The European Union, and the entire world, have changed substantially since the latest elections to the European Parliament in 2014. At that time, Europe was still reeling from the social consequences of the euro crisis, and there were fears that the currency would not survive. Today, after a lost decade, the EU’s GDP is back to pre-crisis levels. However, there are wide disparities from one country to another. The burden of adjustment should have been better distributed between debtors and creditors. The outcome has not been good for European cohesion, with heightened inequality in many countries and a North-South divide that weakens the mutual trust required to advance on political union. A decade ago, we had yet to see the crisis of refugees from the Near East, or the huge increase in migratory flows from Africa. This is a problem that could become the most corrosive force weakening the union among Europeans, and which has sparked a confrontation between Eastern European countries – plus Italy – and those of the West.
Since 2014 the world has undergone many geopolitical changes. The United Kingdom has voted in a referendum to leave the EU. Trump’s America is cutting its ties with Europe, abandoning multilateralism, breaking with the Paris climate change agreements and the Iranian nuclear agreement, and championing protectionism. China is setting itself up as a defender of free trade, and Russia is emerging as a military power. The threat of terrorism persists. The internal adversaries of a free, collaborative and united Europe now have powerful external allies.
What is the future of this EU, which – according to the latest Eurobarometer – 68% of the population believes has been positive for their country (75% in the case of Spain), even though 50% say that they are not happy with its current direction? Perhaps this EU was a 20th- century invention to resolve intra-European problems in a bipolar world that had yet to become globalised. An invention that made it possible to overcome the antagonisms that had wrought so much death and destruction. Nevertheless, the goal of maintaining peace is no longer enough, above all for the younger generation, whilst the memory of war is fading, even from the minds of those who lived through it.
This is why, faced with the rise of these external threats and internal problems, doubts are arising regarding the permanence of this great postwar project.
And yet, if the EU did not exist, we would still have to invent it. However, for it to survive we must re-invent it, making it more united and thus stronger. This compels the EU to speak with one voice, to act with the logic of a global power: with strong cooperative relations with its nearest neighbours, especially Africa; with more robust and inclusive growth; with converging national economies; and able to win the battle of technological innovation.
The upcoming European elections will be the acid test of the EU’s future. Their outcome will show the inroads made by those who reject European integration – whether from the right or the left. This is the fault of populisms, we say, using this catch-all term to paper over the different expressions of public disaffection with an EU legitimised more by its achievements than by its decision-making processes.
What if, to combat populisms, we had to make Europe more popular? In other words, to promote an image of Europe as a powerful defence in the face of concerns over globalisation and the resurging ghosts of nationalism. This is why, in every country, pro-European political leaders must convince their citizens that a stronger future is dependent on stronger unity. That no nation on its own can have an impact on the world’s problems. That Europe begins at home, because the decision-makers in Brussels are not extraterrestrials; rather, they were each elected and sent there by each country. And that we must combat fallacies such as the idea of freeing ourselves from the “yoke of Brussels” as a supposed miracle cure for all our ills.
But forming a more perfect union, which necessarily entails pooling risks and opportunities, also calls for greater participation in decision-making, and more democratic control. Historically, European integration has been achieved through agreements between the national political elites, with the “permissive consensus” of their citizens. But those days are over. Today, people are more aware – which is good news – of the importance of the decisions made in Brussels. However, many people feel (rightly or wrongly) that they have no influence over these decisions. They do not know who is responsible for what, nor what legitimises the actions taken by the EU institutions in which their governments exercise shared sovereignty.
We must give them reasons to see the EU as an instrument for shared prosperity that favours an equitable distribution of wealth, and increases their influence in the world.
And we must acknowledge that, from this standpoint, the EU’s performance over the past decade has not been very satisfactory. And this explains the disaffection of so many citizens. We must not take refuge in a euro-sanctimonious attitude, nor be unwilling to criticise certain EU policies. Still, we must explain that criticisms of EU policies are not always fair. There are restrictions on our sovereignty which we mistake for impositions from Brussels. However, these restrictions stem from the growing interdependence of a globalised world, and from the European Treaties which we have accepted in an exercise of our sovereignty.
We have also reached the end of a system in which the EU took care of macroeconomics and the Member States took care of distributing income. A system in which a liberalising EU promoted competitiveness and eradicated national economic barriers, while the Member States used redistributive policies to protect – for better or for worse – the losers in this process of European economic liberalisation and globalisation.
Aware of the inequalities that could not be fully alleviated by national redistributive policies, Jacques Delors launched the cohesion funds – a Spanish initiative – to favour economic convergence between EU countries. However, European economies have diverged in the past 10 years, losing ground with regard to their pre-crisis convergence.
The economic crisis, with its lasting scars of inequality and impoverishment of the middle class, as well as the fears provoked and fuelled by immigration, have generated a nationalist, populist, and extremist backlash. The losers of globalisation, feeling defenceless, have sought refuge in what they know best: the nation-state. And they have done this by embracing identity politics.
The union of all Europeans needs to have a social, protective dimension if we want citizens to get back on board with the European project. It is difficult to imagine the long-term sustainability of a monetary union without a budget that has redistributive, stabilising effects to mitigate asymmetric shocks. We need to strike a new balance between the monetary dimension of European economic policy, which cannot always do everything, and its fiscal dimension. To this end, we must also abandon the rule of unanimity on tax issues and foreign policy.
We need a social Europe. However, we cannot proclaim grandiose social goals with a budget equivalent to 1% of European GDP. If we do not have the capacity to finance these goals, they will only lead to frustration and disaffection.
Not being able to rely on the American military umbrella could actually be an opportunity for us to develop European strategic capabilities. The response to “America First” must be “Europe United”. The major cultural challenge of our time is to build societies that are both open and cohesive. The EU must show its citizens that it can protect them better and create more opportunities than reactionary nationalism and closed economies.
In order to do this, we must be strong. And strength, in a world dominated by political and economic giants, can only come from unity. Embracing a federal model, and accepting a differentiated process of integration among the Member States (because not all of them will be equally committed) is the only way to achieve this goal.
* Originally published in El País, 25 October 2018