The failure of the intergovernmental conference to adopt the European Constitution last December proves that the intergovernmental method has become obsolete and unfit to reform the European Union's institutions. The survival of the right of veto in the institutional revision procedure - and in other key issues such as foreign, security and fiscal policies - is the symbol of the old Europe of the nation-states. Bestowing on a single State the power of blocking the other twenty four is clearly incompatible with Europe's present degree of unity. In the building of the European institutions it does not suffice to say "no".
We can draw a lesson from the success of the Convention method in drawing up constitutional documents such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Constitution. A body made up of the people's representatives (national and European Parliaments), national governments and the European Commission, working in public meetings, can succeed where intergovernmental conferences have failed.
Of course, the European Constitution is a stage of an unaccomplished process. It does not eliminate the contradictory character of the European institutions' architecture, even though, after ratification of the Constitution, the Union will be stronger and more democratic. But what is more important is the incorporation of the Convention method in the body of the Constitution and the bestowal on the European Parliament of the power to convene the Convention, although the Intergovernmental Conference retains the last word in the constitutional revision. In future, there will be a need to solve the ambiguity that so far allows the coexistence of two heterogeneous systems: the national which wants to perpetuate a deceptive sovereignty in vital sectors like those of taxes, foreign and security policy and constitutional revision, and the European, that wants to exert its sovereignty, i.e. its power to govern in place of the States in those vital sectors, as already happens for the currency.
A rule must be introduced that allows the Constitution to be amended without the agreement of all the States. No rigid Constitution, and more specifically no federal Constitution, provides such strict conditions for its revision: the vote is always by qualified majority. Even for amending the UN Charter a two thirds majority is required. Likewise, for the coming into force of multilateral international treaties the ratification by a given number of States is required, but not by all, and often not even by the majority of those who participated in the negotiations.
The serious disease of the European Union lies in the right of veto. Only a Constitution can heal it. The old European institutions must be reformed to pave the way to a "more democratic, more transparent and more efficient Union". This is a quotation from the Laeken declaration that summoned the Convention, which drew up the European Constitution. This means that even governments are aware that a deep institutional reform is necessary to allow the European Union to fill the democratic deficit, to manage the European economy, to keep the enlargement to the Central and Eastern European Countries under control and to speak with one voice in the world.
Failing a European Constitution, the intergovernmental logic is destined to prevail and the spirit of the Founding Fathers of the European Community will end by being forgotten. The danger of this prospect lies in the fact that the Franco-German leadership cannot suffice for the purpose of steering an enlarged Europe made up of 25 member states. The change in size of the European Union demands that France and Germany seek the support of the United Kingdom, in order to reach the critical mass that is necessary to lead the European Union. The problem is that the United Kingdom is ruled by a eurosceptic government. Since the Anglo-Franco-German directoire is conceived as acting out of the European Union's rules, it represents a real alternative to a European federal Constitution.
This means that small states, if they want to exert an influence on the European Union, have a vital interest in the ratification of the Constitution. Indeed, the replacement of relations of force with law always aims to protect the weakest. Also within the Philadelphia Convention, which framed the United States Constitution, small states played a decisive role. They did not only confine themselves to accusing big states of seeking mastery over the other states, but also proposed a formula of representation of citizens and states within the federal institutions (the Connecticut compromise), which was deemed satisfactory by the contending parties. It is noteworthy that the disagreement on the majority voting formula brought about the failure of the intergovernmental conference on the European Constitution.
Thus, a group of member states can refuse to proceed at the speed of the slowest and decide to adopt the Constitution. This, therefore, should be ratified by a qualified majority of member states. Of course, this avant-garde group should leave open the door for the other member countries. Likewise, the United States Constitution was ratified when nine out of thirteen states approved it. Afterwards the other states followed the core group.
But a grouping of governments, however large it may be, is not enough to provide the necessary impetus to assure the adoption of the Constitution. New actors should make up for the lack of governments' leadership: above all the European Parliament and national Parliaments. If they have the courage to exert their power, they can decide to adopt the Constitution. This decision can become the resolutive element for carrying out the constitutional design.
Outside the framework of the Constitution, the European Union is going adrift. The European elections, which will take place next June, represent a unique opportunity. In fact, it is hard for political leaders to win the consent of the citizens with a failure behind them. After the elections it will be much more difficult to relaunch the constitutional process. This is the reason why a commitment for the ratification should be taken before May 1, when the ten new members will enter the European Union. If this goal is achieved, it will become easier to convene a new Convention according to the rules of the Constitution, in order to accomplish the construction of federal institutions.