No one with a minimum knowledge of the issues at stake could hope that the World Climate Conference (COP15) in Copenhagen would allow to reach a truly binding agreement between the parties.
It is enough to remember that Barack Obama (the main actor and performer of the “green” turning point of the post-Bush era) was taking part in the negotiations with his hands tied, as he could not afford to offend the Congress, before which essential reforms for his presidency were in delicate balance (among which the Healthcare Reform and the American Clean Energy and Security Act).
However, one should greet as a positive step the fact that, for the first time, the major polluting countries (namely China and the United States) took part in the Summit with the intention of assuming direct responsibilities, no longer denying or underestimating the global effects of the planet warming, acknowledged as the consequence of human activity.
In spite of this, the results achieved remain quite insufficient in front of the gravity of the issues and the time available to solve them.
One was hoping that the Copenhagen Summit would allow to establish a two-step process, i.e. a first one to be implemented in Copenhagen, that would allow at least to set common behaviours and aspirations as well as clear objectives, spaced over a definite time period; and postponing to a later stage the implementation of targets, decision-making and control mechanisms as well as legal commitments.
The agreement reached only contains the general proposal of limiting to 2°C the increase of the Earth average temperature, along with the financial aid to the poorest countries, amounting to 30 billion dollars for the three-year period 2010-2012 and 100 billion dollars per year from 2020 onward.
Besides the lack of binding commitments, no reference is made to the objectives of CO2 emission reduction set by the IPCC – Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (-25% compared to 1990 levels by 2020 and -50% by 2050).
Furthermore, the funds allocated to the development of clean technologies in underdeveloped countries for the three-year period 2010-2012 are significantly lower than those usually deemed necessary; no commitments were made for the period following 2012 and, in this context, the promises for the 2020-onward period have no value and cannot be taken into serious consideration.
The form of the agreement and the way it was approved arouse significant perplexity and concern. Until Copenhagen, the negotiations were always supervised by the United Nations and the documents were drafted or adopted by the UN Secretary.
In Copenhagen, on the contrary, five countries (United States, China, India, Brazil and South Africa) made a choice for all, leaving the others (Europe and Japan in the first place) in front of the alternative of accepting the deal or not having any.
They discussed between themselves, drafted and finally agreed on the “Copenhagen Accord” whilst the UN Assembly (the Conference of the Parties) merely acknowledged the signature of the agreement.
The procedure followed in Copenhagen represents a further loss of credibility for the United Nation and an affront to the current Secretary-General.
During the negotiations, all the major actors played with a stacked deck, being only concerned with the protection of the national interest and sovereignty of their respective countries1.
Europe, which had fulfilled all the necessary requirements by implementing a consistent climatic policy and setting suitable and binding objectives for CO2 emission reduction within 2020 (-20% / 30% compared to 1990), was not able to occupy the leadership position which should have been its due, considering its overall economic and geopolitical importance.
Once again, it appeared clearly that the European Union is an “economic giant but a political dwarf” as it still lacks a federal government capable of acting and speaking with a single voice.
The European Union thus had to give up the idea of occupying the leading position that it deserved for its history and its capacity to show the world the method to be used when the States have to face jointly issues that reach beyond national boundaries.
Europe, through its inability and inadequacy, is therefore also responsible if the Copenhagen Summit was not able to arouse the awareness that climate stabilisation (and, more generally, natural environment) is a public property for the whole planet.
Climate and natural environment must be protected jointly by the major polluting countries, through common institutions capable of making decisions and having the appropriate means to implement those decisions.
International agreements are not suitable to govern jointly complex situations in constant evolution such as climate and global environmental issues.
Jean Monnet, one of the founding fathers of the European Union, used to say “there is an unfathomable difference between negotiating an international agreement and facing a common issue. In the first case, each party brings its own issue to the negotiating table. In the second case, there is a single issue which is the same for all parties, and everyone brings to the negotiating table not its own issue, but the wisdom to find a solution to the common issue”.
The experience of the European unification process has shown that progress was made when there was the will to face a common issue and, vice versa, the situation remained stalemated when the intergovernmental agreement method was adopted.
The experience of European integration should be transposed at worldwide level whenever we are faced with an issue on a global scale, such as climate stabilisation, that must be solved jointly by the main countries of the world.
Other targets have been programmed in 2010, after Copenhagen. To prepare for these targets, the International community must change its patterns and ways of thinking, inverting the increasingly strong tendency to re-nationalise international cooperation.
The International community must not only pursue goals and undertake binding obligations to be implemented gradually, within a well-defined period of time. It must also acquire a tool that is essential to govern jointly the global environmental issues, setting up a World Environmental Organisation – based on the European Carbon and Steel Community (ECSC) model – capable of making decisions, supervised by an independent High Authority under the aegis of the UN, and having appropriate financial resources to implement the decisions made.
This new World Organisation should be entrusted with the task of continuously monitoring the climate changes and the fulfilment of the undertaken obligations; encouraging technological exchanges; coordinating and developing technological innovation; assisting the developing countries with suitable financial and technological support to allow them to comply with the emission reduction parameters for climatic and environmental improvement.
Its financial means (amounting to $100 billion a year) should derive from automatic revenues, through the institution at worldwide level, by the main polluting countries, of a world carbon tax intended as a consumption tax on fossil fuels or as a “world” addition to the national equivalent duty, if any.
This world carbon tax should provide for different rates:
- between fossil fuels, according to their different carbon content
- between the states, taking into account the per capita emissions of each country, for equity purposes.
The world carbon tax would generate a double dividend: on the one hand, it would discourage the use of fossil fuels and, on the other hand, it would deduct from the states’ budgets (already significantly indebted as a consequence of the economic and financial crisis) the financing of climate stabilisation, imposing it onto the polluting consumers.
The eventual promulgation of the above objectives at the next Conference (COP16), next year in Mexico City, would require the intervention of some extraordinary event capable of affecting deeply the willingness of the World’s decision-makers.
An event of this type could be represented by the involvement of civil society and the many NGOs acting in its name, which should join forces to sustain in a coordinated and united manner, a realistic and efficient World Environmental Plan focused on the project of creating a World Environmental Organisation, as proposed above.
1 The United States has proposed to reduce the CO2 emissions in the atmosphere by 17% compared to the current emissions, whereas the Kyoto Protocol (as well as the EU binding objectives) measures the reductions with reference to year 1990. In equivalent terms, the US proposition corresponds to a 4% reduction compared to the 1990 emissions. For its part, China has always avoided to make reference to any quantitative reductions of CO2 in the negotiations, and has merely mentioned the improvement of energy efficiency and reduction of its carbon intensity. Carbon intensity is the emissions / GDP ratio and must not be confused with emission reduction. In fact, the increase of the Gross Domestic Product can easily compensate for the reductions resulting from efficiency improvements, even though they appear significant (from the point of view of developed countries with growth rates much lower than that of China). India and Brazil have always made their commitment conditional on the granting of consistent financial support from more developed countries.