Why and how can an Arab federal Union come into place? This question is important as it engages us in the examination of the origin and the formation of that federal union, and the impact it would have on the trajectory of its future development.
Dicey, a harsh critic of federalism for its weakness, conservatism and legalism, has nevertheless offered a key concept that could be used in the Arab context. He put forth two conditions for the formation of a federation: «A body of countries… so closely connected by locality, by history, by race, or the like, as to be capable of bearing, in the eyes of their inhabitants, an impress of common nationality… (and) the existence of a very peculiar state of sentiment among the inhabitants…they must desire union, and must not desire unity1.»
Although he did not elaborate a lot on these two conditions, he acknowledged that this “close connection” between states includes, in addition to the above, a prior loose political alliance or common rule, and that a federation is the maturation of such a connection2.
Wheare followed the same tradition but gave it more structure and detail. A federal government is appropriate for a group of countries or communities “if, at one and the same time, they desire to be united under a single independent general government for some purposes, and to be organized under independent regional governments for others. Or, to put it shortly, they must desire to be united, but not to be unitary”3. He differentiated between the desire for union and the capacity to have it, and through his comparative studies of four older established federations (USA, Canada, Switzerland and Australia) he identified seven conditions as motives for union4. Language, race, religion and nationality were not essential prerequisites.
Watts, after examining six newer federations (India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the West Indies) expanded the motives for union to eleven, and these could also serve as motives for regional autonomy5. He argued that the absence of the capacity for union, a condition put forth by Wheare, did not prevent the new federations from working.
As shown in my first article, Arab nationalism, using a similar language and logic, stressed the motives for union, but disregarded the motives for autonomy. These were considered as reminiscent of old identities that would be replaced by modernization, as tools used by colonialism to divide and weaken the Arabs, or as false consciousness that education would dispel. Arab nationalists saw the motives for autonomy as obstacles that needed to be overcome, not to be institutionalized. Had they looked at them using a federal lens, they would have accepted them and given them a political expression. One reason why Arab nationalists took this position may be due to their acknowledgment that it was nationalism, particularly the awakening of Arabism and the Arab revolt of 1916, that played a major part in breaking up the Ottoman Empire. What the Arabs did to the Ottomans should not be repeated to the Arabs.
With this emphasis on the motives for union, it was easy for the Arabs to confuse union with unity, and with the failure to achieve unity, union was also forgotten. A clear distinction between the two is essential. In Dicey’s words, a “federal government will hardly be formed unless many of the inhabitants of the separate States feel stronger in their allegiance to their own State than to the federal state represented by the common government”. While Arab nationalists would certainly see this as an obstacle to unity, federalists would see it as a prerequisite for union.
However, this concurrent existence of motives for union and regional autonomy is not enough. What is more important, according to Wheare and Watts, is the relative equilibrium or balance between these motives to give a federation its meaning. King also cautions against the idea of “balance” because a perfect balance between opposing forces would mean “immobility”.
History shows that the Arab world had, in fact, lived with this “duality” of motives most of the time, despite the fact that one of them was emphasized and the other was discredited. It was the rise of Islam that gave the Arabs a true sense of political unification under a religious banner, the Caliphate. The Caliphate lasted from 632 to 19246, and within this long span of time, it passed through different stages of function and scope, changed capitals7 and even languages8, but most importantly it went through changes in its structure of power and source of legitimacy9.
What is of concern to us here is central/provincial relations. In the early phase of this system, the Caliphate was strong and enjoyed direct control over the people because territories were limited. An Arab, in this context, would be living under the direct control of the center. However, the expansion of Moslem rule and the acquisition of vast territories necessitated the delegation of authority by the Caliph to a governor. The Caliph originally appointed the governor, but later, the governor assumed his position through his own military power. He ruled in the name of the Caliph and ensured the application of the Shari’a and relevant civil matters. In return, the Caliph recognized the rule of that governor/Sultan as legitimate and called on him for military assistance when required10. The rise of the Sultanate as the actual form of effective political and military leadership meant that the Caliphate had lost most of its powers, and was reduced to a mere ceremonial institution. Thus, an Arab was subject to the direct authority of a regional governor, and indirectly to the Caliph. He was subject to a dual authority but to markedly different degrees.
When we consider that both the Caliphate and the Sultanate existed side by side for centuries, it is not difficult to argue that both traditions of centralism and regionalism coexisted in the Arab world from an historical perspective. At times, there were three different but concurrent Caliphates in the Arabic/Islamic world, and within each different powerful Sultanates existed. If we consider the territorial dimension at the time of a weak Caliphate, a person residing inside the city of the Caliphate would be under the direct central control, while another person belonging to the same Caliphate but living in a different city under the Sultanate would be under the direct regional control. When the Caliphate was strong, the state was centralized. When it was weak, real power was in the hands of regional governors and thus was effectively decentralized. This resulted in very elusive boundaries, overlapping identities and multiple centres of power.
The Millet system of the Ottoman Empire was the closest thing in the Arab world to non-territorial federalism. The system allowed minorities (religious and nonreligious) considerable freedom in managing their own affairs, including worship, education, language, welfare, social services, tax and courts in family and civil matters such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance. They also chose their leaders, who represented them with the state and negotiated on their behalf. Except for a few central functions important to the state as a whole, such as security and state taxes, those communities were left to manage their own affairs on their own, provided they did not challenge the authority of the state itself.
With the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I and the decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s, the nation-state inherited the scene and emerged as the main political actor. In very few countries, like Egypt, a sense of nationalism was well developed, but in most other cases, the nation state was a completely new phenomenon, a new reality. However, nation-state building was challenged by preexisting tribal, feudal, religious and local identities from within11, and by regional security dilemmas and international pressure from outside12. Despite the weak nation-building, state-building benefited from these challenges. The Arab-Israeli conflict and other regional security dilemmas were used to rally support for the survival and the expansion of states. Moreover, military regimes, often with socialist ideologies, facilitated the spread of statism. As a result, the state became strong in “security” matters, but in many other domains was unable to extend its authority within its territories. The unfolding crisis of state legitimacy was also further magnified by state mismanagement and lack of good governance in terms of representation and accountability.
Can we speak of an “Arab tradition of federalism”? Is it possible to construct a continuous thread of “duality” or multiplicity within the Caliphate, the Sultanate, and the Millet system, with the balance moving between centralism and regionalism and with overlapping multiple identities and a weak nation-state? According to Riker, “federalism is the main alternative to empire as a technique of aggregating large areas under one government”13. If the Arabs had been living in some kind of “empire” most of the time until the early 20th century, can we not conclude that the Arabs have lived in the shadow of federalism without even realizing it? Whether an Arab tradition of federalism actually exists or whether this is just a fulfillment of Forsyth’s remark that federalism “with sufficient effort can be detected almost everywhere”14, is open to debate and further analysis.
If the answer to any of the above questions is yes, then our focus could move to the formation of an Arab federal union. How would this come into existence? Within the Arab context, the Rikerian model of federal bargain is the most likely way15. As the state remains the main political actor, both the expansion and the military conditions put forth by Riker apply. Within Arab-nationalism literature, there is a debate on where the expansion condition would originate, with Syria/Iraq and Egypt as the main contenders, reflecting the historical rivalry between the Nile and the Mesopotamian civilizations16. The rest of the Arab countries are weaker, have not traditionally been expansionist, and would thus represent the states receiving the offer.
At this stage, it is possible to arrive at some preliminary characteristics in the design of an Arab federal union, taking into account some of the issues that would have to be addressed in this respect. Despite the historical prevalence of the centralist tradition, the union would be highly decentralized, at least in the initial phase, because of the legacy of state nationalism in the last half century. States would be reluctant to give up their sovereignty and powers, and the functions given to the federal center would be limited. It would be only through the maturation of the federal system that the center could receive more power. This has been the tendency in other federations as well.
A second, closely-related feature would be the executive dominance of federal state governments. State governments would be highly represented in the federal institutions (Germany provides the closest federal example and the EU the closest federal-confederal model). This would require an intensive mechanism of intergovernmental relations, like governors, ministerial and prime ministerial meetings. The current structure of the Arab League provides an excellent base upon which to build such a mechanism.
An Arab federal union would have to tolerate different forms of semi-democratic government, at least in the initial phase. Unlike the US Constitution, which guarantees a republican form for all states, the EU includes different forms of governments. In the Arab world, there are at least three different forms of governance: Republic, Monarchy and Jamahiriya (in Libya). Within the first two forms, there are important variations in democratic governance and institutional design. Moreover, the dynamics between the federal constitution and state constitutions would be a source of tension. As both categories of constitution affect each other, and there are different forms of state constitutions, the development of the federal constitution would be dependent on the ability of the federal union to guarantee respect for the form of government of each state on the one hand, and the application of basic democratic governance throughout the federation on the other. This is similar to the US model, where the Southern States’ constitutions allowed for slavery and racial segregation, while the federal constitution stressed equality. This distinction endured for over a hundred years following the Civil War, but the federal constitution became the ultimate savior of individual liberties and freedoms.
Courts in an Arab federation could possibly play a more important role than those in other federations. The courts would have to decide not only on the constitutionality of acts, that is, whether an act by an institution is within the scope of functions and powers allocated to it by the constitution, but also on the substance of the case. It is more than likely, because of the Moslem majority or the influence of state constitutions, that the constitution of an Arab federation would include a reference to Islam as a source of legislation. As there are four different schools of jurisprudence and law in Islam (Hanafi in Iraq and Egypt, Maliki in North Africa, Shafi' in Egypt and Yemen, Hanbali in the Gulf states), a federal court would have to include representatives from all four schools for it to be perceived as fair and balanced. Laws relating to women, personal status, marriage, divorce and inheritance differ among Arab countries, although they are all derived from “Islamic law”17. An Arab Supreme Court would resemble the International Court of Justice, in which all the major schools of law are represented; and that was a major source of its legitimacy.
This brings us to the issue of representation. Who and what would be represented? Four types of representation are possible: people, governments, regions and minorities. Governments would be highly represented because of executive dominance, as has been previously shown. The states’ representations would reflect their de facto asymmetry in population, wealth or geo-political position, although this is potentially another source of tension, as it has been in Canada between those who champion the cause of equal representation and those who prefer asymmetrical representation. States with larger populations and wealth would have more representation, veto rights or opt-out options. Regional groupings, formed through common ties that have bound certain states like the Gulf and North African states, could be a third level of representation for regional development or asymmetrical relation. This is similar to the case of Belgium. Finally, minorities could be represented based on territorial and non territorial models depending on the specific condition of each, either within the states or within the federal union, or both. States that are reluctant to safeguard minority rights within their own territories may be less sensitive in allowing those minorities “federal rights” in return for other benefits.
This preliminary examination of why and how an Arab federal union may be formed opens further ground for investigating the features covered above and triggers thoughts on what other features could constitute an Arab federal union. We cannot be definite about the success of federalism in the Arab world, but while the motives for union and autonomy continue to co-exist, there could be merit in considering the application of the federal principle, in a gradual and experimental process to arrive at a working balance of union and autonomy, while accommodating the issues that confront the region.
Conclusion
What would be the significance of an Arab federal union? Time magazine, commenting on the Arab leaders' meeting in Cairo in 1945 to establish the Arab League, wrote that “if the Cairo conference succeeded, it would put into effect the Alexandria resolution (Alexandria Protocol) for unified educational, financial, commercial, legal and foreign policies by all Arab nations. It would change the balance of power in the Middle East, (and) might affect Britain, France, Russia (and) the US”18.
The Arabs thought they could avoid federalism because “nobody would have a federal constitution if they could possibly avoid it”19. But with the failure of Arab nationalism and the Arab League models, is it time to look for an alternative? Watts remarks that “the adoption of a ‘federal solution’ in each (new federation) was not an arbitrary choice but a last resort, a grudging compromise made necessary by the need to accommodate concurrent pressures for unity and for regional autonomy”. The Arabs were not completely unaware of federalism20, they just thought they could do without it.
1 Dicey. Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, p. 75.
2 This has been the dominant model of forming federations to which Riker’s bargain applies and Alfred Stepan calls “Coming Together”, to differentiate it from a newer model of forming federations through devolution or “Holding Together”. For more details see Alfred Stepan, “Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model", Journal of Democracy, Vol. 10, No. 4 (October 1999), pp. 19-33.
3 Kenneth Wheare, Federal Government (London, Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 36.
4 Wheare, Federal Government, pp. 37-40; they are: military insecurity and common defense, independence from foreign powers, economic advantage, past loose political association, geographical neighborhood, similarity of political institutions and right leadership at the right time.
5 Ronald Watts, New Federations: Experiments in the Commonwealth (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 41-90.
6 30 years under the Four Guided Caliphs, 90 years under the Umayyad, more than 500 years under the Abbasids, 250 years under the Mamluks, 400 years under the Ottomans.
7 It moved from Medina under the Four Guided Caliphs, to Damascus under the Umayyad, to Baghdad under the Abbasids, with competing centers of Caliphate in both Andalusia (Spain) and Egypt, to Cairo under the Mamluks, and finally to Constantinople under the Ottomans.
8 The Umayyad emphasized the “Arabic” nature of the Caliphate, however, under the Abbasids, Persian was widely used in the circles of power by the secretarial class at the capital. Turkish became the official language of the Caliphate under the Ottoman Empire.
9 Thomas Arnold, The Caliphate (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965). Hamilton Gibb, Studies on the Civilization of Islam (Boston, Beacon Press, 1968).
10 Ira Lapidus, “The Separation of State and Religion in the Development of Early Islamic Society”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 6 (1975), p. 364.
11 Andrew Shryock, Nationalism and the Genealogical Imagination: Oral History and Textual Authority in Tribal Jordan (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1997). Shryock reveals how tribal history is transmitted orally and considered the only “true” history, and with the existence of multiple tribes with changing balance of power among them, there appear to be many “true histories”, distinct from the official unifying “history” of the state, which in itself is another tribal history of the ruling Hashemite family.
12 Bahgat Korany, “The Arab World and the New Balance of Power in the Middle East”, in Michael Hudson (ed.), The Middle East Dilemma: The Politics and Economics of Arab Integration (New York, Columbia University Press, 1999).
13 Riker, Federalism, p. 5
14 Murray Forsyth, Unions of States: The Theory and Practice of Confederation (Leicester University Press, 1981), p. 7
15 Craig Volden, “Origin, Operation, and Significance: The Federalism of William H. Riker”, Publius, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Fall 2004), pp. 91-93.
16 Philip Hitti, “The Possibility of Union among the Arab States”, The American Historical Review, Vol. 48, No. 4. (Jul., 1943), pp. 722-732.
17 Amira Mashhour, “Islamic Law and Gender Equality - Could There be a Common Ground? A Study of Divorce and Polygamy in Sharia Law and Contemporary Legislation in Tunisia and Egypt”, Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 2 (2005), pp. 562-596.
18“Arab Federation?”, Time, February 26, 1945. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,792001,00.html
19 Ivor Jennings, Some Characteristics of the Indian Constitution, p. 55, quoted in Watts, New Federations, p. 98.
20 Mohamed Bakr Hussein, Federal Union between Theory and Practice (Cairo, 1977), Mohamed Anwar Abdel Salam, The American Federal Union and its Meaning for Arab Unity (Cairo, 1974), both in Arabic, plus several federal union proposals from Arab University Graduates (1955), Arab Lawyers Union (1957) and some statesmen and politicians from 1950s to 1970s, in Youssef Khoury, Arab Unity Projects 1913-1987 (Beirut, Center for Arab Unity Studies, 1988) (in Arabic).