In his seminal speech on European integration in the University of Zurich on September 19^th 1946 Winston Churchill spoke of the old continent as being, “united in the sharing of its common inheritance”. He portrayed the base of Greco-Roman culture and the Christian faith and ethics as “being at the origin of most of the culture, arts, philosophy and science both of ancient and modern times”. But it was our conflicts rather than our similarities that really motivated him. Everyone in that lecture hall knew that his reference to nationalistic struggles that had “…wrecked the peace and marred the prospects of mankind” was the real reason for his desire to see, “a United States of Europe” (albeit one from which Great Britain would stand somewhat apart). Certainly it was the agonies of divisive histories rather than any sense of a shared European identity that drove the Founding Fathers, such as Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenaur, Alcide De Gasperi and Paul-Henri Spaak, to propose a new institutional structure to help reconciliation and future peace. There were, of course, other reasons that motivated them also, such as the rejection of what one observer has described as “The false universalism of communism and the false particularism of fascism, one of which sought to make everyone the same and the other of which refused any sense of common humanity”.
Those times are now long past and the context of our present debate is different. The threat of fratricidal conflict in Europe has receded and our peoples seem, perhaps complacently, unconcerned by it. Also, apart from the faltering memories of past conflicts, we no longer have the need to be cemented together in mutual protection from the USSR.
So inevitably attitudes to European integration, particularly amongst the young, have changed and are challenged by new realities such as the enlargement of the EU. Their motivation for a belief in the process can no longer be promoted by the recollections of terrible events now only within the living memory of a small and diminishing minority. Therefore we must rethink and restate the case for European integration. This will be assisted by an understanding that the fundamental relationship between the nation state and the citizen has been changed in the globalising and increasingly interdependent world of today. Of course it had been the nation state, and the manner in which it functioned particularly since the nineteenth century, that created many of our historic problems. In 1826 the British Foreign Secretary, George Canning, remarked following the collapse of the Congress of Vienna system, “Things are getting back to a wholesome state, every nation for itself, and God for us all”. His world was that which many of us hope that we have escaped fearing, as President Mitterrand said in his farewell speech to the European Parliament, “Le Nationalisme, c’est la guerre”.
So what is this concept of a nation state which some eurosceptics and nationalists in particular wish to retain? It means different things to different people. Jeremy Rifkin (The European Dream, p. 166) has written, “The popular conception of the Nation State… is rooted in common culture, language and customs. (But) in reality is more of… an artificial construct…”. Often, in order to create it, he wrote, it was necessary to, “…create a compelling story about a common past, one convincing enough to capture the imagination of the people and convince them of their shared identity and common destiny.” The reality however is often more complex. There are indeed shared histories and values and the binding together of communities has many valid and positive aspects that are not contrived. It has to be admitted, however, that in many cases the alleged unity of peoples has been a recent phenomenon and is less than fully convincing historically. National languages have been important in this but, for example, in 1789 a small fraction of the French people spoke French and in 1861 only 2% of Italians spoke Italian. Castillian too was very much a minority language in Spain. After the Reformation, religion also had an effect in creating a sense of a shared past and a common destiny for majorities in a national state, although it also has had the divisive effect of creating a question mark over the nationality of minorities. However, the fact is that most people in Europe feel an intense and often passionate sense of belonging to a nation state. This could never be supplanted by a European identity and nor should it be. It is to national identity that people primarily cling. The Danish intellectual Toger Seidenfaden wrote: “There is no European people, no European ethnicity, no European demos; as a consequence the EU is notoriously incapable of generating popular enthusiasm on any major scale. This is, of course, one of its most attractive features”. Whilst this comment goes a little too far for my
taste, one can see what he meant.
Ernest Renan has written that the nation is a spiritual principle consisting of two things, “A common legacy of rich memories from the past and a consensus to forget the oppressions and injustices that once divided the members of the nation”. We have all seen this in action. If one looked into the heart of most Europeans today, they would see themselves as part of one race or another, although their DNA may well provide evidence of a more complex reality. Unfortunately, many probably see their race as being “better” in one way or another than others. This is part of the legacy of nationalism and perhaps the price for the cohesion of a community. Of course, too, there are confusing overlaps between nations within nations. Examples proliferate around Europe. The British are comprised by a group of perceived nationalities, as are the Spanish and many others. The question as to where their ultimate loyalty lies would be hard to answer for many a Scot, a Walloon, a Bavarian or a Catalan.
In his History of Europe, Norman Davies draws a distinction between civilisation and culture. The former is defined as “the sum total of ideas and traditions which had been inherited from the ancient world and from Christianity”. In other words it constitutes what binds us together. Culture, on the other hand, is seen by him as growing “from the every day life of the people… In earlier times civilisation was extolled and culture despised. Nationalism did the opposite.”
All of this makes for a volatile situation, particularly when one takes into account the new challenges of integrating the relatively recent waves of migration within Europe itself and also, particularly, from North Africa. We now have a Europe that is increasingly diversified within its component parts with, for example, 10 million Muslims living in the EU. Paradoxically, too, while the EU integrates nation states with each other it also can create the seeds of national disintegration. This is because nation states that contain different ethnic strands were often bound together in the past because of the advantages of economic integration within a nation state, combined with the need for protection from external aggression. Neither of these conditions exist today within the EU. Essentially, the completion of the Common Market and the removal of the prospect of intra-European warfare has removed the fears that formerly drove regions to adhere to a larger nation state. Many Catalan or Basque nationalists, for example, see little point in a continued connection with Madrid if it costs them money. In addition, a positive reason for division into smaller units is that, within the EU, there is increasing evidence of greater economic success amongst the smaller nation states than the larger. The three highest levels of GDP per capita are to be found in Luxembourg, Ireland and Denmark. This is argued by some to be influenced by the greater flexibility in domestic economic policy that each can now deploy. These smaller states can adapt to the opportunities afforded by a full access to a vast Common Market in a more focused and effective way than larger states.
So today our political structures have to accommodate a series of apparently conflicting realities. These include separatism and integration and diversity and shared values and the EU can help in this accommodation. We have to build upon and develop our shared values to bind us together, whilst not attempting to stifle the legitimate distinctions and loyalties between ethnic or religious groups within our collective body politic. If we do not maintain a sense of some shared identity and interdependence, we will be unable to continue to justify the essential supranational aspects of what the EU is. As William Wallace, the political scientist, wrote in the early 1980s of the EC, “it is less than a Federation, but more than a regime”. This is particularly the case because, within agreed confines, laws can be made that are opposed by individual Member States, and the direct effect of Community Law makes national law and national courts less than fully sovereign.
The integration process should help to develop a common political community to protect the values, political diversity, democracy and human rights in which we jointly believe and which will act as a defence against the attack on any of these values at national level. The EU should, in a broader sense too, be the means for the resolution of, “The contradictions of tribalism and globalism” (Horsman and Marshall, After the Nation State, p.189). We are assisted in this because we are much more alike today than many recognise. Indeed, on the big issues of our time, European peoples are remarkably united in the attitudes that reflect their shared values. Their distinctive positions can be contrasted to those currently prevailing in other parts of the world, including the United States. In this regard Robert Kagan has detailed our differences. Although his description of a Europe of Kant’s perpetual peace as against a Hobbesian US defending and promoting a liberal order through force are gross simplifications, they reflect some truth. We here believe in communitarianism, solidarity and multilateralism in a specific European way. The fact that according to Eurobarometer surveys Europeans want, in a majority everywhere, ‘a more independent’ common foreign and defence policy is a reflection of an increasing European belief that we share more in our approaches to international affairs with our European neighbours than anything that divides us. That was shown in reactions to the Iraq war, where public opinion was generally negative to the war throughout the EU, even though European leaders notoriously divided with some courting unpopularity in supporting the US. On the domestic front too we share similar views on a wide range of issues, for example, from the death penalty to the extent and limitations of individual freedom. The European convergence means that we and others now have a capacity to work together to constructively influence a world full of both opportunities and threats. If we fail to do so together, even the largest states will reduce their influence over their own destiny, and the distinctive European viewpoint will be increasingly marginalised and ignored internationally.
In my opinion, the approach of the current leadership of some important Member States to global challenges facing the EU has regrettably been to retreat more towards national capitals rather than advance the integration process that we need to deal with the issues of interdependence. Should it persist, this will gradually undermine institutions such as the European Commission and the European Parliament having a limited but clear federal vocation. The ‘no’ votes in France and The Netherlands have incorrectly been interpreted as votes against European integration, and this may increase this intergovernmentalist tendency. They have also been interpreted by some as a warning against further enlargement, particularly in regard to Turkey.
Let me turn now to the issue of future enlargements and possible limits to the expansion of the EU having regard to this issue of shared identity. Firstly, however, it should be emphasised that the enlargement of the EU can no longer be considered as inevitable even for those countries within Europe that comply with the requirements set in what is known as ‘the Copenhagen Criteria’. There is a likelihood that in the future new accessions will only take place after specific referendums, at least in some existing Member States. It needs to be recognised in particular that amongst those most likely to oppose enlargement to include Turkey will be some committed integrationalists who argue that Turkish membership damages the cohesion of the EU.
The debate about Turkish accession, therefore, crystallises many of the questions about identity, history, attitudes and values within the EU. Religion plays a real part in this too. Even though the Founding Fathers of the EU were virtually all Christian Democrats, they did not invoke God or Christianity as a factor in European integration. Indeed, the separation of Church and State remained the prevailing position in the conclusion of the debate on the Constitutional Treaty, but Christianity remains the heritage of many Europeans. Although the status of the Church was included in Article 1-51, the invocation of God in the preamble was omitted (although only after fierce debate during which Catholics were joined by Lutherans, Calvinists and Orthodox). One can take it, however, as evidenced by the papal blessing of the politicians who convened on the 29^th October 2004 in Rome to sign the Constitution, that the Catholic Church, for example, did not reject the draft. However, this accepted division between the Church and State in the EU does not mean that there are no objections to Turkish accession, based upon a perception that the Turkish people are in some sense different and this is connected with religion. Thus, although Pope John Paul II in Ecclesia in Europe made the point that “…Europe must be equivalent to openness…”, it is apparent that this openness has limitations. Pope Benedict XVI is publicly against Turkish accession. He is not, of course, alone in this. The President of the Convention on the Future of Europe, Giscard d’Estaing, has said that Turkish accession would mean “…the end of the EU”. Nor is it supported by President Chirac, Angela Merkel or Chancellor Schussel of Austria, and these politicians, amongst others, clearly reflect the views held by many Europeans. The question may be asked as to whether this opposition is related to questions surrounding the distinctive identity and values of the Turkish people or whether it is simply related to more pragmatic concerns such as the fear of migration, the lack of development of the Turkish economy or real depth of its democracy. It might also specifically relate to the treatment of religion in Turkey. Olli Rehn, the European Commissioner for Enlargement, recently said “…freedom of religion is one of the key issues to be addressed by Turkey.” The reality is that the debates about secularism in Turkey today, such as whether to make adultery a criminal offence or whether boys who have been to religious schools can pursue a university education of their choosing, underline the fact that accession will create a very new and much deeper diversity in the EU, should it occur.
The bottom line should surely be that there is an existing commitment to negotiations. These will take many years to conclude and only then will it be possible to judge whether Turkey could or should be a full member. That judgement will depend, in turn, on a fair assessment of the extent to which Turkey can subscribe to a deepening political integration founded upon shared values and the attitudes that emanate from them.
The very fact of this debate taking place now, whatever its merits, underlines the fact that there is a widely shared belief that there is something distinctive and important in European values and attitudes, and that the EU is about more than the creation of a functioning market supported by some elements of cross border solidarity.
Even though the Constitution has not been adopted, it presents, in its terms, a reasonable template for our future development. Article 1.1 was exhaustively discussed and it simply states that any European country that subscribes to promoting the Union’s values is eligible for accession. It did not define what it is meant by “European”, but it is a geographic concept that has been interpreted to include states that are potentially within the border of the continent. The values, too, are set out in Article 2 as being “Respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy the rule of law” and “respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities”. The objectives set out in Article 3 include, “Promoting cohesion and solidarity and respect for the rich cultural and linguistic diversity of the Member States”. These all seem to be an expression of identity that has a real meaning.
I believe that the meaning of these values and objectives have a particular – and shared – European interpretation. It is not intended to be divisive or disparaging to suggest that this interpretation is different to that applied in other parts of the world. Our cultures may be distinct, but our development has gradually brought us together in a unique way which we can build upon. The late Hugo Young once wrote in The Guardian about our European cultures “It is helpful to learn that there are not rival cultures a zero sum game of allegiance, but that they mingled and grew together.” We should seek to continue that process of growing together.

This article was first published in the autumn issue of Studies.