The aggravation of the crisis and the lateness and insufficiency of the measures destined to fight it have convinced those who are well-informed that a federal leap forward is necessary, otherwise a break-up of the euro-zone might become possible or even probable, with all the dramatic consequences one may imagine. A long time taboo in France, Federalism is in a fair position to become a kind of panacea, a miracle-remedy, all the more attractive as its significance remains vague and ill-defined. Let us try and define the questions raised by this federal leap, which, according to its upholders, would not only permit to solve the crisis (an exit through the top) but would allow a restart of the European construction in its various aspects. In my opinion, these questions seem to be those of competences, of democratization and of differentiation.

Competences

The basic principle of Federalism is the distribution of state competences between different levels of government. According to an expression attributed to Henri Brugmans, the founder of the College of Bruges, we have instituted in Europe a Federalism “upside down”, ascribing to the Community, which has become the Union, competences, for example those concerning agriculture, which could have remained at the level of the States, even the Regions, but depriving it of the attributions that are usually the first to be transferred to the Federation, that is to say foreign affairs and defence. These questions are not forgotten in the treaties, but the modes of decision which are included there are devoid of all efficiency, in spite of the creation of a High Representative, Vice- President of the Commission, and a diplomatic corps, the so called External Action Service, which is at his/her disposal. In the same way, the European Agency of Defence, whose role could be decisive in putting in common the national research budgets, has at its disposal neither operational competences nor budgetary means. It is significant that a function, federal in its nature, i.e. the supervision of the external frontiers of the Union, remains in the hands of the national services of police and customs, while the Frontex agency has not been given the attributions and the means which would be necessary to ensure an efficient and homogeneous control of borders.

In this field, the character of peoples and governments is as important, or even more so, than the texts. It is obvious that the governments are not ready to grant any pre-eminence to a common authority, and to accept majority decisions. Concerning the peoples, the reluctance is less obvious if we believe the polls. At the least, one can think that a personality with an undisputed democratic mandate could obtain a broad adhesion to a foreign policy founded on the common principles of our democracies.

Until now it is a question of economic, budgetary, banking unions, these unions being more or less accepted inside the euro-zone, whereas fiscal or social unions are still contested. The more embracing expression of “political union” is being used, but this notion does not seem to apply to foreign policy or defence. But the solidarity necessary to save the euro and come out of the crisis remains precarious if it is not accompanied by a significant progress in these fields. A Union which remains limited to the economy would not justify the name of political. The first task of Lady Ashton and her department should be to define the sphere in which the competence of the European Union is to be recognized, so that the notion of a common destiny corresponds to a project in course of realization. A Europe which in this way will affirm its unity on the world scene, will recover the confidence and the trust of its citizens and of the rest of the world, which are sorely missing today and without which any recovery would be hazardous.

Democratization

The main weakness of the European Union is the result of the illegibility of its institutional system. Jean-Louis Bourlanges is quite correct when he objects to the alleged democratic deficit of institutions founded on universal suffrage, however indirect it may be. The Commission, so often caricatured as a technocratic monster, is invested by a vote of the Parliament, who can also censure it. Is it a democratic deficit? No, but it is a deficit of visibility. It is to remedy to this deficiency that voices have been heard, among others Chancellor Merkel’s, to propose the election of the President of the Commission by universal suffrage. This proposal, which was also made by the German CDU Party, has been received by the French authorities, from Sarkozy to Hollande and their advisers, with a prudent but embarrassed silence. A few audacious characters, notably Commissary Michel Barnier and Senator Jean Arthuis, both former ministers, have proposed as an intermediary step the election of a single President – for the European Council and the Commission – by a committee or congress composed of European and national members of Parliament.

A British, and federalist member of the European Parliament, the liberal-democrat Andrew Duff, has conducted a campaign, until now, unfortunately, without success, asking for a fraction of European deputies to be elected on transnational lists; this would contribute to stimulate a democratic debate at the Union level and it would induce parties to present integrated platforms.

Oddly, the provision most contrary to democratic principles which exists now in the Union, that is to say the composition of the Commission, according to the non-written rule, however anchored in mentalities, of one Commissary for each member State without considering the number of inhabitants, remains not debated. According to the Treaty of Lisbon, the number of commissaries was to be progressively reduced according to an equalitarian rotation. This disposition, which is definitely unrealistic since it would result in guaranteeing permanently a Commissary for one of the three Baltic States, but not one for Germany or France, has been de facto abandoned to assure the Irish that they would never be deprived of the right to appoint their own commissary. There is only one rational way to solve this problem: give the President the right to choose some fifteen collaborators (secretaries) on the only base of their competency, and of the necessity to get the agreement of Parliament on the composition of the commission.

Another question that never pops up would be raised if the hypothesis of a universal suffrage election is retained. Would it not be in conformity with European diversity, especially linguistic, to elect not just a solitary personality but a team with, at its head, not a President according to the French model, but a primus inter pares? Indeed, it is difficult to imagine one man or one woman campaigning in some thirty countries speaking different languages. Meanwhile, as we keep waiting for such a bold reform to become possible, the governing parties, as Delors proposed long ago, should present their candidate to the presidency of the Commission before the next European elections.

Differentiation

The heterogeneity of member-States, such as it results from the latest enlargements, pleads in favour of a differentiation in integration, which also translates the diversity of expectations. The suppression of controls at the borders and even more so the monetary union have already formed several zones with a more advanced integration. The project of a more limited Union that could be created out of the greater Union is sometimes envisaged or advocated. The Schaüble-Lamers Memorandum of 1994 was pointing in this direction. Mr. Valery Giscard d’Estaing has just launched a similar project.

Strong objections militate against the two-unions formula: the first one is that it would divide Europe into two zones, while the criteria for differentiation are multiple; the second one is that it does not consider the difference between the desired and the possible. The United Kingdom has no intention to adopt one day the common currency, whereas Poland is very keen to get it. One can imagine the complexity of the negotiations which would be necessary to establish harmonious relations between the two Unions and their institutions.

Then it seems more in conformity with the European ideal of unity and with political realism to rationalize the differentiation according to the wishes and capacities of everyone. Nevertheless, the difficulties will be considerable, since some States, headed by the United Kingdom, object to any kind of Federalism. One solution could be to admit in the Parliament and the Council, having become the Chamber of States in a bicameral system, the right to participate in a deliberation, without voting rights in the matters object of one’s derogation. It is more difficult to imagine this sort of system in the Commission, where the members are not supposed to represent their State of origin. The choice of the commissaries by the President according to their competencies would make things easier. The pending question remains the election of the executive by universal suffrage, as we can hardly see today how it could be the object of a general agreement.

It is likely that the strong will of a majority of States to go ahead against the reluctance of a minority could lead to the voluntary departure of some members of the minority, followed by agreements for keeping them inside the common market, a status which Norway finds satisfactory until today, together with Liechtenstein and, to a large extent, Switzerland. The adoption of the Fiscal Compact without the United Kingdom and the Check Republic is a step in this direction.

However reluctant to make the federal leap, it might be for the governments the very last chance to save the euro and, with the common currency, the most advanced form of integration they have ever reached. It would also be the means, in Europe and in the World, to restore the confidence, which is faltering today, in the European project.