.
It is time to make some serious "efforts to create a world Parliamentary Assembly, which would allow people from all countries to become involved in the global decision-making process", Watson writes. Such an assembly would strengthen the UN's capacity to tackle military conflicts, population explosion, famine, water shortages and so on, adding legitimacy to an organization that already "enjoy[s] high levels of trust from the world's citizens".
Not surprisingly, the model for the UNPA is the European Parliament. The four authors praise the EP's progressive acquisition of status and its impact on the EU's development and integration. For the first time, Onesta observes, "in that nascent European Parliament delegates chose to band together not under their national flags" but "under the ideological banners of their respective political families", in a dynamics which "has much to teach to the world".

As far as its election, composition and political role are concerned, a few hypotheses are taken into consideration. To sum them up, initially the UNPA could be composed of representatives from each national parliament (but also of members of NGOs and other non-state actors, as Boutros Ghali warmly suggests) and could act as a small consultative body under the UN General Assembly. With time, direct universal suffrage could be introduced (with a distribution of delegates proportional to population size, in Watson's opinion), and the UNPA could become an essential part of the UN decision-making process. The assembly could even "evolve into a world parliament". The impact of a direct universal election would be enormous, because on that day - a day which every democratic person "can only dream of", in Onesta's words - "humanity will have learned to let go of the petty nationalisms that have caused so much bloodshed in years past". To make this dream less unrealistic, we can start by subscribing the appeal of the UNPA campaign².

1 The whole text is accessible on the web at http://www.unpacampaign.org/documents/en/MEPBROCHURE.pdf.
2 See http://en.unpacampaign.org/appeal/support/index.php.

Historian, member of the European Parliament, former Foreign Minister of Poland (1997-2000) and co-founder of the movement Solidarnosc.

How can, in your opinion, the EU federal transformation process be re-launched?

The impulse towards the EU's transformation in a federal direction, shall come from the commitment of the European citizens, which has to be directed to the Parliament, the Commission and the Court of Justice, the three great EU's institutions. But my answer is marked by a certain bitterness, because in the last three years we have seen the resurgence of national selfishness, most of all in the big countries, with regard to the economy and in particular the Stability Pact. A new economic patriotism, most of all in France and Germany.
But as the progress of European integration took place so far thanks to the determination and political will of the European peoples, I believe that in the future too no progress could come without it. The legitimacy of the EU power must be resumed in the notion of European citizen. And when I say that it is necessary, in the community-building process, to mobilize the nations, I refer myself to the commitment of national Parliaments and Governments. Otherwise, the process will stall, as happened with the referendums on the Constitution in France and the Netherlands.

On what bases do you think that a European identity can be formed?

I think that the idea of citizenship can originate from the encounter of history and geography, i.e. from the world of values which have been shaped in the course of civilization on European soil, and the common interest, i.e. the answer to the question why we live together, why there is an interest uniting the Finns and the Italians, the Poles and the Greeks. If there is the recognition of an interest furthering such an encounter between history and geography, we have the answer to the question. We know that there is an identity, founded on the notion of human person, and rooted in the Jewish-Christian tradition or in the secular ideas of Humanism, which is something that unites Europe. Secondly, there is the problem of the European interest, which is still not strong enough to unite and overcome national interests. For the task to be accomplished a central role can be played by the European citizens.

What is missing, in your opinion, for bringing that task to an end?

I think that today's problem is which part the citizens play in the construction of Europe, what place they have in it. It is necessary that the citizens feel themselves important in the construction of Europe. Today it is not so. Few things depend on the citizens, everything passes through the national level. The moment of the elections of the European Parliament is not a significant moment in the European political life and in participation. In Poland, for example, where voter turnout in national elections is 40-41%, it has been half of that in the European elections. Citizens should be asked questions. I am not a great supporter of referendums, in particular in big countries. I think that only local referendums are meaningful, due to the fact that they do not have political consequences. But what counts is to introduce at the European level the habit of popular consultations. If one day all over Europe, in the same day, the question were posed not whether the Constitution is accepted or not, but about a European army, a basic income, or foreign policy, the involvement of the citizens would be high. If Eurobarometer would propose such questions to the citizens, they will not feel themselves the objects of a market survey, because it will be a European institution asking the questions, i.e. the institution that will make a decision taking into account the opinions expressed by the citizens. In Europe the right formula has not been found yet, but all the polls confirm that if questions are asked concerning concrete issues like the European army or the EU foreign policy, two thirds of the citizens will respond positively.

You are a member of the European Parliament, the first supra-national Parliament in the history of mankind, which represents a great innovation, but shows also significant limits in realizing democracy and the common good. How can the relations between the EP and the citizens be improved, as well as European democracy?

First of all, it is necessary to create a European public space. Also Habermas called for it. European communication media of a very high quality standard are necessary. The TV channel Euronews is an example, but there is still much to be done. My colleague and friend Gérard Onesta, MEP elected in France for the Greens, has promoted a big gathering of NGOs and mass media interested in European problems. It is a project called Agorà, which in a few days¹ will meet at the EP building in the presence and with the participation of the MEPs².
Moreover, there is another problem which has not been solved yet in a clear fashion. Every European member of Parliament feels he represents the European constituency, but each of them has been elected in one of the European countries. The question I ask is: "How to establish a connection with those who have elected us? The contacts shall be local, regional, national or European?". I make an example. There is a habit to invite groups of citizens to visit the European Parliament. I once met a group of young people from Poland who had been sharing for many years an exchange program with a German school. Students and teachers can speak two languages, Polish and German. My impression was that this is indeed the European constituency, the overcoming of that Tower of Babel. This is the route to follow, that of a European Parliament representing the interests of the European citizens, which takes legislative decisions concerning the whole European people. To accomplish this, it is necessary that a MEP has a closer relation with the voters, not only with the national voters but with the European citizens.

The UEF has worked on the project of a European referendum on the Constitutional Treaty, now dropped. That proposal would make easier to overcome the unsolved question of national ratifications, that will come up again with the new Treaty. Since you have expressed your preference for a European referendum, what is your opinion about keeping the national ratifications procedure?

It is a difficult problem. In the past I proposed a European popular consultation, to be held on the same day in the whole Union on concrete questions which could be answered with a Yes or No, given that no citizen is willing to read a Treaty more than 500 pages long. I was happy to find out that the movement of young federalists gave my proposal a warm reception, and I continue, then, to support their initiatives. But why no decision was taken? In the 2005 elections, 41% of Polish citizens participated, in the recent elections 53%. About 2 million people more, and with a sizeable participation of young people. I think the answer is: partly because the negative French and Dutch referendums cost too much and arose the fear that defeat could happen again.

1 The meeting took place after the interview, on 8-9 November 2007 at the European Parliament.
2 See http://forum.agora.europarl.europa.eu/jiveforums/category.jspa?categoryID=9.